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A Profile of the Rural Poor 
 
Background Paper for Chapter 1: “Setting the Scene” 
IFAD Rural Poverty Report 2009 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This background paper has two objectives. First, it provides an overview of trends in the 
magnitude, location and nature of rural poverty, with emphasis on least developed 
countries. There is a large body of recent work that describes the trends in rural poverty 
across the globe, and this paper selects and distils the most relevant findings linked to 
the overall mandate and interests of IFAD in agricultural development for poverty 
alleviation. A starting point is IFAD’s Rural Poverty Report 2001. A recent synthesis of 
relevant information is available in the World Development Report 2008, spotlighting 
the role of agriculture in development generally and poverty reduction in particular. In 
doing so, the World Development Report gave much attention to the rural poor and the 
potential pathways out of poverty for the three types of countries: primarily agricultural, 
in transition, and urbanized. IFPRI sponsored a major conference in Beijing in October 
2007, “Taking Action for the World’s Poor and Hungary People,” where current issues, 
perceptions and evidence over a wide range of themes related to rural poverty were 
documented. And there have been some important recent studies coming both from 
academics as well as international agencies such as the FAO and other UN agencies.  
 
The second objective of this background paper is to offer new evidence that advances 
our understanding of rural poverty. It presents various quantitative analyses of the 
determinants both of rural activities and of income from farm- and non-farm sources. 
The analysis confronts the diverse nature of the problem of rural poverty by making use 
of household survey data from FAO’s Rural Income Generating Activities (RIGA) data 
base of 15 countries, complemented by demographic, health, production and income 
data from other sources, such as numerous national censuses and the WHO. The nature 
of poverty differs depending on the level of development of a country, on whether 
poverty is predominantly urban or rural, on the economic activities available to families, 
and on the access that families have to a range of assets. For the rural poor specifically, 
the distinction between sources of income is important for the identification of possible 
avenues through which policy and donor assistance can support raising household 
incomes: What is the degree of household dependence on farming? What are the 
opportunities for off-farm work and migration? And the access of rural families to 
education, land, and various forms of infrastructure will determine what households do 
and what incomes they can earn. Which household characteristics and assets are 
associated with specific occupations? Farming or agricultural labour? Farm work or 
non-farm work? Which are associated with higher incomes? And how does the 
relationship between assets and economic activity, and between assets and income, vary 
across the spectrum of countries, regions and level of development? 
 
The Section 2 of this background paper provides an overview of some broad, recent 
trends, issues and potential challenges related to the rural economy and the alleviation 
of rural poverty. The section discusses the world demographic changes and future of 
food demand and trade, the role biofuels in food price trends, where WTO agricultural 
trade negotiations stand, and recent thinking about the future of the small farm. Section 
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3 examines in more detail the evolution of rural poverty and food security indicators, 
using IFAD’s RPR 2001 as a point of reference. It presents broad regional trends, 
development and urbanization, demographic considerations related to gender and 
changes in dependents per worker in households, and the relation between marginalized 
groups and poverty. Poverty correlates with family and personal characteristics, such as 
education levels, age and gender of household heads, the number of dependents within 
the family, and access to infrastructure important for sanitation and health. Trends in 
some key demographic variables describing the poor and rural populations are presented 
to give a sense of the environment in which appropriate pro-poor policies must contend 
in the future. 
 
Section 4 looks at who are the rural poor and what do they do. Based on survey and 
other data sources, rural poverty profiles for several countries are presented, focusing on 
household characteristics and access to assets. The discussion then turns to linking 
principal activities and incomes of the rural poor to family characteristics and assets, 
specifically education, land and infrastructure. The section turns to emphasizing the 
relationship between family assets and the probability of being poor, and classifies 
households in a typology based on access to different bundles of assets. This 
information is relevant for the design of interventions – government, NGOs and private 
– determining the most efficient targeting and coverage. The section ends with a 
discussion of the role of rural labour markets and what we know about participation by 
workers in those markets in farm and non-farm employment. 
 
Section 5 discusses the changing income sources of the rural poor as the rural economy 
evolves and countries develop. It presents an analysis of the share of household income 
deriving from agriculture as family income increases, and compares rural households 
across countries at different stages of development. Section 6 present some concluding 
remarks regarding the policy challenges to reducing rural poverty. 
 
2. Broad issues and challenges for the developing world and rural poverty 
alleviation 
 
Future of food demand: population and income growth in the developing world, 
growing intra-developing-country trade 
 
One major factor driving future growth in food demand and potential absolute levels of 
poverty is demography. The world’s population is expected to grow between 2010 and 
2030 by about 20 percent, from 6.9 to 8.3 billion. And by 2050, the global population is 
projected to reach 9.2 billion. The bulk of this increase in population will be in 
developing countries. As shown in Table 1, the 50 least-developed countries are 
expected to grow in population by 50 percent by 2030 and double by 2050, reaching 1.7 
billion people. The population of Sub-Saharan African countries – the majority of which 
are least developed – also is expecting to increase by 51 percent. The population of less 
developed countries (excluding the least developed) will increase nearly 20 percent, 
from 4.8 billions in 2010 to 5.7 billions in 2030. Among the less developed countries, 
China is expected to grow slightly less than 8 percent, while India to grow 23.4 percent. 
In fact, by 2030, the population of India would overtake that of China. In the developed 
world, growth rates are expected to be much more modest; the population of high 
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income countries is projected to grow by only 2 percent between 2010 and 2030, also 
the expected increase for Western Europe. Some rich countries – notably Japan – will 
have declines in population, and only the United States among presently rich countries 
will show population increases, approximately equal to that of the world’s growth 
percentage. Notably, Russia is projected to show a population decline of 8.5 percent 
from 140 million in 2010 to 128 million in 2030, and a nearly 23 percent decline 
between 2010 and 2050. 
 
Urbanization – and the associated changes in consumption patterns – will also drive 
food demand. The world’s population growth will be clearly driven by developing 
countries, and urbanization will be particularly significant in the developing world. 
Urbanization rates in China, in less developed and in the world and are projected to 
reach 60 percent by 2030. In fact, urbanization rates in least developed countries will 
rise by about a third, from 29 percent to 41 percent.  
 
The final impact on food demand due to population increases and urbanization will be 
significantly influenced by income growth and the associated increase in demand for 
higher-valued products. At low levels of income, there is still a large impact of income 
growth on food expenditures. Food expenditure shares fall with income – a stylized fact 
known to economists as Engel’s Law, but at low levels of income, between $2 and $10 
per day, the Engel coefficients remain high for higher-valued products, such as meats, 
dairy, edible oils.1 With growth in incomes, food expenditures are moving from basic 
grains and other staple crops toward meats, dairy, vegetables, fruits and fish. And 
urbanization, income growth and openness to trade have exposed consumers in many 
developing countries to non-traditional foods, with a higher dependence on imports. 
Pingali (2006) notes that already in Asia there has been an increase in the consumption 
of wheat and wheat-based products, dairy products and temperate-zone fruits and 
vegetables, some imported. Further urbanization and income growth will reinforce these 
trends.  
 
Food demand – and indeed food production – for most products will, between 2007 and 
2016, increase faster in developing countries than in the OECD. Developing countries 
will increase both the production and consumption of beef, pork, milk and butter, sugar 
faster than developed countries. Only in the case of wheat are the trends in the 
production projected to be higher in OECD relative to non-OECD. Growth rates in the 
consumption and production of rice are similar. As developing countries grow in both 
population and income, increases in the imports of wheat are projected to be significant. 
The annual rate of growth in wheat production in non-OECD countries through 2016 is 
estimated at 0.5 percent; in contrast, the annual rate of consumption growth is estimated 
at 0.8 percent. But for all other major food categories, the growth rates of production in 
non-OECD countries are equal or greater than growth rates of consumption. Non-OECD 
countries taken together are likely – as a group – to be a net exporter of food products, 
but exports will come from a concentrated set of these non-OECD countries. There will 
be an increase in trade among non-OECD countries. In the case of wheat and dairy 
products, although some non-OECD countries will remain important exporters, major 
OECD exporters will remain dominant.  
 
                                                 
1 Beyond $10 dollars per day, consumers spend more on services attached to food, such as packaging, 
processing, and restaurants, and not on the raw materials. 
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Although land constraints may not pose an imminent threat from a global perspective, 
and despite the likelihood of technological improvements, in many densely populated 
countries available land will constrain farm production. Moreover, increased 
urbanization and industry will increasingly compete with agriculture over water 
resources. Because land and water resources are non-tradable and unevenly distributed 
among countries, international food trade will certainly increase over the next several 
decades – an increasingly larger share of world food production will move from 
producer to consumer through international trade. Given the foreseeable state of 
technology, some developing countries, such as in Latin America, will see food 
production outpace consumption. For many other countries, however, food imports as a 
share of consumption will likely increase. Increasing food import dependency becomes 
of concern for those least developed countries – not for middle-income countries – that 
are severely constrained as to their capacity to pay for these imports, but also that are 
sometimes facing severe internal infrastructure and distribution bottlenecks. 
 
OECD-FAO projections (OECD-FAO, 2007) show that beyond 2010 recent increases in 
commodity prices will stabilize after a slight decline. But world prices for wheat, rice 
and other cereals, oil seeds and vegetable oils, and sugar will remain considerably 
higher than at the turn of the century. Nevertheless, prices for cheese and poultry and 
pork are projected to increase and remain higher after stabilizing. Other milk products 
will likely be stable beyond 2008. In summary, world food prices in the near and 
medium future will likely remain higher than they were before 2006. The reader should 
note that these price projections are in US dollars. With the fall in the dollar relative to 
other currencies, nominal prices could continue increasing although not necessarily as 
rapidly in real terms. One can expect that the continued volatility of the dollar will have 
consequences for volatility in both dollar-denominated energy and food price 
fluctuations. In the past five years, dollar-denominated price variations in oil seeds, 
wheat and maize have doubled compared to previous decades, due in part to the growth 
of biofuels, a topic to which we now turn.  
 
The role of biofuels in food price trends 
 
During the last five years, an increasingly close connection has developed between the 
prices of energy and cereals crops. Certainly there have been recent concurrent 
increases in oil, wheat and corn prices, which have implications for raising food prices 
in developing countries. The extent of transmission of world prices to domestic prices in 
individual countries depends on specific trade and domestic policies, but there has 
definitely been an increase in the correlation of world energy and food prices, increasing 
the volatility of domestic consumer prices for food. This is particularly worrisome in the 
case of poor consumers. Von Braun notes that price variability in oilseeds, wheat and 
maize has doubled relative to previous decades.2 
 
Energy – and fertilizer – costs affect both the production and transport costs of 
agricultural goods, but also the growing demand for cereals in the production of biofuels 
means that oil prices will increasingly affect the opportunity costs of using grains for 
food, either directly as in the case of wheat or indirectly as in the case of feed grains. As 
                                                 
2 Von Braun, J. 2007. “The world food situation: New Driving forces and required actions, IFPRI’s 
Biannual Overview of the World Food Situation,” presented at the CGIAR Annual General Meeting, 
Beijing, December 4, 2007. 
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the use of cereals for energy grows the connection between petroleum and food prices 
grows stronger. Recently feed prices have been pushing up meat prices, which have 
nearly doubled since year 2000; and milk product prices have nearly tripled. The 
enhanced demand for feed grains for energy production is projected by the OECD-FAO 
to grow significantly over the next ten years, as seen in Table 2. Projections for maize 
devoted to ethanol production in the US alone see an anticipated 36 percent increase 
between 2007 and 2016. Although the US is by far the largest user of maize for ethanol, 
both Canada and the EU are also rapidly expanding their maize production for biofuels. 
 
Table 2 indicates that not only will maize demand shift outward due to increased biofuel 
production, but wheat and oilseeds in Canada and EU also will be increasingly diverted 
to direct energy production. For wheat in the EU, the projected increase in wheat 
devoted to biofuels between 2007 and 2016 is over 500 percent, and approximately 100 
percent for maize and oilseeds. Brazil’s use of sugar in ethanol production is already 
currently significant and expected to nearly double between 2007 and 2016. The 
relationship between sugar cane used in ethanol and food prices is less direct than in the 
case of grains, but sugar cane production does divert resources from the production of 
other crops.  
 
Biofuel production, especially the large related increase in the demand for maize in the 
US has contributed – along with other factors such as weather-related production 
declines – to a recent short-term increase in cereal prices. Further, the shift of maize 
production toward ethanol has impacted area planted to oilseeds, namely soybeans, 
increasing the price of this crop as well. Food prices have shifted upwards also in part 
due to a reduction in export subsidies (mainly in the EU), and in part due to increasing 
consumer demand related to population growth and incomes. In the medium term, until 
2016, OECD-FAO considers likely that the prices of grains, oilseed and sugar will 
moderate compared to their recent highs, but are unlikely to return to the secular 
declines seen over the past decades. Meat and dairy prices will likely remain at their 
recent high levels, due both to higher costs related to higher feed grain prices, but also 
importantly due to their higher sensitivity to income growth (compared to direct cereal 
products). 
 
From the point of view of possible impacts on food prices, of greater concern are the 
projections of IFPRI, based on its updated IMPACT model. IFPRI projects an increase 
of 26 percent in the price of maize and 18 percent in the price of oilseeds under a 
scenario based on currently-declared planned biofuel expansions. Under a scenario of a 
doubling of biofuel production relative to currently planned expansion, maize prices 
would rise by 72 percent and oilseeds by 44 percent. IFPRI further projects that under 
both of these scenarios food-calorie intakes will decrease (compared to baseline levels) 
across all regions in the developing world, with Sub-Saharan Africa suffering the most. 
OECD (2008) simulated projections for commodity price increases linked to 
hypothetical biofuel scenarios are more modest. Increases for sugar and maize are the 
largest, reaching 7 percent in the year 2020 for sugar under its “worst” scenario (no 
biofuel subsidies to other crops), and 12 percent for maize under its worst scenario 
(subsidies).3 But to what extent would these projections be modified – in terms of even 
                                                 
3 Under the subsidy scenario – where biofuel crops are given a 50% subsidy to stimulate crop production 
– sugar prices in 2020 are projected to rise by only 1.4% (due to an increase in the production of 
alternative sources of ethanol). Under a non-subsidy scenario maize prices are projected to rise by 5%. 
See OECD (2008), Environmental Outlook to 2030. 
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higher prices – under more liberalized trade policies if the WTO Doha Round were to 
succeed? 
 
Where do multilateral agricultural trade policy negotiations stand? 
 
Reforms of agricultural trade and subsidy policies would result in higher world prices 
for most commodities, yielding significant gains to developing countries from a 
farmer’s perspective (WDR 2008). But many developing countries are net importers of 
agricultural and food products, and their consumers, especially poor consumers, could 
face higher food costs. Although agricultural trade liberalization has been in some cases 
a unilateral decision of specific countries, most rich countries and several developing 
countries have been unwilling to embrace reforms outside the context of multilateral 
negotiations. Yet the future of international trade policy changes under WTO 
negotiations is uncertain, and negotiations are currently moving at a slow pace. But 
there has been some progress. As of February 2008, the draft agreement proposals for 
market access for agricultural and non-agricultural products represented advances on 
technical issues, although important high-profile questions remain unresolved. While 
agricultural trade reforms would be most relevant to the developing world’s farmers and 
consumers, agricultural negotiations are part of a “horizontal” process. Negotiations on 
issues related to trade in industrial goods still provoke deep divisions, delaying further 
progress on agriculture. It remains uncertain whether or not agreements can be attained 
in 2008, especially given the debate over revisiting past trade liberalizations now taking 
place in the U.S. presidential election campaign.  
 
During the last decades a trend has emerged, which continues to some degree, towards 
more bilateral agreements. This trend was and could continue being reinforced by a lack 
of progress in multilateral negotiations. These bilateral agreements, while indeed 
contributing to further integration of developing countries into the global economy, 
could nevertheless cement current trade patterns. On the positive side, they also open 
unanticipated trade channels that might not have otherwise occurred without these 
agreements.  
 
Despite the lack of progress in the WTO process and the slow pace of reforms in OECD 
countries, there have been important policy changes. There is a trend to separating 
(decoupling) producer supports from production incentives in the US and EU countries, 
reducing price distortion, mainly in grains. Also in many developing countries there has 
been a reduction in the anti-trade bias that once severely prejudiced agriculture. In 
general terms, developing countries are taxing their agricultural sectors less now then 
compared to the 1980s, although taxation remains on exportables and sometimes 
importables remain protected. Net intervention, however, has declined. For example, in 
Sub-Saharan Africa during the last twenty years the net taxation of agriculture declined 
from 28 percent to 10 percent (WDR 2008, p. 98). And over the last thirty years both 
China and India have reduced much of the anti-agriculture bias in trade and domestic 
price policies (WDR 2008, p. 102). 
 
The future of small farms and recent thinking about policies addressing rural poverty. 
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Agricultural production remains an important source of income for most of those living 
in rural areas and its growth will continue to be a mainstay of poverty alleviation. But 
most farms are small – indeed Anríquez and Bonomi (2007) estimate that roughly 9 of 
10 farms in the developing world are smaller than 2 hectares. In Latin America farms 
smaller than 2 hectares represent 27 percent of the total number of farms, and in China 
small farms make up 98 percent of the total. The average amount of a country’s 
farmland held by small farms ranges from 1 percent in Latin America to 56 percent in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. In South Asia small farms hold on average 47 percent, and 
worldwide they hold about 15 percent of total farmland area.4 Over time some countries 
have seen a notable increase in the share of total land held by small operations, 
especially in densely populated areas such as in India, Thailand, Pakistan and 
Bangladesh. In major part this is due to the increasing number of farms and their 
declining size given a fix supply of available land. Other countries with lower 
population densities and higher ratios of potential farmland to workers have seen a 
decline in this share, such as in Botswana, Brazil and Chile (see Figure 1). In Chile 
average size of small farms has declined with the decrease in the share of land held by 
small farms. In Botswana, on the other hand, while the share held has declined, average 
small farm size has increased, implying an expansion of total farmland area. 
 
We need to be cautious, however, about making these simple cross country comparisons 
given the problems of defining a common threshold for small farms. For example, a 
threshold of 2 hectares used in the Anríquez and Bonomi study is not very revealing in 
the case of most areas of Brazil and Chile, where such “farms” would be surveyed as 
production units, and perhaps indistinguishable from garden plots. But 2 hectares in 
Bangladesh could represent an economically viable operation, providing a reasonable 
livelihood in a low-income country. Areas with high population densities, such as in 
South and East Asia, naturally tend to have many smaller farms. And the fragmentation 
of farming places a limit on the total income available to small farm families, even 
threatening their economic viability. Even if these relatively small farming units can 
survive – although at subsistence levels – the total income potential is so limited, 
regardless of productivity, that unless households have access to off-farm income or 
remittances they will be unable to exit poverty. 
 
There will remain millions of small farmers for years to come. Especially in low-
incomes countries with agricultural based economies, a major challenge will be to 
enhance the productivity of these small operations. If an economy can rapidly generate 
non-farm activities, either rural or urban, then the pressure to aid small farms is much 
less; but realistically, most least-developed countries will not have this luxury in the 
near future. Moreover, the world is constantly changing, and the environment in which 
small farms must compete is likely to become more difficult. 
 
Are the prospects for improving the welfare of small farmers becoming worse? The 
globalization of markets, the concentration of marketing chains, the focus on quality 
control, and new technologies requiring large up-front investments all tend to give an 
advantage to larger enterprises. The so-called supermarket revolution, for example, has 
introduced more stringent requirements of producers for scale and timely delivery, 
                                                 
4 The reader should note that there is a large variation in the productive capacity per hectare of farmland, 
and farmland includes land devoted to field crops, plantations and pastures, irrigated and non-irrigated. So 
land distribution estimates unadjusted by productive capacity would likely overstate the concentration of 
land in larger operations. 
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standardized products, and the traceability along the marketing chain. As the marketing 
chain evolves in developing countries and the buyers of farm produce become more 
sensitive to changes in consumer demands, small farming operations will find that 
accessing commercial markets entails activities subject to steep scale economies. 
Certification, record keeping, the flexibility to respond to changing buyer requests all 
require fixed investments, the costs of which are only fully recuperated by spreading 
them over sufficiently large production volumes. As Boslie, Henson and Weatherspoon 
(2003) and Reardon and Timmer (2007) have noted, small farming operations have as a 
general rule not adapted well to these conditions, but there are some promising 
exceptions. Cooperatives and producer associations could be an institutional response to 
facilitate the incorporation of small farms into these marketing innovations. For 
example, the Indian Dairy Cooperatives Network has 12 million members and produces 
22 percent of India’s milk. Of the cooperatives membership, 60 percent are very small 
holders, many of whom are women, and many of whom are landless. Another example 
is that of the Colombian National Federation of Coffee Growers, with a membership of 
over 300 thousand with mostly small plantations of under 2 hectares. This association 
not only assists in marketing services, but also provides production assistance, finances 
research and development, and even invests in rural roads and electrification in coffee-
growing communities. 
 
While the spread of supermarkets – and the de-linking of domestic consumption from 
domestic supply – are beneficial to consumers, small-scale farming is likely to become 
less competitive. In a more flexible economy, the human and capital resources in 
uncompetitive firms would flow to more profitable enterprises, but in many developing 
countries resources – especially human resources above a certain age – are likely to 
remain on ever-less-profitable small farms. The younger are more mobile, but their 
mobility depends on the human capital they can carry with them – that is, education.  
 
The policy response to emerging trends 
 
Commodity prices are likely to remain high for at least a few years. While this new 
price environment benefits many small farms, one question is whether or not they 
benefit more than larger operations. The answer is not obvious: small farmer operators 
are constrained to a greater extent in their access to credit, services and markets. The 
ability to take advantage of higher world prices through the expansion of production is 
therefore limited. Small farms could overcome these restrictions through market 
arrangements, such as contract farming, but such an outcome is likely only in the case 
of certain products. From a longer term perspective the response of small farms to trade 
opportunities will depend on each country’s policy environment.   
 
Over time, a list of basic challenges for rural development policy aimed at the 
alleviation of rural poverty has been distilled from experience and emphasized by 
IFAD: 
 
• Access to key natural resources for agriculture: land, water. 
• Access to technologies, services and institution to improve productivity: 
technical assistance, extension services, R&D, credit, insurance. 
• Access to input, output, land, credit markets 
• Access to a variety of income sources in the farm and non-farm economy: 
labour, non-farm self-employment, migration and remittances. 
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• Better policy and governance. 
 
The first three are oriented toward agricultural production, still the most important 
economic activity in poor rural areas. The fourth – and perhaps most important in the 
longer run – is oriented to household income-earning activities beyond the farm, either 
as part of a portfolio of income sources or as a means of non-farm specialization. The 
fifth is overarching, a political economic challenge applicable to all rural activities and 
key to economic growth more generally. 
 
To confront the challenges related to agricultural production and to enhance 
governance, the World Development Report 2008 (Chapter 6) identifies some key 
institutional innovations:  
 
• The improvement of the security of property rights and the facilitation of 
land transfers. The latter would help rural families “adjust their livelihood 
strategies” – both in terms of rural activities as well as out-migration. 
• The enhancement of credit and savings opportunities and the ability to make 
money transfers. 
• The promotion of greater efficiency in input markets, particularly seeds and 
fertilizers.  
• The encouragement of farmer organizations, including cooperatives, that 
might better be able to take advantage of scale economies, both in input 
purchases and in accessing markets. 
 
Useful as they are, translating these general guidelines into practical applications in a 
country and even within regions of a country requires some judgement of the efficacy of 
particular instruments, which in turn requires ex post evaluations. Unfortunately 
rigorous evaluations at the level of individual countries are scarce. Such evaluations are 
important, however, given the heterogeneity of small farms throughout the world in 
terms of poverty levels, productivity, soil fertility, and access to infrastructure and 
markets. 
 
This heterogeneity stems in part from the natural resource base and geography, but also 
in part from the approach governments take to expenditures on public goods. The 
infrastructure of a country, such as telecommunications and transport, and the support 
network of finance, research and extension determine the ability of small farmers to take 
advantage of opportunities in both domestic and international markets. The role of 
government in providing public goods is well established, but the performance of 
governments is often disheartening.  
 
Two notable examples well illustrate the importance of the efficiency of government 
spending in rural areas. Fan, Hazell and Thorat (1999) find in India that investment in 
roads has had the greatest impact on poverty reduction and has enhanced agricultural 
productivity, while research and extension spending has had the largest impact on 
productivity and only indirectly significant positive effects on poverty. Irrigation 
spending, on the other hand, has had a large effect on productivity, but an insignificant 
effect for poverty reduction. Fan Zhang and Zhang (2002) show that for China 
infrastructure development was a key to reducing rural poverty. For Western China the 
most effective incremental expenditures were on agricultural R&D, education, roads, 
and electricity. In the case of both India and China, the growth of rural non-farm 
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employment, which depends on infrastructure services, was also an important source of 
poverty reduction. These results are in line with the famous Ravallion and Datt (1999) 
household study for India showing that the growth in non-farm activities was important 
to lifting families out of poverty, once one accounted for literacy, availability of 
infrastructure, and initial poverty levels. 
There has been a growing awareness of the role of complementarities between policy 
instruments in helping reduce poverty. Escobal and Torero (2004), for example, look at 
the complementarities of infrastructure services in Peru, finding that rural households 
have greater income potential and a lower chance of being poor if they have access to 
rural water, electricity, telephone, and road infrastructure. With telephones and roads, 
households increase their work time significantly as well as diversify income sources. 
Families without access to any infrastructure spent on average 85 percent of their time 
on farming, but with access to at least two services their farm work time fell to an 
average of 55 percent of their time. There is, however, low infrastructure coverage in 
rural Peru: only 5 percent of rural families have access to all four services, and 74 
percent have access to only one or none. Synergies exist between types of 
infrastructures; introducing both services together increases income by more then each 
separately.  Making all infrastructure services available to the 30% currently without 
access to any service could contribute to moving a half a million Peruvians out of 
poverty. (World Bank, 2005, Beyond the City, p. 195). 
 
A policy of providing better infrastructure would also influence the accumulation of 
human capital, improving both schooling and health. Araujo (2003) finds poverty levels 
were reduced in semi-urban and rural Mexico due to public investments in education 
and road infrastructure that promote the growth of non-farm labour demand. These 
investments reduce poverty in semi-urban areas via encouraging manufacturing 
employment growth. And such investments have poverty alleviation effects via service 
employment growth in both rural and urban areas, but especially in rural areas.  
 
As a general proposition, improved road networks, and the consequent improvement in 
local transportation and safety, leads to improved school attendance. The wider 
accessibility of electricity in rural areas produces a range of benefits, but one in 
particular – more time for school study – improves school performance. Better 
education and health care facilities lead to greater opportunities for employment, which 
leads ultimately to higher rural household incomes. Deolalikar (2001) shows that 
investments in road infrastructure in poor areas in Vietnam have improved access to – 
and use of – public health facilities, and increased secondary school enrolments. 
Certainly, as Leipziger, et al. (2003) for example document in a cross-country study, 
investments in water and sanitation reduce infant, child, and maternal mortality. They 
also increase schooling attainment. Differences in health outcomes between the rich and 
the poor are linked to infrastructure coverage. About 25 percent of the difference in 
infant mortality rates – and 37 percent of the difference in child mortality rates – of the 
poorest and riches quintiles is explained simply by access to water.5  
 
The bottom line for the challenges facing rural poverty reduction is that policies should 
concentrate both on improving household activities already available – most 
                                                 
5 For more on the complementarities in public investments for improving poor household welfare 
between infrastructure services, education, and rural non-farm employment see Reardon et al. (2000) and 
Chong and Hentschel (1999). 
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prominently farming – via enhancing productivity and access to markets, and on 
expanding the range of potential activities of family members. The lesson from 
experience and much of the rural development literature is that the income generating 
potential – the ability to access and take advantage of activities – depends crucially on 
access to assets, such as education, land, and infrastructure. In order to better understand 
from this perspective the situation of rural households today, the next section turns first 
to the discussion of the extent of rural poverty and then to some detailed analysis of 
household surveys. These data allow an assessment of the income-earning activities of 
rural poor families and permit an analysis of the relationship between the participation 
in different activities, the corresponding potential incomes, and the access to the assets 
that allow households to take advantage of available opportunities. 
 
3. Rural poverty in the developing world: numbers and trends 
Broad regional trends  
 
The population of developing countries is estimated at approximately 5.2 billion, about 
20 percent of which – 977 million in 2004 – are estimated to be living on less than $1 a 
day; over 51 percent, or 2.6 billion people, are living on less that $2 a day (Chen and 
Ravallion, 2007).6 Approximately 3 billion people in the developing world live in rural 
areas, about 30 percent of which are living on less than $1 a day. In contrast, the urban 
poverty rate is around 13 percent. But while the urban poverty rate in developing 
countries has remained fairly constant over the last decade, the rural poverty rate has 
fallen from 37 percent (from slightly more than a billion people in 1993) to 
approximately 30 percent (890 million in 2002). Using the $2-a-day line, the rural 
poverty rate fell from 78 percent to 70 percent (note that by excluding China the 
incidence of poverty decreases in 1993 and increases in 2002.) 
 
There are some notable regional differences in the evolution of poverty during the last 
two decades, as can be seen in Figure 2. The fall in the number of world’s poor is in 
large part due to economic growth in East Asia, especially in China; while poverty rates 
in South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa continue high and fairly stable, with the absolute 
number of the poor increasing in these regions. Figure 3 emphasizes regional 
differences in trends in the number of persons in poverty.7 Most importantly for the 
decline in the total number of poor in the world, the number of East Asia’s – China’s – 
poor declined strongly during the 1990s. During the mid-1980s (using the $1-a-day 
standard) China’s number of poor accounted for approximately a third of all poor and 
the region’s share of the world total was over two-fifths. In 2004, China accounted for 
13 percent and the region for 17 percent. In Lain America the number of poor rose 
slightly until the year 2000, and with a decline since; the population share of the poor 
has been stable if not declining. 
 
South Asia’s number of poor, by contrast, remained fairly stable, with effectively no 
change in the count using the $1-a-day line, and a slight rise using $2-a-day. Rising 
overall populations of course led to a decline in the share of this region’s population 
living in poverty. But the region’s share of the world total living on less than $1 a day 
                                                 
6 See also Chen and Ravallion, (2004). 
7 See S. Chen and M. Ravallion, “Absolute Poverty Measures for the Developing World, 1981–2004,” 
Policy Research Working Paper 4211 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2007). 
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grew from slightly over a third during the mid-1980s to 46 percent in 2004. Less 
encouragingly, in Sub-Saharan African countries the numbers of poor increased, 
although less rapidly in the case of the $1-a-day count compared to the $2-a-day count. 
Nevertheless, there was progress in terms of reducing poverty rates using both 
standards, especially using the $1-a-day line. But the region is falling behind other 
developing countries taken together; its share of the world total increased from 16 
percent to 31 percent between 1984 and 2004, and this share will certainly continue to 
grow during the coming decade. 
 
Historically in the developing world poverty has been concentrated in rural areas, and as 
Figure 4 shows rural areas continue to hold the greatest share of the poor in all regions 
except for the Latin America and the Caribbean region. And across all regions the 
incidence of poverty is greater in rural areas than in urban, strikingly so in East Asia and 
the Mid East and North Africa, as seen in Figure 5. 
 
Box 
Poverty dynamics 
 
Earlier on we described changes in poverty over time.  However, trends over time tell us 
little about the determinants of poverty dynamics at either the macro or micro level; that 
is what economic and policy factors are driving changes in poverty, and what is 
happening at the household level.  
 
Drivers of poverty reduction at the country level 
 
At the macro level, recent research has focused on the links between economic growth, 
inequality and poverty reduction, and the role of policy in maximizing the impact of 
economic growth on poverty reduction. Here we look at the recent experience of three 
countries: Brazil, China and Mexico. 
 
Brazil has experienced little reduction in poverty rates over the last 20 years. From 1985 
to 2004, the headcount index fell only four percentage points, from 33 to 29 percent 
(Box Figure 1). All of this reduction was located in rural areas; the poverty headcount 
index in urban areas remained unchanged. This disappointing record was due not only 
to low growth rates over this period (average annual growth in per capita GDP of less 
then .5 percent), but a low growth elasticity of poverty reduction, which is consistent 
with Brazil’s high level of inequality. The sectoral and geographic pattern of growth, 
and the limited ability of the poor to benefit from this growth, contributed to the slow 
pace of poverty reduction (Ferreira, et al, 2007). 
 
Recent research has focused on why this elasticity is so low. The sectoral composition 
of growth is relevant; prior to 1994, growth in the services sector was more poverty-
reducing then agriculture or industry. Further, growth was more pro-poor in states with 
lower levels of infant mortality and higher levels of worker unionization.  Critically, 
policy is important in three ways: by affecting the sectoral composition of growth, by 
affecting the sensitivity of poverty to growth in each sector, and by affecting 
macroeconomic policy and wealth redistribution. Policy reform in the mid 1990s 
stopped hyperinflation and liberalized trade—increasing the poverty reducing role of 
growth in the agricultural and industrial sectors (Ferreira, et al, 2007). Improved 
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targeting and increased spending on social pension and assistance programs helped 
reduce poverty as well as inequality (Neri, 2005 and 2006; Soares, 2006; and Kakwani, 
et al, 2006).  
 
Box Figure 1. The evolution of Brazilian poverty rates by head count. 
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Source: Ferreira, et al (2007) calculation using IpeaData time series and PNAD. 
 
 
China has made extraordinary progress in reducing poverty over the last 20 years; the 
incidence of poverty in the world’s largest country has dropped from over 50 percent in 
1981 to 8 percent in 2001 (Box Figure 2). Poverty reduction has been particularly 
spectacular in rural areas, dropping from over 76 to 13 percent. While migration to 
urban areas has helped reduce the national incidence of poverty, most poverty reduction 
has occurred in rural areas. Not surprisingly, while overall economic growth has played 
a key role in the long term reduction of poverty, the sectoral composition of growth also 
matters: growth in agriculture had a much stronger poverty reducing impact then the 
manufacturing or service sectors.  Policy reform spurred this growth; most importantly, 
agrarian reform and lower taxes on farmers were key to agricultural growth and poverty 
reduction in rural areas. Controlling inflation and increased public spending also played 
an important role. However, rapid economic growth has lead to rising inequality, and 
this inequality may hinder further reductions in poverty. China may not be able to 
maintain its past success unless it deals with the problem of rising inequality (Ravallion 
and Chen, 2007). 
 
Poverty trends in Mexico show the debilitating impact of economic crisis (Box Figure 
3). The poverty headcount had decreased during the late 1980s and early 1990s, but 
skyrocketed in both urban and rural areas following the 1995 economic crisis and 
devaluation. The effect was devastating; it took approximately 6 years for the incidence 
of poverty to return to pre-crisis levels. The relatively high levels of poverty in rural 
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areas up to 2005 are due primarily to low productivity in agriculture and stagnant rural 
wages, and high levels of inequality has limited further poverty reduction. These 
phenomena were to some extent offset by the increase in transfers, public and private, 
improved targeting of public expenditure in rural areas, and the expansion in rural non-
farm activities.  
 
Box Figure 2. The evolution poverty rates by head count in China. 
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Source: Ravallion and Chen, (2007) 
 
Box Figure 3. The evolution of Mexican food poverty rates by head count. 
 
Source: Urzua, et al (2007) 
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Poverty dynamics and the micro level 
 
There are two important dimensions to poverty dynamics at the micro level. First, recent 
research has shown gradual poverty trends often mask significant movements in and out 
of poverty at the household or individual level, implying that both transient and chronic 
poverty are present. Second, and related to these poverty movements, is how one 
distinguishes between transient and chronic poverty. How do we determine whether a 
household’s poverty status reflects a temporary drop in income due to some 
idiosyncratic shock, or whether it reflects a longer term inability to maintain a sufficient 
standard of living?   
 
This distinction is important as these two types of poverty reflect different situations 
and require different policies (see Jalan and Ravallion, 1998, 2000; McCulloch and 
Baulch, 2000; Hume and Shepard, 2003; Barrett, 2005). Transient poverty (also referred 
to in the literature as the temporary or stochastic poor) is occasional in nature and may 
be tackled by safety nets, income-smoothing programs or insurance which help 
households to transfer resources from good to bad periods of the lifecycle and survive 
and/or avoid temporary shocks in terms of jobs, health or weather. As such the transient 
poor may represent a diverse group, even with the same country or region. Chronic 
poverty requires structural intervention focused on growth and in particular on 
development of human capital, infrastructure and business-related assets, as well as the 
socio-economic and institutional context in which these are used. The particular nature 
of both transient and chronic poverty varies by country and context, as well as by 
available data and definition used.  
 
This was described in the 2001 Rural Poverty Report, along with an annex that 
reviewed the then most recent literature in terms of poverty dynamics. Developments in 
the study of poverty dynamics since then have focused primarily in two directions. First, 
work has continued regarding the documentation of poverty dynamics and the relevance 
of transient and chronic poverty, for the most part confirming earlier hypotheses. 
Second, and more importantly in policy terms, conceptual and empirical work has 
advanced in the study of threshold effects and poverty traps, which has given new 
understanding to the policy challenges faced when dealing with chronic poverty.  
 
Identifying these poverty dynamics and differentiating between transitory and chronic 
poverty is difficult due to data limitations. Analysis of poverty dynamics requires panel 
data (visiting the same household or individual) for at least three years, although limited 
analysis can be carried out with a two year panel dataset. Much of the empirical analysis 
of long term poverty dynamics has been carried out in developed countries, since these 
kinds of data sets are relatively rare in developing countries.   
 
Two standard approaches are used for discerning between transient and chronic poverty 
in panel data. The spells approach identifies, often through the use of hazard models, the 
chronic poor based on the number and/or length of poverty spells.8 The component 
approach distinguishes “permanent” household income from its transitory variations, 
                                                 
8 See Bane and Ellwood (1986) and Stevens (1994, 1999) for early applications in developed countries, 
and McCullough (1999) and Denisova (2007) for more recent applications in developing and transition 
countries.  
 17
typically using multivariate regression techniques.9 A more recent third approach is the 
Stages-of-Progress methodology, which combines participatory techniques with sample 
surveys (see Krishna, 2004). 
 
In terms of recent research from the few multiple year panel datasets that do exist, as 
well as a larger number of two-year panels, recent research on poverty dynamics in 
developing countries has demonstrated the following consistent empirical findings:  
 
• Gradual trends in poverty mask a lot of movement in and out of poverty. 
While some of this apparent movement may be due to measurement error (see 
discussion in Barrett, 2005), it reflects the reality that poverty is not a static 
phenomenon and that there are different types of poverty, with the most 
important difference being between transient and chronic poverty (Deininger 
and Okidi, 2002; McCulloch and Calandrino, 2003; Haddad and Ahmed, 2003; 
Krishna, 2007; Barrett, et al, 2006).  
• Escaping and entering poverty are not symmetric in terms of 
determinants. Shocks (health, funeral, weather, employment, etc) are key 
determinants in terms of falling into poverty (Bigsten, et al, 2003; Krishna, 
2007; Barrett, et al, 2006). 
• Rural non-farm activities are a key route out of poverty, but many of the 
rural poor that exit remain rural and in agriculture (McCulloch, et al, 2007; 
Gonzalez-Vega et al 2004; Davis, et al, 2007).  
• Chronic poverty reflects low levels of assets, or persistent low returns to 
assets. Particularly, and consistently important, are low levels of education 
(including illiteracy), large household size (and presence of small children), 
location (rural, and particularly remote rural areas) and physical assets (see 
review in Mckay and Lawson, 2003; Denisova, 2007). 
• Threshold effects and poverty traps are an important dimension of 
chronic poverty (Barrett, et al, 2006; Barrett, 2005). 
Rural poverty, economic development and urbanization 
 
The recent World Development Report 2008 characterizes countries according to the 
degree to which their economies have moved from both a high dependence on 
agriculture for growth and a concentration of poverty in rural areas to a much lower 
dependence on agriculture and a concentration of poverty in urban areas. Agriculture-
based countries – having an average rural poverty rate of 51 percent - are very poor in 
per capita terms. They are mainly located in Sub-Saharan Africa, and contribute slightly 
more than 14 percent to the developing world’s rural population and to 22 percent of its 
rural poor. Developing, urbanized economies – with an average rural poverty rate of 13 
percent – have a per capita income that is on average nearly ten times that of 
agriculture-based economies. They are located in Europe, Central Asia, and Latin 
America and the Caribbean, and contribute almost 9 percent to the developing world’s 
rural population and to only 4 percent of its rural poor. 
 
By far the most important group of countries in terms of number of inhabitants are 
transforming economies, not yet urbanized but less dependent on agriculture. 
Transforming countries – having a rural poverty rate of 28 percent - have on average 
                                                 
9 See, for example, Jalan and Ravallion (1998) and the review in Stampini and Davis (2006).   
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more than twice the per capita income of agriculture-based countries, but slightly less 
than a third of the per capita income of urbanized developing countries. They are mainly 
located in Asia – China and India being the largest – and contribute 77 percent to the 
developing world’s rural population and to 74 percent of its rural poor. As these 
transforming economies become more urbanized, due in part to rural-urban migration, 
concentrations of poverty will shift from rural to urban areas. With development and 
increasing economic complexity, populations and poverty will move toward urban 
areas. Within 25 years, urban residents will make up three-fifths of the population in 
developing countries, almost 40 percent of the very poor, and slightly more than half of 
the $2-a-day poor.  
Presently, however, as discussed above, in most developing countries poverty is both 
more prevalent and deeper in rural areas than in urban areas. The rate of the 
urbanization of poverty has slowed since the late 1990s, and while the poor based on the 
$1-a-day poverty line might be urbanizing slightly faster than the overall population, the 
poor based on the $2-a-day line are not (Ravallion et al, 2007). Given the most recent 
trends in urbanization and forecasted trends in urban populations, rural areas will 
remain yet for several decades where the majority of the developing world’s poor 
reside. Table 3 shows the breakdown of poverty in terms of absolute number and the 
percent of rural and urban populations for various regions and the years 1993 to 2002.10 
Certainly rural incomes have historically been lower than urban incomes across all 
regions, although there has been a tendency for some convergence (Table 4). Yet rural 
poverty has declined, and not merely due to a shift of populations from rural to urban 
areas. Rising incomes of rural residents (including remittances) have contributed to the 
bulk of poverty decline. As Ravallion et al (2007) note, 75 percent of the reduction in 
developing world $1-a-day poverty – or 4.2 percentage points of a 5.5 point total 
decline – is due to declines in rural poverty, with 20 percent due to increasing urban 
areas’ share of the population. 
 
Demographic considerations 
 
This slow trend toward the urbanization of poverty has been and will continue to be 
driven by demographic changes within rural and urban populations. Age distributions – 
the number of young, working age, and elderly persons – and the proportions of women 
and men will influence the income potential of rural populations. An aging rural 
population with a relatively low proportion of working-age males, for example, could 
slow the growth of labour-intensive agriculture, slowing rural economic development 
and maintaining high rates of rural poverty. Although each affects the other in a 
complicated dynamic, certainly at national levels there is a high correlation between 
economic development and the population shares of both the elderly and the young. 
More than 50 percent of the variability across countries of the proportions of those older 
than 64 years and younger than 15 is explained by differences in development levels 
(Anríquez, 2007). 
 
Rural populations tend to have higher rates of fertility than urban populations, but the 
rural population’s share of the young also tends to fall faster with development. Across 
countries rural populations also tend to have a slightly larger proportion of the elderly. 
                                                 
10 And for reference, urban/rural poverty rates by country for selected time periods, based on country-
specific poverty lines, are found in Table A1 in the Data Appendix. 
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The young and the old make up the economically dependent share of a country’s 
population, and this share is larger in rural areas.  
 
Improvements in sanitation and medicine – largely available today to all countries 
regardless of development level and due to previous economic growth in the developed 
world – has led to a fall a child mortality rates and an increase in life-spans in most of 
the developing world. This also led to a historically-rapid increase in the number of the 
economically dependent relative to the number of those of working age in the 
developing world. But with a country’s development and improved income 
opportunities for households, a variety of incentives leads to the decline in fertility rates, 
putting downward pressure on the dependency ratio of the non-working-age population 
to the working-age population – by reducing the flow of the young into the population. 
As the effect of this shift in fertility rates works its way through ever older age cohorts, 
however, the dependency ratio begins to slow its decline and eventually to increase. 
One important question is whether a country can become rich before it becomes old. 
 
Rural dependency ratios are higher than urban dependency ratios across all regions, as 
seen in Table 5, and highest in the least developed regions. Sub-Saharan Africa has the 
highest national rural dependency ratios of all regions. The Middle East and North 
African region also has high overall and rural dependency ratios. High dependency 
ratios at the household level are correlated with poverty, and rural and urban population 
demographic differences correlate well with the higher incidence of poverty in rural 
areas than in urban. While the dependency ratio is falling in every region, urban ratios 
are declining faster in urban areas in some regions (East and South Asia and Sub-
Saharan Africa) and rural ratios are declining faster in others (Latin America and the 
Middle East and North Africa). 
 
Mapping the shares of rural populations over 60 years of age across countries shows 
that these shares correlate well with income levels, although older cohorts represent a 
relatively smaller share of national populations in Sub-Saharan Africa. (See map in 
Figure 6) Changes in the older-age cohort are also positively correlated with income: 
wealthier countries are older and age faster. Looking at a selected group of countries for 
which detailed household survey data are available reveals that the age of the household 
head in rural areas is not correlated with the expenditure quintile in which the household 
falls11.  
 
Another important demographic characteristic of rural populations is the balance 
between males and females. Household income studies give mixed results with respect 
to cross-country generalizations of the role of female household heads in determining 
income and the likelihood of poverty. Nevertheless, for specific countries several 
studies do indeed find that, all things being equal, female-headed households are more 
likely to be poor. Regardless of the ceteris paribus connection between poverty 
measured in dollars and female-headed households, these household tend to have higher 
dependency ratios, women often have lower education levels, and women household 
heads often take on employment (usually with lower remuneration) that accommodates 
at-home time constraints.  
 
                                                 
11 See Anríquez (2007) 
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What do we know about the proportion of females in the rural population? The ratio of 
females to males – the femininity ratio – in rural areas is high in East Europe and 
Central Asia and in Sub-Saharan Africa, and femininity ratios are higher in rural areas 
in South Asia, the Middle East and North Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa. The greatest 
difference between urban and rural ratios is in Latin America (107 to 93). To account 
for differing mortality rates between older males and females, an adjusted femininity 
ratio using persons between ages 15 to 49 years is perhaps more revealing. This 
adjusted ratio is even greater in Sub-Saharan Africa; the gap between urban and rural 
grew larger in Latin America, South Asia and Sub Saharan Africa, the latter two with 
higher ratios in rural areas (See Table 6and the map in Figure 7). 
 
But are some rural populations increasing their shares of working age females? As 
Figure 8 demonstrates, in most cases where the initial rural femininity ratio is greater 
than one the ratio tends to decline over time, and where it is initially less than one, it 
tends to increase or slightly decrease over time. In some countries, however, such as 
Mexico and Zimbabwe, the rural femininity ratio has shown an increase from an initial 
value greater than one. Thus overall, with some exceptions, where initially there is an 
imbalance in the number of working-age females to males in rural areas, rural 
populations tend to adjust over time toward balance.  
 
How is migration influencing rural populations? A recent study by Anriquez (2007), 
examining net migration across administrative units in six countries (four in Latin 
American and two in East Africa), produces several interesting results. In Brazil, 
Ecuador, Mexico, and Panama out-migration tends to be associated with poorer 
communities, community wealth being measured in terms of the assets of education 
levels and housing quality. These poorer areas also tend to be the most rural. The 
poorest might not be leaving these communities, but those who have the opportunities 
and incentives to migrate come from poorer, rural areas. In these poorer, more-rural 
communities female-to-male ratios are lower. Moreover, indigenous populations tend to 
make up a larger share of these poorer administrative units, but indigenous populations 
are growing more rapidly in wealthier communities. Interestingly, average education 
levels and housing quality – two measures of household assets – are improving faster in 
marginal communities. This last result is likely due to lagging communities catching-up 
to national averages, but also due to a sorting effect – those who migrate perhaps are, 
while not the poorest, nevertheless below communities means in these asset indicators. 
Taken together these results suggest that population movements are contributing to a 
convergence of wealthier and marginal communities in Latin America. 
Turning to East Africa, in Kenya the wealthiest administrative units in terms of 
education and housing quality are receiving immigration from less well-off units, but 
out-migration is less from the poorest units than from those not so poor. Education 
levels and housing quality are improving faster in these middle-wealth units than in the 
poorest, suggesting that population movements are contributing to a divergence of 
wealthier and marginal communities. Out-migration in Kenya is also more female. In 
the case of Uganda, where internal displacement of populations has followed war and a 
“protected villages” program, population movements between 1991 and 2002 show a 
return migration from urban to rural and poorer regions. These poor regions also saw 
the most rapid improvement in welfare indicators. In both countries one important 
conclusion of the Anríquez study is that education is the key asset that determines out-
migration. In Kenya, low level of education is an underlying factor that reduces out-
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migration in the poorest areas, leading to these communities lagging further behind 
wealthier communities. 
Box  
The Demographic Challenge of Sub Saharan Africa 
 
The demographic transition is the process by which population dynamics change from 
high to low levels of fertility and mortality as countries experience economic development. 
During the first stage countries have both high fertility and mortality and therefore 
populations grow very slowly if at all. During the second stage mortality falls while 
fertility is still high which causes population to grow very fast. During the third stage 
births also start to fall, which begins to reduce the rate of growth of population. Finally, as 
both fertility and mortality become low during stage four, populations stabilize again. 
 
The second stage of the transition, which is characterized by falling mortality but still high 
fertility rates, is sometimes referred to as the demographic trap since populations grow 
exponentially. Many worry that the demographic trap in Sub Saharan Africa (SSA) is more 
severe then that experienced by other countries that had developed earlier, since progress 
in medical and public health technologies has caused steeper falls in mortality, particularly 
child mortality. These translate into even higher rates of population growth for SSA. The 
demographic trap can translate into an economic poverty trap if the economy is unable to 
feed and employ this growing population. 
 
Box Figure 4 shows the demographic position of SSA relative to other developing regions. 
We reproduce the population growth and birth rates,12 because the data on fertility and 
mortality are much spottier, particularly in SSA. The first panel shows that during the last 
30 years real income in the region has not grown while the crude birth rate has started to 
fall, but at a much slower pace as compared to other regions. The second panel shows SSA 
has the highest rate of population growth than any other region. Also, like South East Asia 
and the Middle East and North Africa region, the population growth rate has begun to fall 
since the mid 1980’s, however in the SSA region this fall has been more moderate.  
                                                 
12 The fall in the birth rate does not necessarily imply a reduction in fertility because the former rate does 
not take into account the age composition of the population. 
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Box Figure 4. Evolution of the birth and population growth rates by developing 
region (1975-2005). 
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Source: Authors’ calculations using UNSTATS. 
 
 
The growth of population and its age composition has important implications for 
development. When population grows at an increasing rate it means that every year a 
growing number of young individuals enter the labour force. These large inflows of 
potential workers can represent both a possible threat to the economy if it can not generate 
employment fast enough, or a possible blessing as an abundance of inexpensive labour on 
which industrialization can thrive, as Lewis (1954) suggested. On the other hand if the 
rapid expansion of labour force is accompanied by a structural transformation (i.e. the 
relative shrinking of agriculture and industrialization) new jobs in the urban/industrial 
sector have to accommodate both the growing labour force and the jobs shed by the 
agricultural sector. Given the slow pace of industrialization in SSA, many worry that the 
secondary and tertiary sectors are not ready to handle these demographic pressures. A 
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recent cross-country study by Bezemer and Hazell (2007), however, showed that for the 
next decade no change is expected in the share of employment in agriculture in SSA (58 
percent), which together with the fast growth of population means that roughly 9 new 
million jobs will be created in agriculture between 2000 and 2015. This employment 
context contrasts starkly with the reality of China where 5 to 7 million agricultural jobs 
will be lost each year during the same period. 
 
The age composition of the population is also important from the development 
perspective. SSA is the youngest developing region, with 44% of the population under 15 
years (Ashford, 2007). During the next decade the majority of these children will enter the 
labour force; and together with a falling rate of population growth this means that the 
demographic dependency ratio (the number of nonworking age persons to working age 
population) will fall drastically in SSA over the next few decades. This encouraging 
scenario has sometimes been called the demographic dividend or bonus, because with a 
lower proportion of the population economically dependent, economies can accumulate 
savings and make investments, which improve the prospects of economic growth. These 
positive demographic conditions will translate into national development if accompanied 
by a favourable social and economic environment. 
 
In conclusion, although the population of SSA will continue to grow as far as demographic 
projections can see, the region seems to have turned the corner in terms of population 
growth, as shown in the long term view provided by Box Figure 5, and the region as a 
whole is slowly entering the third stage in the demographic transition of falling fertility 
and population growth rate. Still, the region carries a fast population growth inertia which 
translates into a rapidly growing labour force in the region. It is predicted that 3 out of 5 
new jobs during the next decade will be farm jobs. Thus the fast rate of growth of the 
labour force is both a threat and an opportunity for development depending on the ability 
to increase the productivity of labour. In the case of SSA agricultural productivity will be 
the key as most of these new jobs will reside in this sector. 
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Box Figure 5. Evolution of population growth and total population in Sub Saharan 
Africa. 
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4. A profile of the rural poor 
 
This section looks at the characteristics of the rural poor, their activities and the 
connection between household assets and poverty. The discussion makes use of 
previous analyses based on household surveys for 15 (sometimes 16) countries in FAO 
and World Bank’s RIGA database.13 The surveys are comparable in terms of the 
structure of household income and household characteristics and permit geographic 
coverage across Africa (Ghana, Madagascar, Malawi, and Nigeria), Asia (Bangladesh, 
Indonesia, Nepal, Pakistan and Vietnam), Eastern Europe and Central Asia (Albania, 
Bulgaria and in some cases Tajikistan) and Latin America and the Caribbean (Ecuador, 
Guatemala, Nicaragua and Panama). Although unrepresentative of the entire developing 
world, the surveys provide insight into the activities, incomes and characteristics of 
rural households and the rural poor. The discussion here links principal activities and 
incomes of the rural poor to family characteristics and assets, specifically education, 
land and infrastructure. It emphasizes the relationship between family assets and the 
probability of being poor. 
 
The income aggregates constructed for the RIGA countries contain seven principal 
income sources (crop; livestock; agricultural wages; non-agricultural wages; non-farm 
enterprises; transfers; other non-labour activities) which are grouped into the following 
basic categories: on-farm activities (self-employed farming, income being the sum of 
crop and livestock production); agricultural wage activities; non-farm activities (the 
sum of non-agricultural wage employment and non-farm enterprises); and 
                                                 
13 See Carletto, Covarrubias and Krausova (2007).  A description of these data can be found at 
http://www.fao.org/es/ESA/riga/index_en.htm 
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transfers/other (containing public and private transfer income and other non-labour 
sources).  One can further aggregate income into off-farm activities (the sum of 
agricultural wages, non-farm income and transfers/other); non-agricultural activities 
(the sum of the non-farm and transfers/other category); and agricultural activities (the 
sum of on-farm and agricultural wages). 
Household characteristics of the rural poor 
 
Who are the rural poor? What characteristics distinguish the poor from the non-poor? A 
profile of poor households in each of the 15 surveys in the RIGA database yields a 
similar picture across countries, and reflects, for the most part, commonly held 
perceptions of the characteristics of the poor. A comparison of household demographic 
characteristics, assets and composition of income between poor and non-poor 
households can be found in Table 13, as well as across expenditure quintiles, in Table 
A2 in Data Appendix.14  
 
The patterns observed from Table 13a through Table 13d fall in line, for the most part, 
with the general expectations of household characteristics when comparing poor and 
non poor households. Poor households have more members, a greater share of 
dependents (non-working age), less education, less land, and less access to running 
water and electricity.  Poor households also generally own fewer livestock and limited 
access to primary schools and health clinics. There are exceptions. For example, in the 
case of livestock the poor have on average slightly more livestock than the non-poor in 
Ghana, Nepal, Vietnam, and Albania, although the average livestock holdings are very 
small for both groups. Exceptions underline that regional and country-level factors are 
important. 
 
In terms of demographic characteristics, in all countries poor households have on 
average significantly larger households, and in all countries except for one, poor 
households have a higher share of dependents, and a greater number of working age 
adults (15-60 years). As discussed in more detail in the box on gender and poverty, in 
nine countries poor households have a significantly lower share of female-headed 
households; in only one country do poor households have a higher share of female-
headed households. However, no clear patterns are discernable regarding the age of the 
household head. In four countries, poor household have on average older household 
heads then non-poor households, while in seven countries the reverse is true.  
 
Poor households have significantly lower access to assets across the board. The poor 
own on average significantly smaller plots of land then rich households, and with the 
exception of three countries (Ghana, Nigeria and Vietnam), they also own less 
livestock, as measured in tropical livestock units (TLU).15  For all countries in the RIGA 
dataset, poor households have significantly fewer years of education whether one looks 
at the household-level average or at the years of schooling of household heads.  Further, 
again for all countries, poor households have significantly, and often dramatically, 
lower levels of access to running water and electricity. In terms of the relative distance 
                                                 
14 In order for poverty comparisons to be comparable across countries, we used as poverty lines the local 
currency equivalent of 2.16 PPP international dollars of 2000. These lines were inflated or deflated for 
other years using the national consumer price indices. 
15 Tropical livestock units aggregate livestock into one index using region-specific weights. Cattle, for 
example, have a value of around 0.7 compared to sheep and goats at 0.1 and chickens at 0.01. 
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to health clinics and primary schools among poor and non poor households the results 
are more ambiguous; while in five countries poor households are significantly farther 
away from health clinics, only in three countries is the same true for schools, and in two 
cases schools are closer, on average, for the poor. 
 
With respect to income portfolios, which is discussed in more detail in the following 
sections, participation in, and shares of income from, on-farm activities, and in 
particular agricultural wage employment, are in almost all countries significantly greater 
among poor households. Similarly, non poor households have a higher share of 
participation in, and share of income from, off-farm activities, including transfers. 
Important exceptions from these patterns include Bangladesh, Pakistan, Bulgaria, and to 
a lesser extent, Nepal. In Pakistan in particular, the non poor have a greater share of 
agricultural sources of income, and a significantly smaller share of income from non-
farm sources of employment. This might be due to the particularly strong unequal land 
access in Pakistan, and in particular the large number of landless among the poor, with 
the landless resorting to low return wage employment, both agricultural and non-
agricultural. 
 
Box 
Marginalized populations 
 
A household’s ability to earn income is related to its assets, especially human capital, 
and the activities that those assets permit. For some, however, the access to assets and 
the ability to earn income is not merely a question of initial endowments and the choice 
among jobs within the reach of one’s abilities. Some families are poor because they 
suffer various forms of exclusion; they belong to a group for which the rest of society 
has different rules of the game. Exclusion or marginalization16 manifests itself in 
various ways: in the form of higher barriers to educational opportunities than those 
faced by households in more favoured groups, in the form of job discrimination, or, as 
members of a minority group, by being isolated in terms of social and economic 
interactions with others.  
 
Identifying those who are marginalized – and the different forms that marginalization 
takes – is an important component in the design of specific targeted poverty reduction 
programmes. For instance in many Latin American countries indigenous people still 
face major obstacles to effective recognition of their land rights, while their territorial 
security is threatened by political interests. In Asia discrimination includes lack of legal 
titles over traditional lands, militarization of the territories that curtails the freedom of 
movement, imposition of livelihood systems and land-use patterns that are specific to 
dominant ethnic groups. In Africa the position of hunter-gatherers and pastoralists is 
                                                 
16 The concept of economic marginalization is based on a relational statement between X, the 
“marginalized group”, and Y, the “rest of society”. Following Kanbur (2007), economic marginalization 
can be seen as outcome and as process. On outcomes, marginalization is taken to mean statically, “X is 
worse off relative to Y”, or dynamically “X has got less of the increase in the pie than Y”. As a process, 
the concept relates to economic structures, and in particular to the structure of markets and their 
integration: “To the extent that the markets that some individuals or groups engage in are segmented from 
the economy in general, these individuals can be said to be marginalized from the rest of the economy [...] 
Segmentation and exclusion may, however, have non-economic and non-financial origins, for example in 
discrimination by gender, caste or ethnicity.”  
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subordinated to the dominant groups’ and the governments’ attitudes towards 
agricultural production.  
 
Poverty and Indigenous People 
 
There are about 350 million indigenous and tribal peoples around the globe – about 5 
percent of the world’s population – representing over 5,000 ethnic groups. According to 
World Bank (2003), they are disproportionately poor, making up over 15 percent of all 
living in poverty. Moreover, in most regions and countries, indigenous and tribal 
peoples are over-represented among the poor, having group-specific poverty rates 
greater than the national rates – even in cases where they are majority of the population. 
Definitions of indigenous and tribal people differ from country to country, reflecting the 
diversity of the socio-economic, political and historical circumstances.17 
 
About 70 percent of the world’s indigenous and tribal peoples live in Asia and the 
Pacific, the majority of them coming from China and India.18 Some distinguishing 
features of these groups are a strong emphasis on clan structures and ethnicity bonds, a 
strong sense of identity, and a generally higher status for women. Scheduled Tribes or 
Adivasi in India constitute about 32 percent of the rural population but account for more 
than 42 percent of the rural poor and 85 percent of Adivasi live below the official 
poverty line as compared to 40 percent of the total population.19 According to Plant 
(2002), in the Philippines, while nationwide poverty incidence among families declined 
from 40 per cent to almost 32 per cent between 1988 and 1997, the decline was much 
less pronounced in prevalently indigenous areas (Cultural Communities) and in two of 
these regions the incidence of poverty actually grew. A report published in 2000 by the 
World Bank and the United Nations Development Programme finds that minority 
nationalities make up less than 9 percent of the total population of China but account 
for an estimated 40 percent of the country’s absolute poor. In Vietnam between 1993 
and 1998 the poverty rate in the whole country decreased by 19 points but the reduction 
was lower in rural mountains regions of Northern and Central Highlands, where there is 
a high proportion of ethnic minorities in the population.20 These results are confirmed 
by Van de Walle and Gunewardena (2001), who found that the incidence of poverty is 
60 percent for the Kinh and Chinese groups and 80 percent for the minorities. 
 
Latin America’s 50 million indigenous people make up 10 percent of the region’s 
population. Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (1994) and Hall and Patrinos (2005) examine 
the evolution of social conditions in Bolivia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico and Peru, 
countries with the largest indigenous populations in the region. The indigenous in Latin 
America are not always the minority, and in countries like Bolivia they represent more 
than half the population. In Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru language is the defining 
                                                 
17 Despite the heterogeneity of these groups, a benchmark for their identification is represented by the 
ILO Convention # 169. Tribal peoples are described as those “whose social, cultural, and economic 
conditions distinguish them from other sections of the national community, and whose status is regulated 
wholly or partially by their own customs or traditions or by special laws or regulation.” Indigenous 
peoples are described as those “who are regarded as indigenous on account of their descent from the 
populations which inhabited the country, or a geographical region to which the country belongs, at the 
time of conquest or colonization or the establishment of present state boundaries and who, irrespective of 
their legal status, retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural, and political institutions.” 
18 IFAD (2002a). 
19 IFAD (2001b). 
20 See Plant (2002). 
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characteristic. For Guatemala, self-identification or self-perception is the key variable, 
whereas in Mexico, language and geographic concentration are usually used to define 
indigenous people.  
 
Indigenous people represent a majority of Bolivia’s population at 62 percent (about 3.9 
million people). In rural areas, 72 percent of the population speaks indigenous 
languages, compared to 36 percent in urban areas. While the plains are 17 percent 
indigenous and 83 percent non-indigenous, the highlands and valleys are 67 and 60 
percent indigenous, respectively. In Ecuador it is estimated that in 2001, 9.2 percent of 
the population belonged to a household in which either at least one member of the 
family self-identified as indigenous or speaks an indigenous language. About 39 percent 
of Guatemalans identify themselves as indigenous. Between 1989 and 2000, 
Guatemala’s indigenous population became older and more likely to live in urban areas. 
About 11 percent of Mexican households are indigenous, and the indigenous population 
is predominantly rural and lives in communities with less than 15,000 inhabitants. 
While only 35 percent of the non-indigenous population lives in rural areas, over 72 
percent of the indigenous population lives in rural communities. 
 
Between 25 and 48 percent of Peruvian households can be considered indigenous.  The 
lower limit corresponds to households in which the household head and/or spouse uses 
an indigenous language (Quechua, Aymara or a native tongue of the Amazon region) 
more frequently than Spanish. The upper limit identifies all the Peruvian households in 
which the household head and/or the head’s spouse have parents or grandfathers that 
had an indigenous mother tongue.  
 
Hall and Patrinos found out that few gains were made in income poverty reduction 
among indigenous populations in Latin America and that the indigenous poverty gap is 
deeper. As can be seen in Table 7, they show that the majority – and often the vast 
majority – of indigenous households in Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, Guatemala and Mexico 
are poor. Finally, being indigenous increases an individual’s probability of being poor 
and this relationship was about the same at the beginning and at the close of the decade. 
 
In Africa the concept of indigenous and tribal people differs from those commonly used 
in Asia and the Pacific and the Americas. According to Ohenjo, et al. (2006) more than 
14.2 million self-identifying indigenous people live in Africa. In this region, the term 
indigenous population does not mean first inhabitants, in reference to aboriginality, as 
opposed to non-African communities or those having come from elsewhere. In fact 
most Africans belong to a specific tribal or ethnic group, all of whom are indigenous to 
Africa. This is why in the African context, the African Commission on Human and 
People’s right suggests that the term “indigenous” should be used to describe and 
address the structurally subordinate position of hunter gatherers and pastoralists to the 
dominant groups and the state.21 These peoples can be loosely categorized in three 
groups: hunter-gatherers, exemplified by the Pygmy peoples of Central Africa, Hadzabe 
in Tanzania, San in Botswana and the San of Southern Africa; fisher people; and 
pastoralists who range from the Maasai and Samburu of Kenya and Tanzania, to the 
Tuareg in west and northern Africa. Nomadic pastoralists far exceed in population the 
hunter gatherers; they are estimated at 7-8 million in Ethiopia, 6 million in Kenya, and 
3.7 million in Tanzania. The largest groups correspond to the Berbers of North Africa, 
                                                 
21 See African Commission on Humans and Peoples’ Rights (2003). 
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the Tuareg (1.2 million) of southern, eastern, and Western Sahara, and cattle herding 
Nilotic tribes of Sudan, Uganda, Kenya, and Tanzania.22 Some of these marginalized 
groups have been losing their lands steadily over the years, as their lands were 
considered to be terra nullius, that is, land belonging to no one.  
 
It is difficult, however, to get quantitative estimations of their level of marginalization. 
Due to their nomadic and even cross-national nature, most of these groups are not 
usually covered by traditional household survey instruments. Thus the literature does 
not provide clear estimates on how these groups fare in terms of poverty relative to the 
rest of the society. Nonetheless, the difficult living conditions of these groups have been 
amply documented in case studies. For general studies see for example, Anderson and 
Broch-Due (1999) and de Bruijn and van Dijk (1999). For more people specific studies 
see Bernus (1990) on the Tuareg, Homewood et al. (2005) on the Maasai, White (1997) 
on the Fulani, and references contained therein.  
 
In the transition countries of Europe, a unique minority is represented by the Roma 
people, commonly known as “gypsies”. Unlike other groups, Roma have no historical 
homeland and estimates suggest that between 7 and 9 million Roma live throughout the 
continent. Information on their living conditions and the characteristics of their poverty 
is scarce, primarily for reasons connected to measurement problems.23 Revenga et al. 
(2002) analyze data from a cross-country household survey which addresses the ethnic 
dimension of poverty across countries and allows for a quantitative assessment of the 
living conditions of Roma in the region. The main focus is on Bulgaria, Romania and 
Hungary, where approximately 3.5 millions Roma live, which represent around 40 to 50 
percent of the total Roma population in Europe. As it is possible to see in Table 8, the 
highest level of absolute poverty among Roma households is found in Bulgaria, 
followed closely by Romania. Although absolute poverty among Roma households is 
lower in Hungary, the difference between the situation of Roma and non-Roma 
households is equally stark. Further, the authors examine the determinants of poverty by 
running regressions of log adult equivalent expenditures on household characteristics 
and find that non urban Roma are poorer than urban Roma. 
 
High rates of poverty can be found among ethnic minorities even in developed 
countries. In Australia, Hunter (1999) showed that poverty among indigenous 
households is always greater than poverty of overall Australian households, 
independently of the percentage of median income used and after controlling for 
household composition (see Table 9). In the United States, the overall poverty rate for 
American Indian/Alaska Native individuals, including children, is generally higher than 
that for the total US population, particularly among families living in reservations (see 
for instance DeNavas-Walt et al., 2005). 
 
Poverty and gender 
 
In the development debate many argue that women are increasingly over-represented 
among the poor and following a process of “feminization of poverty”. There are many 
reasons why women and households headed by women may be over-represented among 
                                                 
22 Tomei (2005). 
23 For instance undersampling in censuses and household surveys; privacy legislation in many countries 
which prohibits gathering of data by ethnicity; the reluctance of many Roma to identify as Roma; and the 
diversity of Roma groups and sub-groups. 
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the poor. Female headed households generally have higher dependency ratios and lower 
average earnings for the “bread earner,” who often takes lower paying jobs to 
accommodate time constraints generated by household duties. These factors contribute 
to higher poverty rates (Buvinic and Gupta, 1997). Furthermore, their wellbeing is 
likely to suffer due to the sacrifice in leisure time traded for an equivalent income 
(Lipton and Ravallion, 1995). In addition, just being a woman itself can raise the 
likelihood of poverty: in many countries due to cultural reasons women face obstacles 
to the ownership and accumulation of assets, such as agricultural land (Deere and Leon, 
2003).  And in many countries women face labour discrimination in the form of lower 
remuneration for similar work or exclusion from better paying jobs.   
 
The empirical literature, however, gives a more nuanced picture. Females are not 
always overrepresented among the poor. Visaria (1980a, 1980b), using household 
survey data from India (Gujarat and Maharashtra states), Nepal, Peninsular Malaysia, 
Sri Lanka, and Taiwan, examined the percentage of females in households distributed 
across deciles of a variety of income measures. The author concludes that in terms of 
their living standards, females do not seem to be heavily overrepresented among the 
poor. These results differ with a study in Ghana (Haddad 1991), which calculated 
poverty indices for groups of individuals classified by number of adult males and 
females in the household. While the poverty share of each group was close to that of the 
entire sample, the largest discrepancies occurred for individuals from households with 
more adult females than males. While these households accounted for 39 percent of the 
sample, their share of overall poverty was approximately 46 percent. Further evidence 
of no over-representation of women among the poor appears as well in Drèze (1990) for 
India, Svedberg (1991) for Africa, Lloyd and Brandon (1991) for Ghana, and Louat et 
al. (1993) for Jamaica. The main limitation of these studies, besides being somewhat 
outdated, is the lack of data on the intra-household distribution of wealth and/or well-
being.  
 
Comparisons of the income and poverty levels of female- and male-headed households 
are more numerous. Buvinic and Gupta (1997) report that in 38 of 61 studies reviewed, 
female headed households were over-represented among the poor. However, because 
the case studies of gender and poverty employ a wide range of conceptual and 
measurement techniques, cross-study comparisons are very difficult.24 Quisumbing et 
al. (2001) present cross-country evidence on the proportion of women in poverty in ten 
developing countries. They compare poverty measures for males and females and male- 
and female-headed households and investigate the sensitivity of these measures to the 
use of per-capita and per-adult equivalent units and different definitions of the poverty 
line. The authors used household survey data from Sub-Saharan Africa (Botswana, Côte 
d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Ghana, Madagascar, Rwanda), Asia (Bangladesh, Indonesia, Nepal), 
and Central America (Honduras). 25  As can be seen from Table 10, poverty measures 
                                                 
24 These conceptual issues include: (1) the accurate measurement of the non-leisure time of men and 
women; (2) the different sizes of households headed by males or females; (3) the different composition of 
households headed by males or females; and (4) the definition of headship. 
25 The Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire datasets are nationally representative, while other data are from rural 
surveys that were not designed to be nationally representative. Most of the surveys were conducted by the 
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) and its collaborators (such as the International 
Center for Research on Women) with the exception of the Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire datasets, which were 
gathered as part of the Living Standards Measurement Study of the World Bank.  Some surveys focused 
on a specific region (e.g., the Rwanda dataset), while others aimed for representativeness across 
agroclimatic settings, ethnic groups, and infrastructure and market access. 
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are higher for female-headed households and for females. The differences, however, are 
significant in only three of the ten datasets considered. In a recent study, Medeiros and 
Costa (2008) examine the hypothesis that poverty is increasing among females and 
female headed households using household surveys of the 1990’s from 8 Latin 
American countries that represent the majority of the population of the region. The 
authors show that in general both female and female headed households are not 
increasing their relative participation among the poor.26  
 
Using the RIGA data base and data on other countries and following a similar approach 
to that of Quisumbing et al. (2001), we examined poverty rates both by the gender of the 
head of household and the gender of the individual for the rural areas of 18 countries 
using 33 nationally representative household surveys. The results are given in Table 11 
and show a heterogeneous picture. In this sample of countries it is far more common in 
rural areas for male-headed households to have higher poverty rates than female-headed 
household (16 versus 7 surveys). On the other hand, when poverty is compared by 
gender of the individual, we find that it is more common to have statistical equivalence 
between rates; however, if there is inequality, females are most likely to overrepresented 
among the poor (14 against 3 surveys). 
 
Poverty here is measured in money terms. In the cases where women have the same 
poverty rates as men, they still might have lower welfare, and more likely to be “poor” 
using a broader definition of the concept. Income and consumption poverty measures 
assume a gender neutral distribution of welfare.27 There is no guarantee, however, that 
female and male children have the same access to scarce food, for example, or that they 
receive the same access to education or medical care. In any event, at the individual 
level, females are more likely to be poor than males in 14 surveys.  
 
Although female-headed households might not be over-represented in income and 
consumption poverty rates, they could be disadvantaged in terms of asset ownership. 
This is the message of Table 12. With respect to human capital, rural female heads have 
significantly fewer years of education than rural male heads in 14 out 15 countries of 
the RIGA sample. Additionally, in terms of agricultural assets, in all countries 
considered female headed households own significantly less land and less livestock. 
 
Principal activities and incomes of the rural poor 
 
The alleviation of rural poverty depends on improving incomes deriving from three 
broad categories of activities: farming, off-farm labour both in agriculture and in non-
agricultural enterprises, and migration. Rural households have various degrees of 
diversification of their income sources. A diversified rural economy does not 
necessarily imply diversified households – that is, households that participate in and 
obtain income from a range of economic activities. It may be the case that households 
tend to specialize in certain activities although the rural economy as a whole is 
                                                 
26 The exception to this conclusion is Argentina and Mexico where female-headed households have 
increased their share among the poor.  
27 In the case of adult equivalent measures it is usually assumed that the female requires less caloric intake 
than the male, and in addition it is assumed that the distribution of consumption and income within the 
household is gender-unbiased. This is because in most household surveys some income, and particularly 
consumption, data are usually not available at the individual level. 
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economically diverse. Examining the 15 RIGA countries in Table 14, off-farm sources 
of income account for at least 50 percent of total income in the countries of Eastern 
Europe, Latin America and Asia (with the exception of Vietnam). On-farm sources of 
income tend to be more important for the African countries included in the dataset, 
where the share ranges from 55 to 77 percent of total income. Joining together income 
from agricultural wage labour with crop and livestock production, about half (8 of 15) 
of the RIGA countries had a majority of income from agricultural sources. Overall, as 
would be expected with increasing levels of GDP per capita, the share of rural on-farm 
income falls, the share of rural non-agricultural income increases (Figure 9).  
 
Although non-farm activities are important, the vast majority of rural households among 
the 15 RIGA countries have farming income. Table 15 shows participation rates among 
rural households in different income generating activities. In all countries about two-
thirds or more of rural households participate in farm activities, either growing crops or 
raising livestock. In 11 of the countries participation rates in farming percentage are 
above 80 percent. Of course, some of these households might only raise a few small 
animals or grow crops in very small plots, but the broader point is that agriculture 
continues to play a fundamental role in rural household economic portfolios across 
countries. By contrast, across countries there is a greater range of participation in non-
farm activities and receipt of transfers. For both income sources for most countries the 
rate is at least 30 percent. Relatively few rural households in Albania and Bulgaria 
participate in agricultural wage labour; 20 percent to 40 percent do so in the Latin 
American and Asian countries. The African countries differ notably: few households 
have agricultural wage sources in Ghana and Nigeria, but over 50 percent in Malawi 
and over 20 percent in Madagascar. 
 
Table 15 also shows household participation rates of non-farm wage employment and 
self employment. Rates of self employment participation are lowest for Albania and 
Bulgaria, but in other countries non-farm self-employment participation rates are 
generally high, at least equalling participation rates for non-farm wage employment. 
Wage employment is clearly important for most countries, with more than 20 percent to 
40 percent of households participating in all non-African countries. In Africa, non-farm 
wage participation rates range from 10 percent to 20 percent. Non-farm wage 
employment is particularly important for rural households in Latin America and for 
most countries in Asia. 
 
Non-farm wage and self employment can be further disaggregated by industrial sectors 
in the non-farm economy. There are nine broadly defined non-farm sectors: mining, 
manufacturing, utilities, construction, commerce, transport, finance, services and other. 
Figure 10 shows the share of households participating in the four most common sectors 
of non-farm activities. For most countries commerce and services have the highest 
shares of participation, followed in importance by manufacturing and construction.  
 
The relative importance of types of rural non-farm activities differs by whether they are 
wage activity or self employment activities. As seen in Figure 11, services, primarily 
jobs in the public sector, are particularly important in non-agricultural wage 
employment, holding the greatest share of income from that activity in almost all 
countries. The commerce category is more important among non-agricultural self 
employment activities than in non-farm wage labour in terms of shares of income. 
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The rural economies in most of the RIGA countries show a high degree of 
diversification, with the exception of those in Africa. But there are significant 
differences in the incomes that can be derived from various activities. For both farming 
and non-farming activities, there is a high-productivity/high-income segment, confined 
mainly to privileged, better-endowed groups in high-potential areas. There are usually 
significant barriers to entry to this high-return segment in terms of land size and quality, 
human capital and other productive assets. These barriers to entry prevent vulnerable 
groups from participating and taking advantage of the opportunities offered by the more 
dynamic segments of the rural economy. Barriers may result from a combination of lack 
of household capacity to make investments in key assets and the relative scarcity of 
low-capital entry economic activities in rural areas (Reardon et al., 2000). 
 
Usually the low-productivity segment serves as a refuge for the rural poor, providing 
residual income or subsistence food production. Low productivity activities are 
subsistence farming, seasonal agricultural wage labour and various forms of off-farm 
self employment. The resources generated through these activities – often informal – 
ensure food security and complement an otherwise inadequate resource base. They 
serve as an indispensable coping mechanism, reducing both the severity of deprivation 
and the likelihood of irreversible destitution.28 
 
For households with few assets, or with only seasonal subsistence farm production, or 
without access to liquidity or credit, off-farm activities, although poorly remunerated, 
might be the only available option. Households able to overcome financial or asset 
constraints can diversify or they can specialize in agricultural and non-agricultural 
activities. Diversification or specialization, whether farming or non-farming, depends on 
access to specific assets, on household characteristics and on the functioning of local 
labour and credit markets. And in fact, previous case studies have found a higher share 
of non-farm income among poorer households in some countries and contexts, and a 
lower share in others. 
 
Studies reviewed in FAO (1998) found a higher share of non-farm income among 
poorer rural households in Pakistan and Kenya and a higher share among richer 
households in Niger, Rwanda, Mozambique and Vietnam. More recently, Lanjouw 
(1999) and Elbers and Lanjouw (2001) for Ecuador, Adams (2001) for Jordan and Isgut 
(2004) for Honduras find that the poor have a lower share of income from non-farm 
activities then the non-poor, while Adams (2002) for Egypt and De Janvry, Sadoulet 
and Zhu (2005) for China find the opposite. Further, Lanjouw and Shariff (2002) find 
that the importance of non-farm activities by income level varies by state in their study 
of India. For those states with an overall high non-farm income share, non-farm sources 
are more important for wealthier households. But in those states with an overall lower 
non-farm income, non-farm sources are more important for poorer households. This 
result is due in part to the types of non-farm activities in different states: the share of 
income from casual wage employment is highest among the poor, while the share from 
regular wage employment is highest among the rich. 
 
By examining activities using an indicator of household welfare with the RIGA data, we 
can detect the relationship between rural income generating activities and poverty and 
identify those activities generally associated with wealth. For the 15 RIGA countries 
                                                 
28 See Lanjouw and Lanjouw (2001) and Lanjouw and Feder (2001) for a general discussion relevant to 
non-farm activities. 
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Figure 12 shows the participation in four main activities by household expenditure 
quintile, while Figure 13 show the shares of total income stemming from these 
activities. There are several clear patterns across expenditure quintiles. Participation in 
farming activities is significant for most of households across the expenditure spectrum. 
At least 50 percent of households in all expenditure quintiles had a farming activity. For 
most countries, participation in, and the share of income from, farming is either greater 
for poorer households or there is an inverted-U trend across quintiles. Only in Pakistan 
does the share of on-farm income unambiguously increase across quintiles. 
 
Participation rates and income shares of agricultural wage labour are clearly negatively 
correlated with household expenditures across countries. Albania, Bulgaria, Ghana and 
Nigeria for the most part have negligible agricultural labour markets, but in the 
remaining 11 countries poorer rural households have a much higher rate of participation 
in agricultural wage employment. Similarly, the share of income from agricultural wage 
labour is more important for poorer households in these same countries. By contrast, 
greater participation in non-farm wage and self employment is associated with greater 
levels of household expenditures, for all countries, with the exception of Pakistan and 
Nepal. Wealthier households in rural areas have a higher share of income from non-
farm activities, and again this is true for all countries, with the exception of Pakistan. 
While a large percent of better off rural households maintain on-farm production, a key 
characteristic of these households is greater access to non-farm sources of income. 
 
Notably, as can be seen in Figure 14, public transfers to rural households are 
disproportionately provided to households in poorer quintiles only in Albania, Malawi 
and Guatemala. For some countries, the relationship between public transfers and 
household expenditure is positive, likely reflecting that pensions, a major source of 
public transfers in developing countries, often go to wealthier households. It might also 
reflect poor targeting of programs meant for the poor. The percentage of rural 
households receiving private transfers tends to be positively correlated with household 
expenditure, as can be seen in Figure 15. Only in one country, Madagascar, are the 
households in the poorest quintile more likely to receive private transfers. In almost all 
other countries households in the richest quintile are most likely to receive transfers. 
 
Thus far the evidence shows that rural economies in developing countries are 
diversified, but what of individual rural households? Do individual households tend to 
specialize, with diversity across households, or do individual households diversify their 
income sources? Following Davis et al. (2007) we sort households in the 15 RIGA 
countries according to the definition of specialized as 75 percent of income from a 
single source. Using this standard, rural households are clearly diversified, as reported 
in Table 16. Thus not only are most rural economies highly diversified, but most 
individual rural households are as well. The African countries are an exception; most 
households specialize in farming. Moreover, among most countries in the other regions, 
when households do specialize, they do so in farming. In Guatemala, Panama and 
Bangladesh, however, the dominant form of specialization is in non-farm wage 
employment.  
 
Do poor or rich households tend to diversify? The relationship between diversification 
and wealth is obviously complicated. A decline in diversification as household wealth 
increases could imply that at lower income levels diversification is a response to market 
imperfections. But greater specialization at low levels of household wealth could imply 
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that poorer households face higher barriers to other activities that they would otherwise 
seek due to limited returns from further specialization. Alternatively, an increase in 
diversification as wealth increases could be the result of using profitability in one 
activity to enter other activities, or perhaps implies a complementary use of assets 
between activities.  
 
Again using expenditures as an indicator for wealth, Figure 16 shows that 
diversification of income source varies little by wealth status in the RIGA countries. In 
only 4 of the 15 countries, the share of households with diversified sources increases 
over expenditure quintile, and in another 4 diversification decreases. For 8 countries 
there is no pattern across quintiles. Figure 17 demonstrates that the relationship between 
country per capita GDP and the share of diversified rural households is an inverted U.  
This is consistent with the hypothesis of higher levels of on farm specialization in the 
early stages of development, then an increasing diversification with economic growth, 
and an eventual spread of specialization in non-farm activities.  
 
Diversification at the household level, even to a high degree, does not imply 
disengagement from agricultural activities. Figure 18 shows that, except for three 
countries in Africa, diversified households account for a least 30 percent of the total 
value of both marketed and overall agricultural production. Indeed in 8 countries 
diversified households account for a larger share of the total value of agricultural 
production than farm-specializing households; and in Albania, Bangladesh, Bulgaria, 
Ecuador and Guatemala diversified households account for at least 60 percent of the 
total value.  
 
The most common form of specialization is in farming. But for 7 of 15 countries—
returning to Figure 16, the share of households specializing in farming activities clearly 
decreases with wealth. In Nepal and Pakistan the share of farm-specializing households 
increases, reaching close to 30 percent of households in the top expenditure quintile. For 
all the African countries, at least 30 percent of the top quintile specializes in farming, 
reaching 50 percent in Nigeria and 60 percent in Madagascar.  
 
Specialization in off-farm activities is better correlated with expenditure quintiles across 
countries. For those countries in which a significant share of the rural population 
specializes in agricultural wage labour (notably those in Latin America and Asia), the 
poorest households tend to specialize in this activity. Where there is specialization in 
non-farm employment, whether wage labour or self employment, it tends to be among 
those in the higher wealth categories, with the clear exception of Pakistan.  
Some conclusions about the relationship between household assets and income 
generation strategies 
 
The activities of rural households, their degree of specialization or diversification – and 
most importantly the incomes that they can derive from their activities – depend on the 
assets available to them. In rural areas obviously farming has been and will continue to 
be in the developing world a major economic activity, particularly of rural households. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that much of the thinking about improving the welfare of 
the rural poor focused on access to land and enhancing the productivity of small-scale 
agriculture. But as the many studies and previous evidence demonstrate rural 
households are involved in a range of economic activities; agriculture, although 
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important, is not the sole, or in some cases, even the principal activity of the poor. The 
rural development literature has developed a greater emphasis on a livelihoods 
approach, recognizing that households use a range of assets in a variety of activities, 
including farming and non-farming activities. Thinking in terms of assets and 
livelihoods suggests that there are multiple paths out of poverty (Ellis, 2000). This 
observation has led some to question the merit of a land-focused vision of rural poverty 
alleviation (e.g., Rigg, 2006). But, as a matter of policy, what combination of assets – of 
land, skills and education, access to technological improvements, and infrastructure – 
should be promoted?  
 
Making use of its particular set of assets a household engages to greater or lesser 
degrees in the variety of economic activities discussed in the previous section. Certainly 
given the assets available, household decisions are influenced by external conditions, 
such as the nature of markets and government policy; and the final outcomes of these 
decisions depend on unknowns: family health, changing farm prices and wages, weather 
and pests, and other natural and market forces. Expectations of the working of markets 
influence the choice of activities through prices, and importantly through transaction 
costs, which when substantial – as is often the case in the developing world – raise 
barriers to entry into certain activities. Governments affect the choice of activities 
through a variety of past and present actions such as the investment in infrastructure, 
provision of services, the design and execution of interventions, the implementation and 
enforcement of laws, and regulations generally. Society more broadly speaking shapes 
activities, determining the acceptability of and returns to activities, and establishing the 
rules that govern the use of social capital (Winters, et al., 2007). 
 
There are a few broadly-defined assets closely linked with certain economic activities 
across a range of contexts: land, education (human capital), and infrastructure. Land is 
closely linked to crop and livestock production, and is usually of direct value only in 
farming. It may, however, have an important indirect value to households for 
developing other activities through its use as collateral for credit. One expects that those 
without access to some land, on average, would focus on other non-farm economic 
activities, and in fact studies confirm that land ownership is negatively correlated with 
non-farm work and income. Access to land access appears to determine whether 
households remain in agriculture or shift to other activities.29  
 
Other types of assets are less likely to be linked to agriculture. A household’s human 
capital, as measured by schooling, is linked to a shift to non-farm activities where 
returns to this asset are most likely to be highest (see for example Taylor and Yunez-
Naude, 2000). While there are returns to investing in education for those in farming, on 
average increased education is likely to have greater returns elsewhere, and studies tend 
to confirm that education is linked to a shift away from agriculture.30 Having access to 
                                                 
29 Most studies find a positive relationship between land size and participation in and/or level of 
agricultural income, and a negative relationship with non-farm employment and income. See Yunez-
Naude and Taylor (2001) and Winters, Davis and Corral (2002) for Mexico; Corral and Reardon (2001) 
for Nicaragua;  Adams (2002) for Egypt; Berdegue et al (2001) for Chile; Elbers and Lanjouw (2001) for 
Ecuador; de Janvry, Sadoulet and Zhu (2005),  Zhu and Luo (2005) and Zhang and Li (2001) for China;  
and Lanjouw and Shariff (2002) for India. 
30 For example, Tanzania (Lanjouw et al, 2001), Chile (Berdegue et al, 2001), Ecuador (Elbers and 
Lanjouw, 2001), Brazil (Fereira and Lanjouw, 2001), Mexico (Taylor and Yunez-Naude, 2000; Winters, 
Davis and Corral, 2002), Honduras (Isgut, 2004, Ruben and Van den Berg, 2001) and China (de Janvry, 
Sadoulet and Zhu, 2005). 
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infrastructure and to population centres increases opportunities in non-farm activities. 
Infrastructure, such as electricity, serves as a factor in non-farm production, even small-
scale production in the home; and the proximity to markets enhances both the 
profitability of self employment and opportunities for non-agricultural wage labour. 
One problem in assessing the impact of access to infrastructure on household activities 
and income is that there are varying definitions of “access” related to differences in 
measuring “infrastructure,” such as roads, travel time, electricity, piped water, and so 
on. Nevertheless, even with the differences in measures of access, the results of many 
studies point to a strong connection between the proximity to urban areas and having 
access to infrastructure, and a positive correlation between such access and rural non-
farm employment, especially non-farm wage labour.31  
 
Indeed, Winters et al. (2007) examine the relationships between rural household assets 
and activities using a meta-regression analysis combining comparable household data 
from the 15 RIGA countries. They find that the availability of certain assets strongly 
conditions participation in, and returns to, specific income generation activities. Further, 
characteristics of households participating in different income generating activities are 
surprisingly similar across these otherwise very dissimilar countries. Households 
participating in on-farm activities have land, lower levels of education, live further from 
infrastructure and the head of household tends to be an older male. Households 
engaging in non-farm wage labour have higher levels of education, and they tend to live 
closer to infrastructure, as is portrayed in Figure 26, with a younger head of household. 
Households participating in farm wage labour own little or no land, are poorly educated, 
live further from infrastructure and again the head of household tends to be a younger 
male. Households relying more on transfers are more likely be headed by an older 
female. 
 
What do the RIGA data reveal about household access to different types of assets? 
 
Education 
 
Education is a key indicator of human capital, and a key asset determining household 
ability to access higher return activities and escape poverty.32 The RIGA data contain 
information concerning both the educational attainment of adults and current school 
attendance of children of school age. The first characterizes the educational stock of 
households, and the second gauges how households are currently building their future 
stock through educational investment in their children.  
 
Figure 19 shows the educational attainments of urban and rural household heads by four 
levels based on the completed number of school years. Figure 20 reports data on 
average years of education for household heads in urban and rural areas. A clear picture 
emerges of low levels of education in rural areas and striking differences with urban 
areas. In all the African, Asian and Latin American countries (except Indonesia and 
                                                 
31 See, for example, Ferreira and Lanjouw (2001) for Brazil, Elbers and Lanjouw (2001) for Ecuador,  
Corral and Reardon (2001) for Nicaragua, De Janvry, Sadoulet and Zhu (2005) for China and Winters, 
Davis and Corral (2002) for Mexico. 
32 See Schultz (1998) for an early review of the main theoretical issues and the empirical evidence, and 
Winters, et al (2007) for evidence using the RIGA data.  
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Panama) at least 60 percent or more of rural household heads have only completed 5 
years of education or less, reaching over 80 percent in Nepal, Guatemala and Nicaragua. 
In fact, in four countries over half of household heads have no education at all. Only in 
Eastern Europe are education levels reasonably high with approximately 80 percent of 
the household heads having some post primary education, followed by Panama, 
Ecuador and Indonesia. The difference in education levels between urban and rural 
heads of household is particularly evident in Figure 20. Even in rural areas, wide 
disparities exist by wealth status. As can be seen in Table 17, average years of education 
for rural heads of household increase substantially over expenditure quintiles. 
 
The education levels of household heads reflect the schooling history of the adults in 
our sample and suggest past failures in many countries in providing even primary level 
education. By examining investment in the education of children we can assess whether 
these failures will persist into the future. This is done by looking at school net 
attendance rates at the time of each survey.33 Table 18 compares net attendance rates 
across urban and rural areas for the general population and for females. Looking first at 
the countries with the worse educational record as identified in Figure 19 above, there 
are some clear cases of improvement, such as in Ghana, Vietnam and Nicaragua where 
in rural areas 75 to 83 percent of primary school aged children were attending school at 
the time of the survey. On the other hand several countries show very little sign of 
improvement. In rural Madagascar still only one in three rural children of primary 
school age attends primary school. Countries such as Nigeria and Pakistan also show no 
major sign of improvement with over half of primary school age children in rural areas 
not attending school.   While primary level attendance rates seem to show improvement 
in some cases, secondary school attendance in rural areas for secondary aged children is 
low, remaining below 50 percent of the population. 
 
Aggregate national data show substantial levels of inequality in access to education by 
location (urban-rural), gender and wealth (UNESCO, 2005). Table 18 provides 
comparisons of urban and rural net attendance rates and the differences between these 
are shown in Figure 21.  As expected, rural areas appear to lag behind urban areas in 
primary education in 12 of the 15 countries.  The differences are greatest in Africa 
where rural primary school attendance is 8 to 30 percentage points lower than the urban 
rate. Nepal and Pakistan also exhibit high differences between urban and rural primary 
school attendance. The difference between rural and urban attendance comes though 
even more strongly in secondary school. In every country except Bangladesh, the rural-
urban secondary school attendance gap is over 13 percentage points, and is particularly 
high in Latin America (over 25 percentage points) and Eastern Europe (over 20 
percentage points).  
 
In terms of gender, Figure 22 shows the differences in net attendance rates of rural boys 
and girls at the primary and secondary level of education. Gender differences in 
attendance rates are notable in some cases but not as widespread as one might have 
expected. For primary education, most of the differences are minimal (less than 4 
percentage points) with the notable exceptions being Nepal and Pakistan and to a lesser 
extent Guatemala.  In each of these cases girls attend primary school at a lower rate than 
boys.  For secondary education, results are also mixed, with bias against females in 
                                                 
33 Net attendance rates measure the number of children in an age category—age 6-11 for primary and 12-
17 for secondary—that attend the appropriate level of education over the total population in that age 
category. 
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Nepal, Pakistan, Vietnam and Albania and against males in Bangladesh, Bulgaria, 
Nicaragua and Panama.   
 
Finally, the relationship between school attendance of rural children and household 
expenditures is presented in Table 19 and Table 20. The relationship is unequivocally 
positive in all of the RIGA countries we analyzed, for both primary and secondary age 
levels, with the exception of Indonesia and Bulgaria for primary school. The results are 
much more dramatic for secondary education. For Latin America, children in 
households in the wealthiest quintile are about four times more likely to attend school 
than those in the poorest quintile. For the rest of the countries, differences in attendance 
rates for secondary education between the top and bottom expenditure quintiles are with 
a few exceptions higher than 20 percentage points, and as high as 40 percentage points 
in Nigeria, Nepal and Bulgaria. These differences are the same for boys and girls, and 
are also evident in communist Vietnam and the transition countries. Indonesia has the 
most equitable access to secondary education, ranging from 30 percent in the bottom 
quintile to 49 percent in the top quintile. Further, the attendance rates of children in 
households in the top rural expenditure quintiles are in most countries comparable to the 
average urban rates.  
 
Land 
 
Most rural households own no land, or only small plots of land, as seen in Figure 23, 
which presents histograms of the different land ownership categories by country for 
each region. Landlessness is most prevalent in Latin America and Asia, reaching from 
40 to over 60 percent of households, as can also be seen in Table 21. The prevalence in 
Ghana is also high, though these numbers mask collective forms of land access which 
are not captured in this variable. Landlessness is least prevalent in Vietnam, Malawi and 
Albania, at around 10 percent. In some of these countries alternative forms of access to 
land, such as rentals and sharecropping, are common. 
 
Not owning agricultural land does not necessarily represent a situation of disadvantage 
for rural households, as landlessness may signal either transition out of agriculture into 
higher return activities, or a household wanting to farm, but land constrained. Indeed, 
Table 21shows that the share of rural households that own land tends to decrease with 
increasing levels of household wealth. This is true in all four of the Latin American 
countries, as well as Nigeria and Indonesia. In the other three African countries land 
ownership is more or less constant across quintiles, as is also the case in Nepal, Vietnam 
and Albania. Only in Bangladesh, Pakistan and Bulgaria does the share of rural 
households owning agricultural land increase with expenditure quintile. 
 
Further, lack of ownership does not mean lack of access to agricultural land. In some 
countries informal and or traditional arrangements such as encroachment of public land 
or use of communal land, as well as formal arrangements such as land rentals and 
sharecropping agreements, allow access to agricultural land to many households. This is 
reflected in Table 22 which shows household owned and operated land by expenditure 
quintiles. For example, in Ghana the high jump in the operated land as compared to 
owned land illustrates how in this country informal land access mechanisms are 
extremely important. Also, operated land is better distributed than land owned, as 
shown by the simple inequality indicator of the ratio of holdings of the fifth to the first 
 40
quintile, which is lower for operated land for every country except for Bulgaria and 
Ecuador.  
 
Landholdings of operated land in most of the RIGA countries are small; the vast 
majority have less then one hectare in size. A greater number of larger landholdings are 
found in Latin America, as reflected in Figure 23 and Table 22. The size of average 
landholding varies from 0.61 hectares in Vietnam to around 6 hectares in Nicaragua. 
Average land holdings are smallest in Asia and Eastern Europe and largest in Latin 
America most likely reflecting differences in population densities and, for transition 
countries in Eastern Europe, the specific patterns of de-collectivisation followed by 
these two countries following the collapse of the socialist system. 
 
Land ownership tends to be concentrated, although this varies by country and region. 
Landholdings in the Latin American countries are the most concentrated, with between 
70 and 80 percent of total land held by the top quintile of land owners. For most of the 
countries in Asia, around 60 percent of total land is held by the largest quintile 
(Indonesia is the exception, with 83 percent), while the African countries follow with 
around 55 percent. Albania is the country where owned land is most equitably 
distributed, with only 43 percent held by the top quintile. 
 
Looking back at Table 22, there is generally a positive relationship between average 
size of land owned and welfare, although in Indonesia the poor own on average larger 
plots and in other cases it is apparent at the extremes but not in the central part of the 
welfare distribution (as in the four Latin American countries). This can be read as 
confirmation that for a number of these households, even if landed and to some extent 
involved in agriculture, assets other than land are proving more crucial in determining 
welfare levels.34  
 
To get a sense of who in the wealth distribution owns the greatest share of land in a 
given country, Figure 24 presents the relationship between expenditures levels and the 
share of total land owned, smoothed using a Lowess distribution. In all countries, the 
line is upward sloping indicating that wealthier agricultural households own a greater 
share of total agricultural land than poorer households. Among the Asian RIGA 
countries, for example, the lower expenditure groups each own around 2-3 percent of 
total land while the highest groups own twice that amount, with particular concentration 
in Bangladesh. Among the Latin American countries, particularly sharp increases are 
seen at the higher end of the distribution suggesting greater land concentration among 
the wealthiest.  
 
Livestock 
 
Despite the importance of livestock, issues of access to livestock have not been as 
extensively researched as issues related to land and human capital, and there is a 
tendency to consider them important solely for particular population subgroups (herders 
and pastoralists), while focusing most of the analysis of agricultural livelihoods on crop 
activities. The data in Table 23 confirm the widespread ownership of livestock in the 
developing world. Between 46 and 85 percent of the rural households in the RIGA 
countries own some livestock such as cattle, horses, mules, goats, sheep or chickens.  
                                                 
34 The fact that the land ownership variable does not account for differences in land quality can also be 
part of the explanation. 
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The type of livestock owned is however much more context specific; while in some 
countries (Nepal, Pakistan and to a lesser extent Albania) most livestock owners own 
some cattle, in other countries (and notably in all our African countries) the bulk of 
herds are formed of smaller animals. To get a sense of overall ownership, livestock are 
aggregated into tropical livestock units, which were defined earlier. As is the case for 
land holdings, livestock holdings on average tend to be small in size, ranging from 0.32 
in Malawi to 2.77 in Ecuador. Even among livestock owners, holdings range from 0.51 
in Malawi to almost 4 in Nicaragua. By region, they tend to be smaller in Africa and 
Asia, and larger in Latin America.  
 
As is the case with agricultural land, the share of households that own livestock is not 
necessarily positively related to well-being as measured by consumption expenditure. 
This is true only in Bangladesh, Pakistan and Bulgaria. In Latin America as well as 
Ghana and Nigeria, wealthier households are less likely than poorer households to own 
livestock. As also shown in the table, however, average holdings tend to increase with 
wealth, with the exception of Ghana, Nigeria, Vietnam and Albania. 
 
While ownership of livestock is relatively evenly distributed, total livestock holdings 
are concentrated, both over livestock owners and wealth quintiles, and particularly 
among the Latin American countries. Among the countries in this region, the top 
quintile of livestock owners (in terms of size of holdings) hold between 71 and 93 
percent of total livestock, followed by the African countries in the dataset, with between 
67 and 75 percent (last column in Table 23). Herds are relatively less concentrated in 
the Asian and Eastern European countries, where the same indicator stands at around 50 
percent. The particular concentration of livestock among the Latin American countries 
is most evident in Figure 25, which presents the relationship between expenditure levels 
and the share of total livestock owned, using a Lowess distribution. Wealthier 
agricultural households also own a greater share of total livestock in Malawi, 
Madagascar and Bangladesh. Contrary to the land distribution by wealth in Figure 24, 
however, livestock are progressively distributed in a number of countries, including 
Ghana, Nigeria, Albania, Nepal and Vietnam.    
Infrastructure  
Greater access to infrastructure is assumed to imply reduced time and distance to urban 
centres and facilitated access to markets. Households with greater access to electricity, 
water, communication, roads and other forms of infrastructure will have a broader range 
of economic opportunities compared to those with less access, who may be limited to 
agricultural activities for subsistence or near subsistence. Access to infrastructure, as a 
proxy for access to input and product markets, may also positively influence the type of 
agricultural activity towards more remunerative production technologies.  
 
The difficulty in examining infrastructure is in identifying a measure comparable across 
countries. While most surveys include questions on infrastructure and distances to urban 
areas and key services, few of the variables are comparable. To address this issue, an 
infrastructure access index, including both public goods (electricity, telephone, etc.) and 
distance to infrastructure (schools, health centres, towns, etc.) was created using 
principal components analysis.35  The variables included in the index vary by country 
                                                 
35 See the description in Winters, et al, 2007. The specific variables contained in the index depend on the 
scope of information available in a given survey, which may differ across surveys.  This index, therefore, 
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depending on data availability. Since infrastructure is generally linked to proximity to 
urban areas, the measure captures both jointly. In Table 24, the infrastructure index, 
which is normalized to have a mean zero in all cases, is presented for each country, by 
expenditure quintile. The higher the value of the index, the greater is the access to 
infrastructure. As can be seen in the table, not surprisingly, access to infrastructure 
increases with wealth, illustrating the constraints in terms of opportunities and services 
for the poor in all of the countries of the RIGA dataset. 
 
How are bundles of assets distributed? The number of families without access to a 
minimum threshold of assets. 
 
To illustrate further the importance of these assets, consider the shares of the rural 
population and the shares of the rural poor ($2/day) according to households sorted by 
their levels of land holdings, education levels of household heads and an index of access 
to infrastructure. In Table 25, for each country we create twelve groups defined 
according to having different combinations of more or less than two hectares of land, 
more or less than primary education, and scoring more or less than the country’s median 
level of access to rural infrastructure. Across all 15 countries, there are relatively few 
households in the group with high levels of all three assets, and this group’s population 
share is consistently higher than its share of the rural poor. The numerically larger group 
that is lacking in all three assets – low education, low land holdings and low 
infrastructure – consistently represents a greater share of the poor than its share of the 
rural population.  
 
The patterns of asset bundling – although low in all countries by the standards of the 
developed world – vary considerably across the 15 countries, and each case has its own 
story. In Ghana, for example, the landless with little education and infrastructure 
represent 43 percent of the rural population and 50 percent of the rural poor. Nearly half 
of the rural population is made up of the poor with very little access to assets. In 
Panama, regardless of the amount of land, households with low levels of education and 
infrastructure make up 35 percent of the population, but 62 percent of the poor, while 
those with high levels of both education and infrastructure make up 33 of the rural 
population, but only 5 percent of the poor.  
 
As a general rural, the data for poverty rates by asset bundle show that higher levels of 
education are associated with lower poverty rates, and with non-agricultural wage 
labour. But in some cases the relationship between poverty and education is not so clear. 
In Albania and Bulgaria, for example, where education levels exceed those in other 
countries, access to infrastructure appears to be important in determining poverty. In 
Albania, those with high education, low land but high infrastructure make up 38 percent 
of the rural population and only 17 percent of the rural poor, while those with high 
education, low land and low infrastructure make up 33 percent of the rural population 
and 45 percent of the rural poor. In Bulgaria, those without land make up almost 70 
percent of the rural poor; within this group without land, those with low infrastructure 
make up a much larger share of the rural poor than they do of the rural population, 
regardless of having high or low education. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
takes into consideration the information contained in each survey and allows for the creation of a 
comparable relative measure of infrastructure access; the values of the index are not comparable across 
surveys, but the direction of change (larger equals better) is comparable. 
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Although in these RIGA countries education appears most obviously correlated with 
lower poverty rates, access to infrastructure is also linked clearly to poverty rates. For 
example, in Guatemala, the landless with little education but access to infrastructure 
make up 23 percent of the rural population, but only 16 percent of the rural poor. By 
contrast, the landless with little education and little access to infrastructure make up 19 
percent of the rural population and 22 percent of the rural poor. In both Nepal and 
Vietnam, those with a little land and education but access to infrastructure make up 
nearly the same proportion of the rural poor as they do the rural population. But those 
with a little land and education and little access to infrastructure make up a notable 
larger share of the rural poor than they do the rural population. In Nepal this group 
makes up 38 percent of the rural poor and 44 percent of the rural poor; in Vietnam, the 
group makes up 27 percent of the population and 35 percent of the poor. 
 
To further illustrate the importance of education and the impact of infrastructure on the 
relationship between education and poverty, we model the probability of a household 
being poor (2$/day) as a function of a series of household characteristics and assets. 
Here we focus on the results regarding education and infrastructure. Consider first 
Figure 27a for Malawi and Figure 27b for Nicaragua. In the case of Malawi, the 
probability of being poor is very high for those with low levels of schooling, and falls 
rapidly for schooling beyond primary. But with low access to infrastructure, the 
probability of poverty increases notably compared to high access to infrastructure: for 
those with no schooling the probability of falling below the poverty line is estimated to 
be over 80 percent with low infrastructure access, but falls to 70 percent with high 
access.  
 
In the case of Nicaragua, the probability of being poor is similar to that of Malawi at 
very low levels of schooling, but falls more rapidly as education increases. Again, 
access to infrastructure influences this schooling-poverty relationship. With five years 
of schooling and low infrastructure access, the probability of being poor is 
approximately 60 percent in Nicaragua, but it takes ten years of schooling in Malawi to 
decline to this probability. With high infrastructure access in Nicaragua, the probability 
of falling below the poverty line with five years of schooling falls relative to low 
infrastructure by 20 points to approximately 40 percent. A similar story can be found for 
Bangladesh (Figure 27c). In Panama (Figure 27d), households with no education on 
average have a relatively low probability of living in poverty (around 30 percent); with 
low infrastructure, however, the probability jumps to almost 70 percent, and with low 
infrastructure is falls to less then 10 percent. 
 
Again for Malawi and Nicaragua Figure 28a and Figure 28b show the relationship 
between the size of land holding and the probability of being poor and the influence of 
infrastructure on that relationship. To put these probability functions in context, note 
that the average holdings of the poorest income quintile in Malawi is about 1.2 hectares 
and for the highest 1.7.  The average holding of the poorest quintile in Nicaragua is 
about 3.6 hectares and for the highest 7.5. Clearly for both countries the sensitivity with 
respect to land holdings of the probability of falling below the poverty line appears 
low.36 The impact of moving from low to high access to infrastructure, however, is 
apparent at all levels of land holdings.  
                                                 
36 A similar insensitivity of income with respect to farmland size was found in rural areas of six Latin 
American countries (see Lopez and Valdes, 2000). The contribution of land to total household per capita 
income was estimated to be small in Chile, Colombia, Peru and Honduras, reaching the highest income-
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Across countries the probability of being poor responds most clearly to education levels 
and to infrastructure. The relationship between the probability of being poor and land 
holding is less clear. In most countries, controlling for education and infrastructure (and 
given the low levels of both), changing land size reduces the probability of being poor 
only marginally. There are exceptions, however. In Nepal (Figure 28c), on average the 
probability of poverty decreases with increasing size of landholdings, from almost 80 
percent with no land to around 50 percent with 4 has; for Bangladesh (Figure 28d), the 
change is even greater. Further, for both countries across landholdings the association of 
infrastructure with a lower level of poverty is evident. However, the average size of 
landholdings in the wealthiest quintile of agricultural households in Bangladesh is only 
.84 has, and in Nepal .75 has. So, while the probability of being poor might be more 
sensitive to with land holdings than other countries, a reasonable range over which land 
holdings might increase is quite restricted, with a decline in poverty rates small in 
absolute terms.  
 
In most countries in the RIGA sample, the majority of the rural population simply lacks 
the assets necessary to exit poverty. Some countries, slightly richer, do tend to have 
greater access to infrastructure in rural areas, and higher levels of education, but in 
poorer countries the lack of access to assets is widespread. This raises the question, 
What is the scope for public policies that might have an impact over the medium-term 
horizon? For the adult population the level of schooling is almost given. Expanding the 
size of land holdings over a reasonable range appears only to offer a slight benefit in 
most of the RIGA countries, aside from the cost considerations. The evidence 
considered here points toward education for the young as a longer-term anti-poverty 
strategy – not only in terms of the quantity of schools and teachers, but incentives for 
attendance and improved quality of instruction. It also suggests that improving access to 
infrastructure could be a feasible, medium-term strategy, both by improving farmer 
access to markets, but also by improving employment opportunities in the non-farm 
sector, including wage labour.  
 
The role of rural labour markets 
 
The poorest of the poor often only have one asset—their own labour, making labour 
markets a key alternative for rural households. However, despite its increasing 
importance, the functioning of rural labour markets receives relatively little attention. In 
developing countries, the agricultural sector is a major employer of rural labour; it often 
employs those would might otherwise be farming but have limited or no access to land. 
Agricultural wage labour, however, is generally viewed as a low productivity activity 
that provides workers with a basic income for survival, sometimes serving as a means to 
diversify income. The evidence from most developing regions suggests that the rural 
labour force is growing faster than the agricultural labour force (World Bank 2008), 
raising concerns that the agricultural sector might be limited in its ability to absorb 
labour and to provide rural households with sufficient returns to exit poverty.  
 
                                                                                                                                               
to-land elasticity in El Salvador and Paraguay, but all elasticities less than 0.5 (and three less than 0.15). 
The elasticity of output to land is generally higher, fluctuating between 0.36 and 0.46. 
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The evidence provided thus far in this paper suggests that the rural non-farm labour 
market can provide an important source of income for rural households. What is less 
clear is the role that rural non-farm wage activities can play in providing an exit out of 
poverty for rural households, and how this may vary by gender, education and other 
characteristics of the individual and of the labour market. The current evidence suggests 
that the rural non-farm farm economy includes a mixed range of employment options, 
some of which play a role similar to farm work (low productivity and wages) and others 
providing higher-productivity and higher-wage options.  
 
Rural labour markets are likely to differ from urban markets primarily because of the 
central role of agriculture in the rural economy. Both the nature of the work done on 
farms and the seasonality of the demand for workers determines how rural labour is 
organized. Moreover, many rural households are likely to be involved in multiple 
economic activities, including agricultural production, in part due to the seasonal nature 
of farming. Rural labour markets are also likely to be conditioned by the absence of an 
infrastructure familiar to more densely populated areas. Without goods roads and 
communications, both workers and employers suffer higher transaction costs in labour 
market interactions, making them “thinner” than they would otherwise be in an urban 
setting. Search costs are higher in the coordination of employers and workers, and the 
higher costs of movement reduce geographic integration.  
 
The rest of this section explores participation in rural labour markets, focusing on some 
important characteristics of workers (gender, education, and wealth status) and on the 
distinction between employment in agriculture and employment in a variety of non-farm 
sectors.  For example, consider first the influence of gender in labour market 
participation and wage earnings. There is often an expectation that women are likely to 
participate in different occupations than men; they are also more likely to work on a 
part-time or seasonal basis and earn less from employment activities. Sometimes, 
women are not encouraged to work outside the household and family farm, while in 
other situations women have more leeway. The range of the type of work that women 
might do varies by countries and traditions.  
 
Along with gender, education and age are also likely to play a role in labour choices. 
Those with higher levels of education are expected to find more lucrative jobs, which 
means they are less likely to be in agriculture and more likely to be in non-farm 
activities and working full time. In terms of age, many of the changes in rural labour 
markets appear to be linked to a shift in younger individuals toward non-farm activities 
while older members remain in agriculture or other lower return activities. This, of 
course, may be linked to improvements in the number of years of schooling and the 
quality of instruction of younger households as public investments in education 
increase. 
 
In markets for agricultural wage employment, it has been observed that permanent 
workers often earn less than the daily rate of casual workers, but nevertheless earn 
greater annual incomes. One argument for why this occurs is that employers are willing 
to pay permanent workers during both peak and slack seasons in order to elicit a greater 
commitment from workers, especially in some jobs for which the cost of supervision is 
high (Eswaran and Kotwal, 1985). For workers, the benefit is a higher annual income 
and a reduced risk of having to search for new employment. This also can be a 
mechanism to assure employment for the worker and labour access for land owners 
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during the peak labour demand seasons. Similarly, it has been viewed as a mechanism 
to ensure that the labourer has sufficiently high nutrition in the slack season to perform 
efficiently on the job during the peak season.  
 
Along with possible differences in wage earnings, there is also a question of whether 
agriculture, by virtue of its seasonal production, tends to lead to more casual work 
opportunities than non-farm activities. While seasonal employment demand would be 
consistent with the liquidity constraints of smallholder farmers, it could also limit the 
ability of workers’ households to exit poverty. Recent evidence from Brazil shows that 
seasonality in agricultural employment has increased over recent decades with greater 
employment fluctuations across seasons in recent years than previously understood 
(World Bank 2008).  
 
Data from 14 RIGA countries serve to compare agricultural and non-agricultural labour 
market participation, and here the focus turns from the household to the individual 
labourer of working age (between the ages of 15 and 60). Along with the data on rural 
labour market activities, the availability of individual and household level variables 
allows for an understanding of how participation and remuneration vary based on 
individual and household characteristics, such as gender, education, age, and wealth. 
Table 26 shows the basic rates of participation in wage labour in rural countries for the 
14 countries. 37  
 
A great deal of variance in overall participation rates is evident, suggesting substantial 
differences in the rural labour markets in each country. Further, countries with very 
disparate economies and levels of development have similar participation rates; for 
example, the countries with the lowest rates are Ghana and Albania at 8 and 14 percent, 
respectively, while those with the highest rates of overall participation are Nepal and 
Bulgaria (65 and 47 percent). That said, the four Latin American countries have nearly 
uniform rates between 34 and 39 percent, while in the South and East Asian countries 
the participation rate varies between 25 and 65 percent.  In most of these 14 countries of 
the RIGA dataset, men have higher rates of participation in rural labour markets, 
making up between 60 to 80 percent of total participation. In three countries 
(Bangladesh, Nepal and Bulgaria), however, men and women have more or less equal 
shares of labour market participation. 
Agricultural versus non-agricultural labour markets 
Wide variation is also evident in the division of wage employment by agricultural and 
non-agricultural labour markets, as seen in Table 27. While in most countries non-
agricultural wage labour is more prevalent, in the South and East Asian and Latin 
American countries the share are relatively balanced, while in the Eastern European and 
Sub Saharan African countries the large majority (from 70 to 80 percent) is made up of 
non-agricultural employment. The one exception is Malawi, where 82 percent of wage 
                                                 
37 These figures derive from data on persons who (a) responded to participation questions in surveys, (b) 
responded to labour time and earnings questions, and (c) had a calculable value of monthly earnings that 
was not equal to zero. Individuals could have participated in agricultural and non-farm wage employment 
and could have participated in multiple jobs. The overall participation rates by country in Table 26 are 
necessarily calculated at the level of the individual, created by adding up each person’s various jobs. 
Note, however, that job-level and individual-level results are very similar, since most individuals in these 
13 datasets that have wage employment report only one job. For greater on methodological issues, please 
consult the Appendix III.  
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employment is in agricultural wage labour. A further disaggregating of non-agricultural 
wage labour by industry (Table 28) shows that in most countries services represents the 
largest sector, followed by commerce, construction and manufacturing.  In all countries 
except for three, as with the household level analysis described earlier, participation in 
agricultural wage employment is higher among individuals located in the lower 
expenditure quintiles (Table 29). This is particularly true in the Latin American 
countries and Nepal. Conversely, in almost all countries participation in non-agricultural 
wage employment is higher among individuals in the middle to upper expenditure 
quintiles.  
 
Participants in non-agricultural labour markets have higher levels of education. As can 
be seen in Table 30, in all countries, a higher share of participants in non-agricultural 
labour markets, as compared to those participating in agricultural wage employment, 
have a high school and above education, and for most countries, a middle-school level 
of education as well. Conversely, in almost all countries, the large majority of 
participants in agricultural wage labour have no formal education or only a primary 
school education.  
 
These higher levels of education are associated with better daily wages, as can be seen 
in Figure 29. In most countries, the distribution of daily wages shifts to the right with 
greater levels of education. The only exception is Vietnam, where there is essentially no 
difference between wages. Given the higher levels of education in non-agricultural 
wage employment, it is not surprising that non-farm wages are higher, as can be 
observed with the distribution of daily wages by sector shown in Figure 30. For all 
countries, again with the exception of Vietnam, the distribution of daily wages in non-
farming is to the right of the distribution of farm wages.  
 
Not surprisingly, gender differences in labour market participation emerge by sector 
(Table 31). Women have relatively higher shares of participation in agricultural wage 
labour in three countries—Malawi, Indonesia and Vietnam. Conversely, women have 
relatively higher shares of participation in non-farming labour, but lower participation in 
farming labour, in all four Latin American countries. As can be seen in Table 32, for 
these four countries, as well as Vietnam and Albania, women working in the non-farm 
sector participate most frequently in services compared to men.  
 
Perhaps more surprising, as can be seen in Figure 31, in the 13 countries under study, 
women have an equal or better distribution of daily non-agricultural wages. At the same 
time, women have an equal or worse distribution of daily agricultural wages. For most 
countries, following the pattern described earlier, male and female daily non-
agricultural wages are greater than male and female agricultural wages. In Bangladesh, 
Nepal, Bulgaria, Nicaragua and Panama, the distribution of male and female daily 
wages in both sectors are essentially the same. Even more, in Ghana, Malawi, Vietnam, 
Indonesia, Ecuador and Guatemala, the distribution of female non-agricultural wage is 
greater then that of males.  However, the distribution of female agricultural wages is 
lower then that of males in Nigeria, Indonesia, Vietnam, Ecuador and Guatemala. Of 
course, a formal multivariate treatment is needed to distinguish with more certainly 
between gender and other individual and household characteristics that may vary 
systematically with gender, most importantly education and wealth. 
Full vs. casual labour 
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Participation in rural labour markets varies by the amount of time dedicated to activities 
with some individuals working full time for the entire year while others working as 
casual or seasonal labour. Both the duration and the frequency of work likely influence 
the level of wages and final earnings. We categorize workers according to full-year 
versus part-year (reflecting seasonality) and then between full-time and part-time (an 
indicator permanent or casual work): (i) Full-Year-Full-Time (FYFT), (ii) Full- Year-
Part-Time (FYPT), (iii) Part-Year-Full-Time (PYFT), and (iv) Part-Year-Part-Time 
(PYPT).38 For three countries (Ghana, Nigeria and Bulgaria) due to data limitations we 
can only distinguish between full time and part time, and not full year versus part year. 
Each category of work presents a different set of opportunities and challenges to the 
worker. The participation rates in these categories for the RIGA countries are shown in 
Table 33.  
 
Once again, as can be seen in Table 33, while there is wide variation among countries, 
some trends do emerge. First, whether full or part year, most employment is full time 
instead of part time. Over half of the countries – and all four Latin American countries – 
are more or less evenly split between full year and part year employment. For these 
seven countries, most of either full year or part year employment is full time; only 
around 20 percent of all rural employment is part time. Only in Bangladesh are rural 
labour markets primarily full year. In only three countries (Malawi, Nepal and Vietnam) 
are rural labour markets primarily part year, and in two of these countries, Malawi and 
Nepal, is the majority of part year employment also part time.  
 
One question of interest is whether the wages found in casual and seasonal work are 
higher or lower than those for full time employees. There is some evidence found in 
agricultural labour markets that daily wages are higher for seasonal and casual workers 
compared to permanent workers although incomes for permanent workers are higher. 
The reasoning for this is that permanent workers are willing to forego higher wages in 
the peak season for obtaining wages in the lean season. On the other hand, in many 
cases full time jobs may be higher productivity jobs and thus receive higher wages. 
Looking at the distribution of wages by time category in Figure 32, few clear patterns 
are evident. In Ghana, Nigeria, Indonesia and Bulgaria, part time employment is better 
remunerated. On the other hand, in the four Latin American countries, Bangladesh, 
Nepal and Malawi full time employment is better paid. 
 
Agricultural wage employment, given its seasonal nature, is more likely to be part year 
employment, which in fact is what we can seen in Table 34, were a larger share of non-
agricultural wage employment is full year. Still, surprisingly, approximately one-third 
of agricultural wage employment in the Latin American countries is full time, year 
round, and more then half in Bangladesh and Ghana.  
 
As can be seen in Table 35, for more then half of the countries no differences are 
evident between men and women, but in six countries women have relatively lower 
participation in full time employment. The largest difference is found in Ghana, where 
more then 60 percent of men participating in rural labour markets have full time 
employment, compared to 40 percent of women. Smaller, though significant, 
differences are found in Malawi, Indonesia, Ecuador and Guatemala. Moreover, in three 
countries women have a disproportionately higher share of participation in part year, 
                                                 
38 The precise definitions of these variables can be found in Quiñones et al. (2008). 
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part time employment (Malawi, Indonesia and Vietnam). Only Panama shows 
somewhat more stability of employment for women, with a higher share of full time, 
full year employment, and a low share of part year, part time.   
 
Overall, the analysis of the RIGA data provides a heterogeneous picture of rural labour 
markets. For almost all of the countries of the RIGA dataset, of those who participate in 
wage employment, half or more work in non-farm jobs.  Malawi is a notable exception, 
where the major of rural wage employment is in agricultural wage labour. Overall, 
services, commerce, construction and manufacturing are the most frequent sub-sectors 
for non-farm rural workers, and most rural wage employment, and particularly in non-
farm jobs, is full time. Again in almost all countries, non-farm daily wages are greater 
than farm wages, and are generally associated with higher levels of education. Not 
surprisingly, participation in farm wage work is associated with lower levels of 
remuneration, as well as lower levels of education for the individual worker.  
 
In most of the RIGA countries, women participate less in rural labour markets. When 
they do participate, they work relatively less full time. In the Latin American countries 
considered here, women participate relatively less in farm wage work, while in other 
regions of the world women participate relatively more agricultural wage labour. More 
importantly, women do not necessarily have lower wages then men in non-agricultural 
wage activities, though men in a number of countries on average receive higher pay for 
agricultural wage labour. The analysis of returns to labour however, need to be more 
formally treated in a multivariate framework. 
 
5. The changing characteristics of the rural poor 
 
This section focuses on the changing structure of the rural economy and of the 
livelihood strategies of the rural poor as countries develop. As described earlier in this 
background paper, the process of structural transformation that accompanies economic 
development has led to a shift of the relative importance in agricultural and rural non-
farm economy in most developing countries. This shift that comes with development 
was suggested earlier in Figure 9 and Figure 17, which traced how the share of 
agricultural and non-farm income for rural households and the number of diversified 
households varied across countries by per capita GDP. There is, however, surprisingly 
little available empirical evidence, based on comparable data, at the country level 
showing this change over time.39  
 
This section explores the available evidence on changes over time in livelihood 
strategies, the composition of income and poverty dynamics. First, we bring together 
available comparable cross-sectional data sources to look descriptively at changes over 
time. Second, given the paucity of long term panel data with which to analyze country 
level dynamics in the composition of income, we compare the strategies of rural 
households in countries at different stages in the development path.  
 
                                                 
39 See Hazel, Haggblade and Reardon (2007) for a review of changes in the composition of income over 
multiple decades in countries such as China, Japan, India, South Korea and Taiwan, and Reardon, 
Berdegue, Barrett and Stamoulis (2007) for a review of country level data on the composition of income, 
including an early version of the RIGA data. For many of the countries with multiple years of data, the 
numbers are not necessarily comparable over time, due to differences in sample and definitions. 
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Changes in the composition of rural income over time 
 
We use two comparable data sources in order to examine rural income changes over 
time: data for those RIGA dataset countries for which there is more than one year of 
information, and data for other countries for which multiple years of information are 
available from repeated cross-sections of the same survey instrument. For the RIGA 
dataset countries one can be reasonably confident that differences over time are real, 
and not due to changes in sampling properties or changes in definitions and the methods 
of the construction of income variables.  For non-RIGA countries definitional and 
construction differences might exist, because the results summarized here are from 
secondary sources. 
 
For most of both the RIGA and non-RIGA countries, one indeed finds decreases in the 
average household share of income which comes from agricultural sources. As can be 
seen in Table 36, Figure 33, and Figure 34, these decreases are evident across a wide 
variety of countries, across different continents, and at different levels of development: 
Albania, Bulgaria, Ghana, Indonesia, Nepal and Pakistan among the RIGA countries, 
and Bangladesh, Chile, China, Mexico and the Philippines among the non RIGA 
countries. For four of the RIGA countries for which we have data (Ecuador, Nicaragua, 
Panama and Vietnam) no change is evident over time.  
 
For the RIGA countries, Figure 35 further disaggregates the changes in the composition 
of income of rural households by expenditure quintile. As noted in the earlier discussion 
above, for most countries the poor tend to have a higher share of agricultural income. 
For all of the countries with a decreasing share of agricultural income in total income, 
the reduction is spread evenly over expenditure quintiles. For two of the countries where 
the shares remain constant over time, Ecuador and Panama, the trend reverses, with the 
poor increasing their share of agricultural income over time.  
Development, the changing income strategies of rural households and poverty 
 
Classical economic studies often used inter-country macro-level comparisons to 
understand the process of economic and social development (Kuznets, Lewis, Engel, 
Chenery and Syrquin). At the core of these studies is the assumption that there exists a 
set of underlying processes that drive the development of an economy. While the 
interactions and details of the processes may differ at a country level, a universal 
relation drives the development process. The existence of these macro-level, universal 
development patterns lends credence to the possibility of similar micro-level household 
development patterns. Much in the spirit of Chenery and Syrquin’s idea that economic 
development leads to a shrinking agricultural sector and expanding industrial and 
service sectors, we posit that household development in rural areas exhibits a similar 
pattern. That is, as the rural economy grows, household participation and the intensity of 
involvement in farm activities declines and is gradually replaced by participation and 
more intensive involvement in rural non-farm activities. While gains in wealth do not 
lead to complete divestment from farm activities and some households remain 
successful in agricultural production, on average the share of income households derive 
from farm activities declines and the share from rural non-farm activities increases 
substantially as the rural economy expands and per capita income grows. The pattern 
appears to be driven by a process of accumulation of assets and investment in education 
and infrastructure, contained within the framework of a dynamic rural economy. 
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We first consider this hypothesis by using simple descriptive graphs, comparing rural 
income diversification and household level specialization and diversification by per 
capita GDP using the RIGA dataset. As seen previously, as a general rule the share of 
rural on-farm income falls, and the share of rural non-agricultural income increases, 
with increasing levels of GDP per capita. Similarly, this time looking at household 
patterns of specialization and diversification, as can be seen in Figure 36 the share of 
on-farm specializing households drops as per capita GDP increases. However, as we 
saw earlier in Figure 17, household level diversification follows an inverted U with 
respect to per capita GDP. 
 
Second, we carry out a more formal test of the existence of a universal pattern of rural 
development with respect to income generation that is akin to the well-known 
development pattern, Engel’s Law, which hypothesized that poorer households devote a 
higher share of their income, and thus expenditures, on food than wealthier households. 
Tests of Engel’s Law seek to verify the relationship between food expenditure and total 
income while we seek to determine a relationship between sets of income generating 
activities (agricultural production, agricultural wage, non-farm wage and non-farm self 
employment) and total income earned.  Since the approach to estimating Engel’s law 
has been well-established, a similar approach has been employed here.  Details on the 
estimation approach can be found in Appendix II. 
 
Table 37 reports the results of the analysis of each of 15 RIGA countries as well as the 
analysis of a megadata set which includes all 15 countries together.  The results indicate 
that in all countries except Madagascar, as per capita income increases the share of 
income from non-farm wage employment increases significantly.  The size of the 
elasticities varies from as low as 0.5 percent to over 10 percent.  The analysis of non-
farm self employment follows a similar pattern in all countries with elasticities ranging 
from 2 percent to 20 percent.  The results indicate that as rural households get wealthier 
they do indeed tend to obtain more income from non-farm sources.  
 
The results for agricultural activities are a bit more mixed.  In the Latin American and 
Eastern European countries, there appears to be a negative relationship between the 
share of income from agricultural production and total income but a positive 
relationship between agricultural wage shares and income.  In the Asian countries, with 
the exception of Indonesian agricultural wages, agricultural production and agricultural 
wage shares are negatively associated with income, and among the African countries the 
picture is mixed.   
 
The main question we want to answer, however, is how these elasticities vary by level 
of development. The estimated values are plotted against GDP per capita and fitted with 
a trend line in Figure 37; clear patterns emerge.  In poorer countries, the elasticities for 
agricultural production are positive or only slightly negative suggesting that agriculture 
remains a key source of income for relatively wealthy households.  For the wealthier 
countries, as household income increases the share of agriculture in total income 
decreases.  In contrast, the results suggest that in countries with greater levels of 
national wealth non-agricultural wage income becomes increasingly important with 
rising elasticities; thus, income gains tend to bring about larger shifts to non-agricultural 
wage employment.  Non-agricultural self employment shows similar positive estimated 
elasticities in all cases (note the scale on this graph differs and the values are much 
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higher due to an outlier).  Regardless of the level of development, income gains at the 
household level are associated with a shift toward more non-agricultural self-
employment income earnings.  Somewhat surprisingly, agricultural wage employment 
is not uniformly negatively associated with income earnings.  In fact, agricultural 
employment appears to be negatively associated with income only in the poorest 
countries.  In better off countries, the share of income earned from agricultural wage 
employment increases slightly with higher income levels.  
 
To get an overall picture of what these elasticities suggest in terms of a broader pattern 
of rural development, Figure 38 provides predicted shares from different income 
generating activities and how they relate to per capita income using the megadata.40   
Overall, the figure confirms our hypothesis and highlights the clear shift from 
agriculture to non-agricultural activities as per capita income rises. On average, as 
development occurs, households with higher levels of income earn a smaller proportion 
of their income from agricultural production and a greater proportion of their income 
from non-agricultural wage employment and self employment.  The shift from 
agricultural production to non-agricultural activities is most pronounced at lower levels 
of development (below $500 per capita) where shares from non-farm wage and self 
employment both go from below 10 percent to nearly 20 and shares of agricultural 
production decreases from 60 percent to under half of income.  Agricultural wage 
employment income represents over 20 percent of income of the poorest households but 
drops quickly to just above 10 percent and remains steady across the remaining 
distribution, while transfers and other income represent about 10 percent of income 
shares across the range of income levels.   
  
6. Some concluding remarks on addressing the challenges to alleviating rural 
poverty  
 
The magnitude of the problem of rural poverty in developing countries can seem 
overwhelming. About 2.6 billion people live on less than two dollars a day, and nearly a 
billion live on less than one dollar a day. In Sub-Saharan Africa, agricultural-based 
countries are poor in terms of per capita GDP and face a rural poverty rate of 51 percent 
on average. Transforming economies – not yet urbanized but dependent on agriculture 
and mainly in Asia – have a lower rural poverty rate of 28 percent, but represent 77 
percent of the developing world’s rural population – and 74 percent of the rural poor.  
Developing urbanized economies have a much lower rate of rural poverty – 13 percent – 
but only represent 9 percent of the developing world’s rural population and 4 percent of 
the rural poor.  
 
Progress toward alleviating poverty has been elusive in many countries, notably in 
South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa, where poverty rates have remained stagnant. But 
there has been progress elsewhere, with a fall in the absolute number of the world’s 
poor, mainly due to economic growth in East Asia, especially China. And in Latin 
America the number of poor has been falling in number and percentages since the year 
                                                 
40 For the merged data, it is necessary to make per capita income comparable across the 15 RIGA 
countries. This was done using purchasing power exchange rates for the year in question and then 
deflating the values using the consumer price index to get real 2005 US dollars.  In order to allow a more 
flexible specification, the natural log (and squared term) of per capita income are included in the 
estimation (as are the other terms in equation 1). 
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2000. These differences in the trends in poverty across regions highlight the importance 
of economic growth generally to poverty reduction and the importance of public 
policies that foster pro-poor growth.  
 
This background paper concentrated its attention on household-level attributes and 
decisions – activities and assets – which underline the practical links between public 
policies and the enhancement of opportunities of households to exit poverty. One basic 
link is between policy and growth. Associated with rapid economic growth is the 
expansion of employment opportunities beyond the farm. Growth also delivers fiscal 
resources that permit expansion of public policies, in infrastructure and education, but 
also in safety nets for those who find the new opportunities related to growth out of 
reach. A second basic link is between access to assets and the ability to exit poverty. We 
have focused on three key assets in our discussion: education, farm land and public 
infrastructure.  
 
A number of key messages emerge. First, an increase in the diversification of income 
sources is important to fighting poverty through the incorporation of more rural workers 
into non-farm activities. Across countries, with economic development overall there is 
an increase in the share of non-farm income in rural areas. Second, the relative 
importance of the three basic assets, bundled or by themselves, varies by country and 
context. However, in most cases the poor are those with low levels of all three assets. 
Third, in few of the countries under study did a significant share of rural households 
have high levels of all three assets, or even two of the three. Most importantly, higher 
levels of education are almost without exception associated with higher household 
incomes, especially when families have access to other assets, in particular 
infrastructure and the opportunities and the ability to engage in multiple activities. 
Moreover, higher levels of education permit mobility within and between rural and 
urban areas, and are associated with higher individual returns to labour. 
 
The scope is limited, however, for public policies with an impact on rural poverty in the 
medium-term horizon. For adults the level of schooling is difficult to improve 
significantly beyond some initiatives for training. For younger rural residents, 
investment in education is the principle avenue for escaping poverty as they reach 
working age. The evidence considered here points toward education for the young as a 
longer-term anti-poverty strategy – not only in terms of the quantity of schools and 
teachers, but incentives for attendance and improved quality of instruction. Beyond a 
general education policy for rural areas, special attention should be given to 
marginalized groups, which often have higher rates of poverty, less access to 
infrastructure, and lower levels of schooling. 
 
In contrast, it is less clear whether it is possible to expand the size of land holdings to 
such a degree that it might significantly raise incomes. Expanding land holdings over a 
feasible range might increase agricultural production but raise family income only 
slightly. Moreover, there are other policy considerations. Surplus land might not be 
available because of population density, and the costs of land transfers are large and 
many times ineffective without further, expensive support to beneficiaries for working 
capital and longer-term investments. Further, involuntary land transfers generate strong 
political tensions and undermine the credibility of property rights. The encouragement 
of land markets, however, especially rental markets, might offer an attractive option for 
farm-income-based families with the opportunity to expand. Again, in the case of 
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marginalized groups, specific policies should be considered in the light of the legal and 
institutional obstacles they face in making better use of land resources. Similar 
institutional improvements could be applied to water markets.  
 
In the medium term improving access to infrastructure appears to be among the most 
feasible and effective medium-term strategies. Rural infrastructure both improves 
farmer access to markets and expands employment opportunities in the non-farm sector. 
As discussed in previous sections, and supported by data from the RIGA countries, 
investments in infrastructure – most notably rural roads – tend to have a large impact on 
poverty reduction, and there is evidence that they also enhance agricultural productivity. 
The literature on the complementarities of policy instruments shows that with 
telephones and roads, for example, households can diversify income sources. A policy 
of providing better rural infrastructure could also influence the accumulation of human 
capital, improving both access to schooling and healthcare. Indeed, improved road 
networks, and the consequent improvement in local transportation and safety, leads to 
improved school attendance. The wider accessibility of electricity in rural areas 
produces a range of benefits; one in particular – more time for school study – in turn 
improves school performance. Investments in water and sanitation reduce infant, child, 
and maternal mortality, and increase school attainment. The mix of public expenditures 
can take advantage of these synergies. 
For many farming areas agriculture will remain for the foreseeable future not only the 
mainstay of economic activity but the main income source of the bulk of rural families, 
and particularly the poor. While infrastructure investments would enhance access to 
markets, and reduce the costs of all transactions for agriculture generally, in order to 
improve the wellbeing of most smallholders policy makers should also consider the 
merits of specific institutional innovations. In the longer run many countries would 
benefit – rural areas especially – by the improvement the security of property rights, 
including the facilitation land transfers and rentals. In terms of having a shorter-term, 
program-oriented focus on farm families, development efforts can encourage farmer 
organizations, such as cooperatives, that might better be able to take advantage of scale 
economies, both for input purchases, technological transfers, and in accessing markets.  
This background paper has shown the importance of different economic activities for 
improving rural family incomes, and the importance of the access to the assets that 
allow households to take advantage of available opportunities. One can extract from the 
results of previous studies, and the evidence presented here for a sample of countries, 
that, in order to reduce rural poverty, policies should concentrate both on improving 
household activities already available – most prominently farming – and on expanding 
the range of potential activities of family members. The lesson from experience and 
much of the rural development literature is that the income generating potential – the 
ability to access and take advantage of activities – depends crucially on access to assets, 
such as education, land, and infrastructure.  
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Tables 
 
 
 
Table 1. Projected population growth in selected countries and regions, 2010-2050 
 
 Population in millions % change % urban 
Region and countries 2010 2030 2050 2010-2030 2010 2030 
Least developed countries 863 1,301 1,742 50.6 29.0 40.9 
Less developed (excluding least) 4,811 5,756 6,204 19.7 48.4 59.6 
China 1,352 1,458 1,409 7.9 44.9 60.3 
India 1,220 1,506 1,658 23.4 30.1 40.6 
Sub-Saharan Africa 867 1,308 1,761 50.9 37.3 48.2 
Latin America and Caribbean 594 713 769 20.1 79.1 84.3 
United States of America 315 366 402 16.4 82.3 87.0 
Russian Federation 140 128 108 -8.6 72.6 75.7 
North, West and South Europe 440 449 442 2.0 75.4 80.6 
World 6,907 8,318 9,191 20.4 50.6 59.7 
Source: Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations 
Secretariat, World Population Prospects. These are median projections. The group of least developed 
countries, as defined by the United Nations General Assembly in 2003, comprises 50 countries, of which 
34 are in Africa, 10 in Asia, 1 in Latin America and the Caribbean, and 5 in Oceania. The group of less 
developed regions includes all least developed plus middle income countries. They comprise all regions 
of Africa, Asia (excluding Japan), Latin America and the Caribbean plus Melanesia, Micronesia and 
Polynesia. 
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Table 2. Trends in crops used for ethanol and bio-diesel, projections 1995-2016. 
 Million metric tons of crop production  
Year US Canada EU 
Total of US, 
Canada and 
EU 
Brazil 
 maize maize wheat wheat maize oilseeds maize sugar cane 
1995 14,225 18 53    14,243 146,051 
1996 10,745 18 53    10,763 151,850 
1997 12,701 150 60    12,851 158,553 
1998 13,666 330 113    13,996 165,806 
1999 14,352 330 110    14,682 172,627 
2000 15,927 330 133    16,257 166,924 
2001 17,298 330 115    17,628 163,853 
2002 20,804 330 90 0 0 2,815 21,134 172,971 
2003 27,357 330 119 0 0 3,734 27,687 182,196 
2004 33,607 330 130 500 0 4,735 33,937 198,493 
2005 40,718 393 130 1,000 300 7,568 41,411 205,620 
2006 54,613 1,001 400 1,400 500 7,993 56,114 222,652 
2007 81,284 2,479 1,163 2,851 2,654 10,204 86,417 249,868 
2008 93,985 3,438 1,285 4,151 2,966 11,154 100,388 276,042 
2009 99,065 3,501 1,455 5,533 3,336 13,044 105,903 301,233 
2010 101,605 3,565 1,481 6,926 3,727 15,652 108,897 325,494 
2011 103,510 3,598 1,495 9,408 4,150 16,767 111,259 353,680 
2012 105,416 3,632 1,509 11,906 4,606 18,550 113,653 381,608 
2013 106,686 3,665 1,523 13,483 5,102 18,921 115,453 409,281 
2014 107,956 3,699 1,537 14,931 5,147 19,489 116,802 436,705 
2015 109,226 3,733 1,551 16,301 5,193 20,074 118,153 463,881 
2016 110,496 3,768 1,566 17,798 5,240 20,676 119,504 490,814 
% change 
2007-2016 35.9 52.0 34.7 524.3 97.5 102.6 38.3 96.4 
Source: Authors’ tabulations from data referenced in Figures 1.2 to 1.4 in OECD-FAO Agricultural 
Outlook 2007, Chapter 1. Projections are based on OECD assumptions regarding countries’ biofuel 
policies already in place. 
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Table 3a. Incidence of poverty by region (EAP, SAS and SSA) and by urban/rural, 
$1.08 a day, 1993-2002 
  Number of poor in millions Headcount index (%) Urban 
share of 
the poor 
(%) 
Urban 
share of 
the 
population 
(%) 
Rural 
share of 
the poor 
(%) 
1993 Urban Rural Total Urban Rural Total    
EAP 28.71 407.17 435.88 5.55 35.47 26.17 6.59 31.09 93.41
SAS 107.48 383.3 490.78 35.3 43.55 41.43 21.9 25.7 78.10
SSA 66.42 206.73 273.15 40.21 53.07 49.24 24.32 29.78 75.68
Total 235.58 1036.41 1271.99 13.5 36.58 27.78 18.52 38.12 81.48
1996                   
EAP 19.34 264.54 283.88 3.34 23 16.41 6.81 33.49 93.19
SAS 115.43 384.97 500.4 34.82 41.63 39.84 23.07 26.39 76.93
SSA 82.32 221.37 303.69 43.41 53.97 50.63 27.11 31.62 72.89
Total 256.96 914.02 1170.98 13.56 31.45 24.39 21.94 39.47 78.06
1999                   
EAP 19.53 268.24 287.76 3.02 23.46 16.08 6.79 36.1 93.22
SAS 120.15 402.4 522.55 33.41 41.59 39.37 22.99 27.1 77.01
SSA 92.05 228.85 320.9 42.57 53.14 49.61 28.69 33.43 71.32
Total 274.36 945.15 1219.51 13.37 31.87 24.31 22.5 40.89 77.50
2002                   
EAP 16.27 223.23 239.5 2.28 19.83 13.03 6.79 38.79 93.21
SAS 125.4 394.34 519.74 32.21 39.05 37.15 24.13 27.83 75.87
SSA 98.84 228.77 327.61 40.38 50.86 47.17 30.17 35.24 69.83
Total 282.52 882.77 1165.29 12.78 29.32 22.31 24.24 42.34 75.76
Source: Ravallion et al. (2007) 
Note: EAP = East Asia and the Pacific, ECA = Eastern Europe and Central Asia, LAC = Latin America 
and the Caribbean, MNA= Middle East and North Africa, SAS = South Asia, SSA = Sub-Saharan Africa. 
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Table 3b. Incidence of poverty by region (EAP, SAS and SSA) and by urban/rural, 
$2.15 a day, 1993-2002 
  Number of poor in millions Headcount index (%) Urban 
share of 
the poor 
(%) 
Urban share 
of the 
population 
(%) 
Rural 
share of 
the poor 
(%) 
1993 Urban Rural Total Urban Rural Total    
EAP 199.84 976.38 1176.22 38.6 85.07 70.62 16.99 31.09 83.01
SAS 237.38 770.65 1008.02 77.97 87.56 85.09 23.55 25.7 76.45
SSA 110.45 331.96 442.41 66.86 85.22 79.75 24.97 29.78 75.03
Total 683.15 2214.65 2897.8 39.14 78.17 63.29 23.57 38.12 76.43
1996                   
EAP 169.18 812.09 981.26 29.21 70.6 56.73 17.24 33.49 82.76
SAS 259.94 813.58 1073.52 78.42 87.99 85.46 24.21 26.39 75.79
SSA 131.64 346.62 478.25 69.42 84.51 79.74 27.52 31.62 72.48
Total 723.7 2118.04 2841.74 38.19 72.88 59.19 25.47 39.47 74.53
1999                   
EAP 166.03 796.67 962.69 25.7 69.68 53.81 17.25 36.1 82.75
SAS 270.88 846.45 1117.33 75.32 87.48 84.19 24.24 27.1 75.76
SSA 150.54 362.76 513.3 69.63 84.24 79.36 29.33 33.43 70.67
Total 760.9 2160.71 2921.61 37.09 72.85 58.23 26.04 40.89 73.96
2002                   
EAP 126.71 711.45 838.16 17.77 63.21 45.59 15.12 38.79 84.88
SAS 290.29 876.3 1166.59 74.56 86.78 83.38 24.88 27.83 75.12
SSA 167.72 370.83 538.55 68.52 82.45 77.54 31.14 35.24 68.86
Total 745.94 2097.29 2843.23 33.73 69.65 54.44 26.24 42.34 73.76
Source: Ravallion et al. (2007)  
 
 
 
Table 4. Projected rural-urban primary income ratios, purchasing power adjusted 
 1980 1990 2000 
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.26 0.41 0.49 
Asia (without China and India) 0.29 0.31 0.33 
Middle East and North Africa 0.34 0.60 0.47 
Latin America and the 
Caribbean 
0.32 0.44 0.49 
Europe and Central Asia 0.66 0.67 0.69 
India  0.17 0.16 0.11 
China 0.41 0.39 0.34 
Source:  Bezemer and Hazell (2007) 
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Table 5. Dependency ratios and changes by region, rural and urban 
 National  
Dependency Ratio  
Urban  
Dependency Ratio 
Rural  
Dependency Ratio 
 Urban – 
Rural† 
Region Average Std. 
Deviation 
Average Std. 
Deviation 
Average Std. 
Deviation 
Obs.  
East Asia & Pacific 0.67 0.13 0.56 0.12 0.73 0.14 25 -- 
E Europe & Central Asia 0.58 0.12 0.51 0.08 0.67 0.14 21 -- 
Latin America & Caribbean 0.70 0.11 0.63 0.07 0.82 0.16 36 -- 
Middle East & North Africa 0.87 0.14 0.77 0.13 0.99 0.15 15 -- 
South Asia  0.84 0.12 0.67 0.09 0.91 0.15 14 -- 
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.93 0.14 0.74 0.16 1.02 0.15 39 -- 
High income: non OECD 0.58 0.09 0.54 0.09 0.65 0.10 13 -- 
High income: OECD 0.52 0.06 0.49 0.06 0.57 0.06 35 -- 
          
Total  0.71 0.18 0.61 0.14 0.79 0.21 198 -- 
  
 Mean Yearly % Change 
National Dependency Ratio 
Mean Yearly % Change 
Urban Dependency Ratio 
Mean Yearly % Change 
Rural Dependency Ratio  
 Urban – 
Rural† 
Region Average Std. 
Deviation 
Average Std. 
Deviation 
Average Std. 
Deviation 
Obs.  
East Asia & Pacific -2.01 0.73 -2.08 1.49 -1.78 0.92 9 - 
E Europe & Central Asia -0.58 . -1.22 . 0.45 . 1 - 
Latin America & Caribbean -0.88 0.58 -0.71 0.62 -1.03 0.85 17 + 
Middle East & North Africa -1.59 0.92 -1.38 1.11 -1.48 0.63 5 + 
South Asia  -0.43 0.47 -0.91 0.94 -0.26 0.65 7 - 
Sub-Saharan Africa -0.48 0.71 -0.69 0.46 -0.24 0.74 8 - 
High income: non OECD -1.04 0.98 -0.92 0.88 -1.03 1.22 5 + 
High income: OECD -0.83 1.08 -0.74 1.03 -0.89 1.16 18 + 
          
Total  -0.98 0.91 -0.98 1.02 -0.93 1.02 70 - 
Source: Anríquez (2007).  The Femininity Ratio refers to the number of females for every 100 males. 
† +/– Identifies the sign of the difference between urban and rural mean. ++/-- Indicates that the difference is statistically significant at 90% using a t-test. 
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Table 6. The ratio of females to males by region, national, rural and urban 
 National  
Femininity Ratio 
Urban  
Femininity Ratio 
Rural  
Femininity Ratio 
 Urban – 
Rural† 
Region Average Std. 
Deviation 
Average Std. 
Deviation 
Average Std. 
Deviation 
Obs.  
East Asia & Pacific 99.2 4.7 99.0 7.8 99.0 5.2 28  
E Europe & Central Asia 106.2 5.6 107.5 6.2 104.5 6.3 27 ++ 
Latin America & Caribbean 102.3 2.6 107.2 2.9 92.6 7.5 43 ++ 
Middle East & North Africa 95.7 3.2 94.7 4.3 96.4 3.7 17 - 
South Asia  94.8 2.8 87.6 5.0 96.8 3.0 14 -- 
Sub-Saharan Africa 104.2 4.3 99.4 7.0 106.0 5.3 45 -- 
High income: non OECD 99.1 6.8 100.8 7.7 95.0 6.3 14 ++ 
High income: OECD 103.1 2.6 105.6 3.4 97.3 5.7 41 ++ 
          
Total  101.8 5.2 101.9 7.8 99.0 7.5 229 ++ 
  
 National  
Working Age (15-49) 
Femininity Ratio 
Urban  
Working Age (15-49) 
Femininity Ratio 
Rural 
Working Age(15-49) 
 Femininity Ratio 
 Urban – 
Rural† 
Region Average Std. 
Deviation 
Average Std. 
Deviation 
Average Std. 
Deviation 
Obs.  
East Asia & Pacific 100.9 5.3 99.9 9.7 100.7 6.6 28 - 
E Europe & Central Asia 100.3 2.9 103.2 5.5 95.6 6.7 27 ++ 
Latin America & Caribbean 103.6 3.1 109.2 4.2 91.4 9.5 42 ++ 
Middle East & North Africa 96.4 6.5 93.4 7.4 99.3 8.7 16 -- 
South Asia  97.8 4.8 84.3 7.9 103.3 7.3 14 -- 
Sub-Saharan Africa 110.3 6.7 98.1 10.4 116.3 10.3 42 -- 
High income: non OECD 97.8 9.1 100.1 10.0 92.0 8.9 14 ++ 
High income: OECD 98.2 2.3 100.7 2.8 92.2 4.6 40 ++ 
          
Total  101.9 6.7 100.4 9.5 99.2 12.1 223 + 
Source: Anríquez (2007).  The Femininity Ratio refers to the number of females for every 100 males. 
† +/– Identifies the sign of the difference between urban and rural mean. ++/-- Indicates that the difference is statistically significant at 90% using a t-test. 
 68
Table 7. Poverty rates, by ethnicity, in selected Latin-American countries 
Country Year Head-count index Indigenous 
Head-count index 
Non-indigenous 
Bolivia 1997 75.0 57.0 
Bolivia 2002 74.0 53.0 
Ecuador 1998 87.0 61.0 
Peru 1994 62.3 40.1 
Peru 2000 62.8 43.0 
Guatemala 1989 88.0 63.0 
Guatemala 2000 74.0 38.0 
Mexico 1992 90.0 49.1 
Mexico 2000 89.7 46.7 
Source: Psacharopoulos, G. and H. Patrinos (1994). 
 
Table 8. Poverty rates among Roma and Non-Roma households, 2000 
$ 2.15 PPP $ 4.30 PPP Country Roma Non-Roma Roma Non-Roma 
Bulgaria 41.4 4.1 80.1 36.8 
Hungary  6.6 0.5 40.3 6.9 
Romania 37.6 7.3 68.8 29.5 
Source: Revenga et al. (2002). 
 
Table 9. Poverty rates in Australia, 1994-95 
Indigenous Australians All Australians Equivalent 
income <40% <50% <60% <40% <50% <60% 
OECD scale 12.8 31.4 49.2 6.2 11.7 25.8 
Whiteford (1985) 10.9 31.2 47.7 6.1 17.3 28.0 
Square Root of 
Household size 13.5 33.2 41.8 7.9 20.9 28.7 
Source: Hunter (1999). 
 
 
Table 10. Poverty rates in ten developing countries, by gender of household head 
Poverty Line #1 Poverty Line #2 
Exp/Capita Exp/AE Exp/Capita Exp/AE Country 
MHH FHH MHH FHH MHH FHH MHH FHH 
Botswana 5.8 2.4 5.0 1.8 0.0 0.6 0.8 0.6 
Côte 
d’Ivoire 31.7 24.0* 32.3 31.0 8.2 6.2 7.5 9.3 
Ethiopia 99.6 100.0 99.6 100.0 99.6 100.0 99.6 100.0 
Ghana 62.0 69.9*** 66.5 69.6 77.2 85.5*** 81.1 85.8*** 
Madagascar 70.0 84.2 68.8 84.2* 75.3 84.2 77.6 89.5 
Rwanda 99.4 100.0 99.4 100.0 98.8 100.0 99.4 100.0 
Bangladesh 63.5 85.3*** 62.1 88.5*** 46.0 73.8*** 45.1 75.4*** 
Indonesia 87.8 85.0 80.1 85.0 90.5 90.0 83.7 85.0 
Nepal 95.5 94.4 95.1 94.4 77.2 94.4** 77.6 88.9 
Honduras 67.4 65.6 70.0 68.8 70.3 65.6 71.6 68.8 
Source: Quisumbing et al. (2001). 
Notes: Poverty line #1 = 365$/ year, local currency, current prices.  
Poverty line #2 = 365$/ year, local currency, PPP conversion. 
Exp/Capita = Total expenditure (income) per capita. 
Exp/AE = Total expenditure (income) per adult equivalent. 
*, **, and *** indicate difference between households is significant at the .1, .05, and 0.01 lever respectively. 
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Table 11. Rural Poverty by Gender of the Head of Household and Gender of the 
Individual 
  
Poverty by Gender of the 
Household Head FGT(0) Poverty by Gender FGT(0) 
Country Year FHH MHH Females Males 
Albania 2002 0.1217  0.1174   0.1239 ** 0.1121   
Albania 2005 0.1044  0.0963   0.1039 ** 0.0902   
Bangladesh 1991 0.6183  0.6232   0.6261  0.6201   
Bangladesh 2000 0.6357  0.7043 *** 0.7041 * 0.6965   
Bulgaria 1995 0.0465  0.0479   0.0544 * 0.0409   
Bulgaria 2001 0.0623  0.0932 ** 0.0934  0.0841   
Chile§ 1992 0.1791 *** 0.1397   0.1519 *** 0.1377   
Chile§ 2003 0.1455 *** 0.1151   0.1259 *** 0.1142   
Ecuador 1995 0.4435  0.4364   0.4429  0.4317   
Ecuador 1998 0.6490 ** 0.6259   0.6233  0.6336   
Ghana† 1991 0.6771  0.7359 *** 0.7253   0.7186   
Ghana† 1998 0.7237   0.7564 *** 0.7471   0.7495   
Guatemala 2000 0.3475  0.4650 *** 0.4567 ** 0.4453   
Indonesia 1993 0.8083  0.8362 *** 0.8328  0.8332   
Indonesia 2000 0.5599  0.5779 ** 0.5729  0.5780   
Madagascar 1993 0.9221 *** 0.8911   0.8994 * 0.8909   
Malawi 2004 0.8388 *** 0.7770   0.7965 *** 0.7821   
Nigeria 2003 0.8439  0.9354 *** 0.9293 ** 0.9248   
Nicaragua† 1998 0.7013  0.6940   0.6950  0.6956   
Nicaragua† 2001 0.6523  0.6623   0.6575  0.6634   
Nepal 1995 0.8060 *** 0.7723   0.7772  0.7740   
Nepal 2003 0.6344  0.6231   0.6306 * 0.6191   
Pakistan 1991 0.6351  0.6780   0.6797  0.6753   
Pakistan 2001 0.7176  0.7968 *** 0.7913  0.7918   
Panama 1997 0.3214  0.3804 *** 0.3655  0.3780 * 
Panama 2003 0.3212  0.3588 *** 0.3540  0.3509   
Thailand 2000 0.1676  0.1818 *** 0.1751  0.1829 ** 
Thailand 2002 0.0900  0.1200 *** 0.1085  0.1184 *** 
Vietnam 1993 0.7785  0.8214 *** 0.8137  0.8136   
Vietnam 1998 0.5596  0.6109 *** 0.6083 ** 0.5959   
Vietnam 2002 0.4113  0.5042 *** 0.4969 *** 0.4825   
Zambia 1996 0.9208 ** 0.9133   0.9202 *** 0.9093   
Zambia 2002 0.9149   0.9186   0.9199   0.9156   
Notes: Authors’ calculations using nationally representative household surveys.  
Poverty lines established at 2 PPP US$ per day 
† National Poverty line used. 
§ Income instead of consumption per capita used to measure poverty.  
 70
Table 12. Accumulation of assets by rural households, by gender of head of household 
 
Average Years of 
Education of the Head
Average Farm Size 
(ha) 
Average Tropical 
Livestock Units 
Country/ Region FHH MHH FHH MHH FHH MHH 
Africa          
Ghana 1998 2.4 3.2 0.87 1.30 0.16 0.89 
Madagascar 1993 1.9 3.0 0.66 1.24 0.61 1.77 
Malawi 2004 2.3 4.8 1.21 1.59 0.22 0.35 
Nigeria 2004 1.9 2.7 N/A N/A 0.23 0.79 
Asia          
Bangladesh 2000 1.1 2.8 0.14 0.37 0.13 0.57 
Indonesia 2000 3.6 6.8 0.29 0.94 N/A N/A 
Nepal 1996 0.4 2.1 0.34 0.63 1.23 1.81 
Pakistan 2001 1.0 3.2 0.30 0.97 N/A N/A 
Vietnam 1998  4.5 4.7 0.17 0.21 0.75 1.18 
Europe          
Albania 2005 5.1 8.1 0.66 0.82 0.80 1.58 
Bulgaria 2001 6.4 8.2 0.40 0.75 0.30 0.57 
Latin America          
Ecuador 1995 3.2 4.5 2.28 6.21 1.80 2.97 
Guatemala 2000 1.4 2.4 0.92 2.07 0.64 0.97 
Nicaragua 2001 1.8 2.7 3.69 6.40 1.39 2.38 
Panama 2003 5.6 5.8 3.22 7.23 1.46 2.16 
Source: Authors’ calculations using nationally representative household surveys. 
Shaded (bold) numbers indicate that the statistic is significantly larger, at the 95% (90%) level, than the equivalent 
statistic for households headed by the opposite sex.  
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Table 13a. Household characteristics by poverty status, African countries 
 Ghana 1998 Madagascar 1993 Malawi 2004 Nigeria 2004 
 Poor Non-
poor
Poor Non-poor Poor Non-
poor
Poor Non-
poor
73.6% 26.4% 89.4% 10.6% 78.0% 22.0% 92.6% 7.4%
Demographic characteristics         
Share  female headed households (%) 28.0 33.1 18.3 15.3 25.1 21.4 12.3 27.3
Age of household head 46.56 43.98 43.08 40.75 43.88 41.26 47.61 49.28
Household Size 5.37 3.15 5.14 3.48 5.05 3.26 5.20 2.67
Number HH members working age 2.38 1.71 2.41 2.14 2.23 1.86 3.01 1.78
Share of dependents in the HH (%) 54.6 40.2 49.5 32.2 54.1 37.3 40.0 30.8
Assets  
   Agricultural assets  
Land ownership (ha) 1.05 1.29 1.09 1.48 1.43 1.66 ... ...
Livestock holdings (TLU)† 0.83 0.41 1.51 1.84 0.28 0.41 0.79 0.23
   Human Capital  
Years of education of household head 3.65 5.09 2.69 3.42 3.63 5.50 2.40 3.71
Highest years education in the HH 5.43 6.22 4.07 4.45 5.65 6.70 4.48 5.24
   Infrastructure  
Distance nearest primary school (km) 0.81 0.38 0.33 0.26 2.01 5.24 ... ...
Distance nearest health clinic/hospital 
(km) 6.04 6.41 1.85 2.30 0.67 0.66 ... ...
Share households with running water 
(%) 2.95 15.49 0.05 1.92 0.98 5.08 23.85 30.61
Share households with electricity (%) 9.58 30.11 1.35 7.17 0.54 5.20 16.72 33.02
Income profile  
   Participation share (% by Activity)§  
Farm 94.63 79.09 96.19 90.86 96.15 92.32 87.79 73.29
Agricultural Wage 2.95 5.02 27.62 16.86 60.40 42.34 3.76 3.13
Non-Agricultural Wage  13.32 24.84 17.54 21.98 14.67 19.37 8.16 13.35
Self-Employment  36.90 45.36 21.09 22.55 28.23 33.57 16.93 27.55
Transfers and Others 47.37 50.38 50.90 41.94 90.01 88.62 8.37 15.32
   Income share (% by Activity)  
Farm 67.86 45.54 71.06 67.61 56.06 53.17 80.38 60.95
Agricultural Wage 0.97 2.19 6.97 3.71 16.91 10.62 1.99 1.82
Non-Agricultural Wage  6.27 15.11 5.47 9.70 6.58 12.48 6.34 12.10
Self-Employment  16.89 26.48 7.87 12.08 9.67 13.60 9.38 19.85
Transfers and Others 8.02 10.68 8.64 6.90 10.78 10.12 1.91 5.28
Source: Authors’ calculations using the RIGA database. 
Notes: † Livestock measured in tropical livestock units. § Participation shares do not add to 100, as households may participate in more than one activity.   
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Table 13b. Household characteristics by poverty status, Asian countries 
 Bangladesh 2000 Indonesia 2000 Nepal 1996 Pakistan 2001 Vietnam 1998 
 Poor Non-
poor
Poor Non-
poor
Poor Non-
poor
Poor Non-
poor
Non-
poor
Non-
poor 
 70.0% 30.0% 56.7% 43.3% 73.5% 26.5% 79.0% 21.0% 60.6% 39.4% 
Demographic characteristics           
Share  female headed households 
(%) 7.61 11.01 15.49 18.38 11.80 14.86 7.68 11.54 19.55 24.22 
Age of household head 43.52 47.00 46.68 45.34 43.93 46.36 45.02 46.93 45.40 49.47 
Household Size 5.30 4.95 5.64 4.64 6.05 4.80 7.64 5.30 5.17 4.23 
Number HH members working age 2.65 2.88 3.25 3.00 2.94 2.70 3.48 3.06 2.70 2.56 
Share of dependents in the HH (%) 0.48 0.40 0.44 0.36 0.50 0.41 0.53 0.39 0.48 0.41 
Assets  
   Agricultural assets  
Land ownership (ha) 0.22 0.65 0.96 0.68 0.50 0.80 0.69 1.44 0.18 0.23 
Livestock holdings (TLU)† 0.46 0.68 ... ... 1.74 1.70 0.46 0.51 1.16 1.00 
   Human Capital  
Yrs. of education of household head 1.82 4.42 4.92 7.64 1.35 3.10 2.50 4.32 6.10 6.67 
Highest years education in the HH 3.96 7.08 9.97 12.04 3.95 6.24 5.51 7.34 7.98 8.94 
   Infrastructure  
Dist. nearest primary school (km) 0.17 0.17 0.27 0.24 ... ... 0.73 0.51 1.66 1.31 
Distance nearest health 
clinic/hospital (km) 29.26 29.57 0.30 0.24 ... ... 53.23 65.07 2.32 2.00 
Share households with running 
water (%) 0.21 0.72 10.92 14.71 3.49 9.44 10.87 12.23 1.17 2.54 
Share households with electricity 
(%) 10.21 37.30 81.50 86.75 4.41 16.45 66.31 77.72 40.20 62.84 
Income profile  
   Participation share (% by Activ.)§  
Farm 77.80 81.51 59.12 49.30 95.02 93.36 68.68 72.44 98.77 98.11 
Agricultural Wage 43.99 16.66 25.05 13.17 50.01 23.18 22.49 13.45 23.64 15.67 
Non-Agricultural Wage  31.03 33.74 30.41 33.28 36.81 32.27 51.75 39.92 30.70 33.32 
Self-Employment  23.49 30.44 28.43 37.32 18.61 23.26 17.85 17.58 33.83 44.01 
Transfers and Others 71.02 82.23 87.61 86.38 27.72 42.64 37.39 51.17 45.97 51.36 
   Income share (% by Activity)  
Farm 16.72 19.41 29.63 21.72 43.51 44.48 34.57 38.78 62.22 48.89 
Agricultural Wage 25.82 7.36 12.00 7.14 22.09 10.00 9.70 4.66 7.53 3.90 
Non-Agricultural Wage  20.18 18.68 18.75 22.00 17.75 17.03 29.29 22.48 8.52 10.10 
Self-Employment  14.85 19.63 14.82 20.71 7.71 12.94 10.61 9.37 16.11 27.70 
Transfers and Others 22.44 34.92 24.81 28.43 8.94 15.55 15.83 24.71 5.62 9.40 
Source: Authors’ calculations using the RIGA database. 
Notes: † Livestock measured in tropical livestock units. § Participation shares do not add to 100, as households may participate in more than one activity.   
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Table 13c. Household characteristics by poverty status, Latin American countries 
 Ecuador 1995 Guatemala 2000 Nicaragua 2001 Panama 2003
 Poor Non-
poor
Poor Non-poor Poor Non-
poor
Poor Non-
poor
43.5% 56.5% 45.3% 54.7% 66.1% 33.9% 35.3% 64.7%
Demographic characteristics         
Share  female headed households (%) 14.05 14.13 10.41 17.02 18.17 19.70 16.16 20.15
Age of household head 48.12 47.14 43.07 44.57 45.72 46.79 47.29 49.40
Household Size 6.37 4.34 7.02 4.81 6.64 4.62 6.96 3.75
Number HH members working age 2.87 2.36 2.89 2.45 3.17 2.51 3.10 2.15
Share of dependents in the HH (%) 55.20 44.65 58.23 47.53 50.85 42.87 53.95 42.21
Assets  
   Agricultural assets  
Land ownership (ha) 3.83 6.65 1.84 1.94 5.43 6.36 5.42 6.47
Livestock holdings (TLU)† 2.33 3.06 0.56 1.14 1.33 3.24 0.70 2.26
   Human Capital  
Years of education of household head 3.26 5.05 1.41 2.76 1.92 3.27 3.43 6.46
Highest years education in the HH 6.52 7.95 3.31 5.08 4.78 6.56 6.78 9.45
   Infrastructure  
Distance nearest primary school (km) 10.73 10.70 4.30 3.08 1.55 1.40 0.64 0.50
Distance nearest health clinic/hospital 
(km) 2.64 2.58 ... ... 6.22 5.60 4.95 3.66
Share households with running water 
(%) 0.48 0.49 0.49 0.56 0.19 0.37 0.61 0.85
Share households with electricity (%) 65.55 78.18 33.86 58.94 14.83 31.28 17.71 73.60
Income profile  
   Participation share (% by Activity)§  
Farm 91.94 86.32 94.86 87.02 92.83 90.01 91.13 79.72
Agricultural Wage 49.60 33.56 59.27 33.23 48.14 27.63 46.23 25.73
Non-Agricultural Wage  32.86 35.27 24.15 40.60 33.17 38.27 23.89 47.38
Self-Employment  30.70 43.10 24.58 34.17 19.98 34.47 23.06 29.81
Transfers and Others 59.32 62.85 70.17 64.53 39.46 47.44 52.75 71.75
   Income share (% by Activity)  
Farm 32.42 29.73 31.74 22.12 37.56 31.71 41.92 19.06
Agricultural Wage 29.47 17.52 30.44 17.07 27.43 13.33 26.48 14.27
Non-Agricultural Wage  17.63 19.04 11.56 26.20 18.39 25.06 11.40 32.46
Self-Employment  9.13 19.12 8.73 15.13 7.13 17.37 10.83 15.02
Transfers and Others 11.36 14.59 17.54 19.48 9.49 12.53 9.37 19.19
Source: Authors’ calculations using the RIGA database. 
Notes: † Livestock measured in tropical livestock units. § Participation shares do not add to 100, as households may participate in more than one activity.   
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Table 13d. Household characteristics by poverty status, Eastern European countries 
 Albania 2005 Bulgaria 2001 
 Poor Non-
poor
Poor Non-poor 
7.6% 92.4% 8.9% 91.1% 
Demographic characteristics  
Share  female headed households (%) 3.33 7.66 13.64 22.21 
Age of household head 47.75 52.32 50.09 57.03 
Household Size 5.93 4.35 5.55 3.00 
Number HH members working age 3.18 2.60 3.61 1.60 
Share of dependents in the HH (%) 46.19 41.32 40.70 53.42 
Assets  
   Agricultural assets  
Land ownership (ha) 0.65 0.82 0.17 0.70 
Livestock holdings (TLU)† 1.65 1.52 0.18 0.53 
   Human Capital  
Years of education of household head 6.60 7.95 5.61 7.90 
Highest years education in the HH 8.68 9.79 7.30 9.30 
   Infrastructure  
Distance nearest primary school (km) 0.37 0.37 1.43 2.31 
Distance nearest health clinic/hospital 
(km) 0.82 0.46 5.27 6.09 
Share households with running water 
(%) 11.88 28.06 100.00 98.28 
Share households with electricity (%) 92.66 89.61 63.64 88.36 
Income profile  
   Participation share (% by Activity)§  
Farm 88.20 95.66 40.91 78.75 
Agricultural Wage 9.05 5.08 11.36 16.81 
Non-Agricultural Wage  14.39 30.96 6.82 20.89 
Self-Employment  2.64 11.44 2.27 2.40 
Transfers and Others 86.00 75.21 88.64 90.76 
   Income share (% by Activity)  
Farm 49.73 39.95 6.89 16.00 
Agricultural Wage 5.72 2.59 8.24 9.73 
Non-Agricultural Wage  7.94 18.76 5.94 11.72 
Self-Employment  1.76 7.71 0.73 1.39 
Transfers and Others 34.85 30.99 78.21 61.16 
Source: Authors’ calculations using the RIGA database. 
Notes: † Livestock measured in tropical livestock units. § Participation shares do not add to 100, as households may participate in more than one activity.   
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Table 14. Percent of rural income generating activities in total income, 15 RIGA countries 
  Income-generating activity          
 Group I Group II Group III Group IV 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (1) + (2) + (3) 
(4) + (5) + 
(6) + (7) (1) + (2) (4) + (5) (6) + (7) 
(3) + (4) + 
(5) + (6) + 
(7) 
    
Country and year Agriculture-Crops 
Agriculture 
- Livestock 
Agricultural 
wage 
employ-
ment 
Non-farm 
wage 
employ-
ment 
Non-farm 
self-
employ-
ment 
Transfers Other Agricultural total 
Non-
Agricultural 
Total 
On-Farm 
Total 
Non-farm 
total 
Transfers 
& Other 
Off-farm 
Total 
Transfers 
Public 
Transfers 
Private 
Albania 2005 17.2 23.3 2.8 18.1 7.4 28.0 3.2 43.3 56.7 40.5 25.5 31.2 59.5 16.4 11.6 
Bulgaria 2001 4.1 11.5 9.7 11.5 1.4 60.7 1.2 25.2 74.8 15.6 12.8 61.9 84.4 56.7 4.0 
                
Ghana 1998 55.0 4.4 1.4 9.6 20.5 8.5 0.5 60.9 39.1 59.4 30.1 9.0 40.6 0.6 7.9 
Madagascar 1993 57.3 13.2 6.5 6.1 8.5 6.2 2.2 77.0 23.0 70.5 14.6 8.4 29.5 0.1 6.1 
Malawi 2004 42.2 12.9 15.0 8.4 10.9 10.1 0.5 70.2 29.8 55.2 19.2 10.6 44.8 3.5 6.6 
Nigeria 2004 73.5 4.3 2.0 7.1 10.8 1.7 0.6 79.8 20.2 77.8 17.8 2.4 22.2 0.3 1.5 
                
Ecuador 1995 21.7 9.0 21.6 18.6 15.7 5.5 8.0 52.3 47.7 30.7 34.2 13.5 69.3 0.5 5.0 
Guatemala 2000 22.1 3.5 21.9 20.9 12.8 18.2 0.5 47.5 52.5 25.6 33.7 18.8 74.4 12.9 5.4 
Nicaragua 2001 21.5 13.5 21.5 21.2 11.5 6.1 4.7 56.5 43.5 35.1 32.7 10.8 64.9 0.6 5.4 
Panama 2003 19.9 4.3 17.0 27.7 14.1 15.7 1.3 41.3 58.7 24.2 41.8 17.0 75.8 7.1 8.6 
                
Bangladesh 2000 15.3 2.2 20.0 19.7 16.3 13.2 13.1 37.6 62.4 17.6 36.1 26.4 82.4 3.3 9.9 
Indonesia 2000 23.8 2.1 9.7 20.3 17.6 22.9 3.6 35.5 64.5 25.8 37.9 26.5 74.2 1.5 21.4 
Nepal 1996 29.4 14.4 18.3 17.5 9.3 9.8 1.2 62.1 37.9 43.8 26.9 11.0 56.2 1.8 8.0 
Pakistan 2001 22.5 13.2 8.3 27.4 10.3 13.9 4.4 44.0 56.0 35.7 37.7 18.3 64.3 2.5 11.4 
Vietnam 1998 41.5 14.8 5.9 9.2 21.2 7.0 0.3 62.2 37.8 56.3 30.5 7.3 43.7 3.3 3.7 
Source: Authors’ calculations using the RIGA database 
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Table 15. Participation in rural income generating activities, 15 RIGA countries. 
Country and Year Agriculture-Crops 
Agricultur
e- 
Livestock 
Agricul--
tural wage 
employ-
ment 
Non-
farm 
wage 
employ-
ment 
Non-
farm 
self-
employ-
ment 
Transfers Other Agricultural total 
Non- 
agricultural 
total 
On-Farm 
Total 
Non-
farm 
Total 
Trans-
fers & 
Other 
Off-farm 
Total 
Trans-
fers 
Public 
Trans-
fers 
Private 
Albania 2005 94.69 85.43 5.30 30.01 10.93 74.44 18.84 95.40 90.30 95.23 38.77 75.83 91.94 58.95 42.51 
Bulgaria 2001 68.30 66.48 16.53 20.18 2.39 89.28 12.54 80.73 94.30 76.85 22.23 90.65 96.81 87.91 9.12 
                
Ghana 1998 87.75 51.45 3.74 17.70 40.12 41.34 13.48 88.94 74.69 88.72 49.33 48.52 75.91 1.86 40.39 
Madagascar 
1993 93.44 78.02 26.02 18.20 21.31 43.46 11.42 96.06 67.02 95.40 35.50 49.56 75.04 0.30 43.33 
Malawi 2004 92.71 64.36 54.90 16.10 29.86 88.93 6.60 97.02 93.45 94.99 41.66 89.58 97.13 54.13 77.40 
Nigeria 2004 88.06 43.82 3.82 9.22 19.11 6.29 4.16 89.52 32.46 89.33 25.94 9.69 35.37 1.27 5.34 
                
Ecuador 1995 73.55 76.17 39.09 34.44 38.82 27.30 48.36 93.03 85.35 88.26 56.55 61.64 94.05 2.01 25.73 
Guatemala 2000 84.66 66.11 42.66 34.64 30.69 65.30 3.67 92.55 84.13 89.86 53.49 66.57 94.58 58.13 18.62 
Nicaragua 2001 85.33 72.26 39.44 35.34 26.12 38.66 19.51 94.97 72.75 91.64 51.92 42.85 87.33 2.35 37.67 
Panama 2003 77.43 64.15 30.38 42.06 28.28 64.59 11.52 86.61 86.51 82.31 58.45 67.45 93.87 15.23 58.65 
                
Bangladesh 
2000 61.22 56.89 35.40 31.88 25.67 48.54 54.96 87.06 90.54 78.96 53.08 74.54 97.37 32.49 26.48 
Indonesia 2000 53.66 10.20 19.33 31.79 32.71 85.40 14.13 64.31 92.51 54.40 54.95 87.02 93.82 7.36 84.62 
Nepal 1996 90.94 80.41 41.64 35.39 20.06 26.42 8.52 97.62 69.09 94.50 49.87 32.37 84.48 3.50 23.81 
Pakistan 2001 47.55 64.28 19.98 48.47 17.77 31.46 15.73 74.52 78.06 69.72 57.87 41.21 84.79 14.46 20.55 
Vietnam 1998 97.75 90.76 20.11 31.86 38.34 36.38 19.34 94.97 72.75 91.64 51.92 42.85 85.84 2.35 37.67 
Source: Authors’ calculations using the RIGA database 
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Table 16. Percent of rural households with diversified and specialized income generating activities, 15 RIGA countries. 
Percent (%)
Diverse Income 
Portfolio
On Farm 
(Crop, 
Livestock)
Agricultural 
Wage
Non-
Agricultural 
Wage
Self 
Employment Transfers Other
Albania 2005 54.8 19.4 1.4 9.1 5.0 9.8 0.5
Bulgaria 2001 38.4 3.6 4.8 5.5 1.1 46.3 0.2
Ghana 1998 23.9 50.3 0.6 6.1 15.4 3.5 0.2
Madagascar 1993 30.6 59.4 1.3 2.8 4.0 1.4 0.4
Malawi 2004 39.4 41.8 5.6 5.7 5.0 2.5 0.0
Nigeria 2004 14.7 69.9 1.0 5.5 7.8 0.9 0.2
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Ecuador 1995 45.5 17.4 13.2 11.7 8.9 2.3 1.1
Guatemala 2000 51.5 11.7 10.9 13.6 5.9 6.2 0.2
Nicaragua 2001 43.2 22.4 12.4 14.5 6.5 0.8 0.4
Panama 2003 41.0 13.3 10.4 20.2 7.6 7.3 0.2
Bangladesh 2000 47.4 11.7 10.9 12.2 10.3 5.4 2.0
Indonesia 2000 41.5 15.7 5.9 13.9 10.4 11.5 1.1
Nepal 1996 50.7 26.3 7.9 7.1 4.3 3.5 0.2
Pakistan 2001 36.3 24.8 4.9 18.2 6.3 8.2 1.4
Vietnam 1998 44.5 37.5 2.1 1.9 12.8 1.2 0.1
Principal Household Income Source (>= 75% of Total Income)
Source: RIGA dataset. All figures are weighted. In a few cases, more than one income activity generated returns greater than 75% of total 
income (due to negative income shares in another activity).  In these cases, the household was classified as having a diverse, rather than 
specialized, income portfolio.  
 78 
Table 17. Years of education, rural heads of household, by expenditure quintiles 
1 2 3 4 5 All
Africa
Ghana 1998 1.43 2.59 2.86 3.52 4.41 2.96
Madagascar 1993 2.15 2.71 3.03 2.87 3.26 2.80
Malawi 2004 3.00 3.55 4.06 4.64 5.79 4.21
Nigeria 2004 2.59 3.22 3.89 4.73 5.65 4.02
Asia
Bangladesh 2000 1.17 1.68 2.19 3.23 4.91 2.64
Indonesia 2000 4.43 5.00 5.90 6.98 8.84 6.23
Nepal 1996 0.99 1.23 1.76 2.29 3.20 1.89
Pakistan 2001 1.89 2.37 2.83 3.40 4.53 3.00
Vietnam1998 3.42 4.28 4.77 5.06 5.88 4.68
Eastern Europe
Albania 2005 6.63 7.35 8.50 8.13 8.77 7.87
Bulgaria 2001 6.00 7.06 7.89 8.86 9.15 7.79
Latin America
Ecuador 1995 2.66 3.58 4.40 4.94 5.99 4.31
Guatemala 2000 1.32 1.58 2.03 2.48 3.89 2.26
Nicaragua 2001 1.37 2.03 2.37 2.79 4.03 2.52
Panama 2003 3.36 4.91 5.73 6.41 8.41 5.77
mean 2.83 3.54 4.15 4.69 5.78 4.20
max 6.63 7.35 8.50 8.86 9.15 7.87
min 0.99 1.23 1.76 2.29 3.20 1.89
Average Household Head Education (Years, Rural Households)
Expenditure Quintiles
 
Source: Zezza, et al (2007) 
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Table 18. Net primary and secondary school attendance rates, by rural/urban and gender  
Africa
Ghana 1998 0.83 0.80 0.75 0.73 0.55 0.53 0.40 0.37
Madagascar 1993 0.63 0.65 0.33 0.34 0.24 0.26 0.04 0.05
Malawi 2004 0.79 0.80 0.68 0.70 0.33 0.35 0.10 0.10
Nigeria 2004 0.51 0.51 0.37 0.37 0.44 0.43 0.34 0.35
Asia
Bangladesh 2000 0.64 0.64 0.65 0.66 0.45 0.47 0.38 0.42
Indonesia 2000 0.78 0.77 0.81 0.80 0.55 0.54 0.41 0.42
Nepal 1996 0.71 0.76 0.58 0.47 0.54 0.53 0.30 0.23
Pakistan 2001 0.56 0.55 0.41 0.34 0.44 0.45 0.25 0.15
Vietnam 1998 0.83 0.82 0.83 0.82 0.69 0.71 0.50 0.45
Eastern Europe
Albania 2005 0.91 0.90 0.89 0.89 0.58 0.61 0.35 0.31
Bulgaria 2001 0.92 0.92 0.86 0.84 0.84 0.85 0.50 0.54
Latin America
Ecuador 1995 0.90 0.91 0.87 0.88 0.63 0.66 0.27 0.29
Guatemala 2000 0.76 0.75 0.69 0.66 0.44 0.42 0.12 0.10
Nicaragua 2001 0.87 0.86 0.79 0.79 0.52 0.55 0.19 0.23
Panama 2003 0.88 0.88 0.85 0.85 0.76 0.79 0.48 0.51
Primary School Secondary School
Overall 
Urban
Female 
Urban
Overall 
Rural
Female 
Rural
Overall 
Urban
Female 
Urban
Overall 
Rural
Female 
Rural
 
Source: Zezza, et al (2007) 
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Table 19. Primary school net attendance rates, by expenditure quintile 
1 2 3 4 5 All 1 2 3 4 5 All
Africa
Ghana 1998 .65 .78 .81 .80 .78 .75 .62 .76 .76 .81 .76 .73
Madagascar 1993 .23 .33 .42 .36 .44 .33 .24 .35 .44 .38 .44 .34
Malawi 2004 .63 .66 .70 .75 .78 .68 .64 .69 .72 .76 .80 .70
Nigeria 2004 .21 .38 .48 .57 .56 .37 .20 .39 .52 .57 .56 .37
Asia
Bangladesh 2000 .55 .63 .68 .70 .74 .65 .56 .64 .70 .74 .71 .66
Indonesia 2000 .82 .81 .82 .78 .75 .81 .82 .80 .82 .79 .72 .80
Nepal 1996 .43 .53 .58 .78 .73 .53 .31 .43 .49 .67 .70 .47
Pakistan 2001 .30 .40 .44 .51 .60 .41 .23 .34 .37 .44 .54 .34
Vietnam 1998 .77 .86 .86 .87 .86 .83 .77 .85 .86 .85 .83 .82
Eastern Europe
Albania 2005 .83 .89 .94 .94 .89 .89 .84 .86 .95 .99 .91 .89
Bulgaria 2001 .79 .91 .88 .90 .91 .86 .77 .87 .92 .89 .88 .84
Latin America
Ecuador 1995 .84 .89 .90 .88 .94 .87 .86 .88 .89 .89 .93 .88
Guatemala 2000 .57 .71 .75 .77 .84 .69 .52 .67 .73 .80 .86 .66
Nicaragua 2001 .70 .81 .81 .89 .85 .79 .72 .81 .81 .89 .84 .79
Panama 2003 .79 .91 .90 .93 .97 .85 .79 .90 .92 .92 1.00 .85
Female  RuralOverall Rural
 
Source: Zezza, et al (2007)
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Table 20. Secondary school net attendance rates, by expenditure quintile 
1 2 3 4 5 All 1 2 3 4 5 All
Africa
Ghana 1998 .28 .43 .47 .42 .43 .40 .24 .39 .45 .37 .49 .37
Madagascar 1993 .01 .02 .05 .05 .08 .04 .00 .03 .06 .06 .09 .05
Malawi 2004 .03 .07 .10 .16 .25 .10 .04 .06 .09 .17 .28 .10
Nigeria 2004 .19 .34 .41 .48 .50 .34 .18 .36 .41 .47 .49 .35
Asia
Bangladesh 2000 .19 .27 .31 .48 .59 .38 .22 .30 .37 .53 .64 .42
Indonesia 2000 .30 .39 .47 .47 .49 .41 .33 .41 .48 .45 .45 .42
Nepal 1996 .13 .21 .27 .45 .54 .30 .05 .14 .17 .45 .49 .23
Pakistan 2001 .14 .21 .26 .35 .49 .25 .05 .11 .15 .23 .37 .15
Vietnam 1998 .33 .44 .53 .56 .70 .50 .30 .39 .51 .52 .64 .45
Eastern Europe
Albania 2005 .21 .28 .38 .53 .57 .35 .16 .20 .42 .44 .57 .31
Bulgaria 2001 .30 .54 .57 .78 .74 .50 .35 .52 .58 .93 .73 .54
Latin America
Ecuador 1995 .14 .23 .33 .44 .57 .27 .16 .26 .32 .48 .61 .29
Guatemala 2000 .03 .06 .14 .17 .42 .12 .02 .06 .08 .15 .42 .10
Nicaragua 2001 .07 .13 .25 .32 .44 .19 .08 .18 .35 .35 .46 .23
Panama 2003 .24 .52 .72 .80 .91 .48 .25 .58 .78 .80 .88 .51
Overall Rural Female  Rural
 
Source: Zezza, et al (2007) 
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Table 21. Percentage of rural households owning land, by expenditure quintiles 
1 2 3 4 5 All
Africa
Ghana 1998 11.6 27.1 35.0 34.9 34.2 28.5
Madagascar 1993 73.5 81.0 75.3 73.3 69.8 74.6
Malawi 2004 94.7 94.9 93.4 91.7 82.3 91.4
Nigeria 2004 65.4 70.2 70.2 72.2 73.0 70.2
Asia
Bangladesh 2000 32.7 40.7 52.5 55.9 63.6 49.1
Indonesia 2000 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Nepal 1996 75.5 79.4 79.4 78.4 80.5 78.6
Pakistan 2001 20.4 27.9 35.2 37.9 42.1 32.7
Vietnam 1998 91.8 93.3 90.8 90.8 84.5 90.2
Eastern Europe
Albania 2005 92.0 91.8 94.2 97.0 95.1 93.9
Bulgaria 2001 34.1 61.7 76.1 78.9 75.4 65.2
Latin America
Ecuador 1995 63.7 63.3 56.0 52.2 53.2 57.7
Guatemala 2000 62.9 59.8 53.0 44.6 37.7 51.6
Nicaragua 2001 45.8 44.0 45.3 40.1 32.9 41.7
Panama 2003 68.7 54.1 49.3 45.1 36.5 50.8
Percentage of Land-Owning Households
Expenditure Quintiles
 
Source: Zezza, et al (2007) 
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Table 22. Land ownership and operated land in hectares, by expenditure quintiles  
  
  
Average Owned Land Size (has, Rural Households) Average Operated Land Size (has, Rural Households) 
  Expenditure Quintiles Expenditure Quintiles 
  1 2 3 4 5 All (5)/(1) 1 2 3 4 5 All (5)/(1) 
Africa                  
Ghana 1998 0.88 0.92 1.23 1.30 1.34 1.14 1.52 2.48 2.44 2.94 2.84 2.52 2.64 1.02 
Madagascar 1993 0.90 1.19 1.05 1.18 1.40 1.14 1.56 1.35 1.71 1.46 1.60 1.89 1.60 1.40 
Malawi 2004 1.21 1.42 1.57 1.63 1.67 1.50 1.38 1.11 1.46 1.42 1.71 1.40 1.42 1.26 
Nigeria 2004 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Asia                  
Bangladesh 2000 0.12 0.20 0.28 0.44 0.73 0.35 6.08 0.18 0.25 0.38 0.42 0.47 0.33 2.65 
Indonesia 2000 1.09 0.86 0.71 0.80 0.68 0.83 0.62 1.39 0.63 0.87 1.08 0.82 0.96 0.59 
Nepal 1996 0.41 0.61 0.54 0.73 0.70 0.60 1.71 0.61 0.89 0.80 0.87 0.89 0.81 1.46 
Pakistan 2001 0.47 0.57 0.85 1.05 1.55 0.90 3.30 0.85 0.92 1.16 1.26 1.71 1.18 2.01 
Vietnam 1998 0.15 0.19 0.20 0.21 0.27 0.20 1.80 0.56 0.60 0.61 0.60 0.66 0.61 1.18 
Eastern Europe                  
Albania 2005 0.68 0.71 0.84 0.85 0.96 0.81 1.41 0.70 0.72 0.82 0.90 0.94 0.81 1.33 
Bulgaria 2005 0.44 0.56 0.75 0.64 0.96 0.67 2.18 0.08 0.24 0.27 0.30 0.36 0.25 4.71 
Latin America                  
Ecuador 1995 4.22 3.73 4.10 5.92 10.41 5.67 2.47 3.14 4.18 4.05 6.36 7.50 5.04 2.39 
Guatemala 2000 1.70 1.99 1.61 1.26 2.97 1.91 1.75 1.57 2.77 1.78 1.90 3.18 2.24 2.02 
Nicaragua 2001 3.62 4.77 7.87 5.35 7.52 5.81 2.08 4.52 5.55 9.01 6.18 6.57 6.36 1.45 
Panama 2003 5.66 4.37 5.16 7.16 9.02 6.27 1.59 5.19 4.68 4.71 6.21 6.92 5.54 1.33 
Mean 1.54 1.58 1.91 2.04 2.87 1.99 1.86 1.69 1.93 2.16 2.30 2.56 2.13 1.77 
Max 5.66 4.77 7.87 7.16 10.41 6.27 1.84 5.19 5.55 9.01 6.36 7.50 6.36 4.71 
Min 0.12 0.19 0.20 0.21 0.27 0.20 2.25 0.08 0.24 0.27 0.30 0.36 0.25 0.59 
Source: Authors’ calculations and Zezza, et al (2007) 
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Table 23. Livestock holdings (TLU) 
Households 
owning 
livestock (%)
Livestock 
holdings (TLU)
Households 
owning cattle 
(%)
Cattle owned 
(#)
Among owners, 
livestock holdings 
(TLU)
Share of livestock 
owned by the top 
20% of livestock 
holders
Africa 
Ghana 1998 50.1 0.67 7.2 0.46 1.34 69.5
Madagascar 1993 76.7 1.56 33.4 2.34 2.04 73.9
Malawi 2004 62.8 31.78 4.8 0.20 0.51 74.5
Nigeria 2004 46.4 0.71 9.4 0.60 1.54 66.6
Asia
Bangladesh 2000 61.7 0.53 36.8 0.89 0.86 51.9
Nepal 1996 88.3 1.72 79.8 2.95 1.96 42.3
Pakistan 2001 47.0 N/A 44.0 N/A N/A N/A
Vietnam 1998 82.1 1.09 34.2 0.60 1.33 50.9
Eastern Europe
Albania 2005 84.1 1.52 65.7 1.17 1.81 49.2
Bulgaria 2001 68.2 0.51 20.6 0.31 0.75 51.2
Latin America
Ecuador 1995 84.4 2.81 31.2 2.47 3.32 71.4
Guatemala 2000 70.2 0.93 11.0 0.75 1.32 78.3
Nicaragua 2001 55.3 2.13 22.8 2.38 3.86 77.6
Panama 2003 60.8 1.90 12.9 2.40 3.14 92.9
Holdings measured in tropical livestock units (TLU). Source of TLU conversion factors: FAO GLiPHA  
Source: Zezza, et al (2007) 
 85 
Table 24. Infrastructure index 
1 2 3 4 5 All
Africa
Ghana 1998 -0.58 -0.22 0.01 0.30 0.48 0.00
Madagascar 1993 -0.20 -0.17 0.03 0.08 0.25 0.00
Malawi 2004 -0.18 -0.16 -0.12 0.00 0.45 0.00
Nigeria 2004 -0.43 -0.19 -0.05 0.17 0.39 -0.03
Asia
Bangladesh 2000 -0.40 -0.28 -0.10 -0.08 0.70 0.00
Indonesia 2000 -0.35 -0.15 0.01 0.11 0.38 0.00
Nepal 1996 -0.30 -0.27 -0.18 0.12 0.65 0.00
Pakistan 2001 -0.25 -0.15 -0.04 0.08 0.36 0.00
Vietnam 1998 -0.42 -0.12 -0.04 0.18 0.41 0.00
Eastern Europe
Albania 2005 -0.31 -0.18 0.00 0.12 0.37 0.00
Bulgaria 2001 -0.59 -0.08 0.07 0.21 0.40 0.00
Latin America
Ecuador 1995 -0.21 -0.14 0.01 0.11 0.24 0.00
Guatemala 2000 -0.40 -0.22 0.00 0.06 0.57 0.00
Nicaragua 2001 -0.37 -0.11 -0.09 0.10 0.47 0.00
Panama 2003 -0.91 -0.41 0.08 0.32 0.93 0.00
Expenditure Quintiles
Infrastructure Index
 
Source: Zezza, et al (2007)
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Table 25a. Household asset status and selected group characteristics  
 
Agriculture Agricultural Wage
Non-
Agricultural 
Wage
Self-
Employ-
ment
Remit-
tances
Public 
Transfers Other
WITH 1 E, L, I 5.66 2.20 0.00 0.00 41.18 5.07 15.89 12.24 9.95 12.85 2.82
LAND 2 NE, L, I 0.00 0.24 0.00 0.00 31.83 0.00 0.00 0.00 42.55 25.63 0.00
3 E, NL, I 2.50 38.73 3.01 16.67 36.48 1.75 22.96 11.38 11.43 13.03 2.98
4 E, NL, NI 4.70 33.84 10.00 45.24 52.29 4.17 13.82 3.41 9.14 13.88 3.30
5 E, L, NI 2.81 1.89 2.96 1.19 54.83 5.38 9.31 2.43 11.87 14.71 1.47
6 NE, NL, I 3.90 5.93 9.40 5.95 33.59 1.95 6.97 1.51 21.55 30.66 3.76
7 NE, L, NI 0.00 0.37 39.31 1.19 57.69 0.00 0.00 12.23 5.85 24.23 0.00
8 NE, NL, NI 2.36 10.81 17.81 20.24 41.87 2.73 7.09 0.85 15.86 30.22 1.38
NO 9 E,I 9.72 3.30 6.59 2.38 5.96 2.77 54.03 14.76 4.54 14.12 3.82
LAND 10 NE, I 0.00 0.55 0.00 0.00 2.42 0.00 16.33 7.57 37.94 33.16 2.58
11 E, NI 2.54 0.98 7.62 1.19 15.27 2.23 59.65 16.15 1.73 3.22 1.74
12 NE, NI 14.51 1.16 50.77 5.95 5.21 0.00 15.42 23.16 7.53 23.40 25.28
WITH 1 E, L, I 0.00 5.25 3.64 2.27 22.50 7.20 11.50 2.37 2.32 51.88 2.24
LAND 2 NE, L, I 0.00 0.34 0.00 0.00 10.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 18.80 70.63 0.40
3 E, NL, I 1.29 26.57 0.28 2.27 18.16 11.21 17.89 1.79 2.71 46.78 1.46
4 E, NL, NI 4.65 19.61 4.92 13.64 20.76 7.27 8.63 0.75 1.98 59.87 0.74
5 E, L, NI 0.00 4.22 0.00 0.00 16.73 5.74 12.12 1.13 4.13 54.65 5.50
6 NE, NL, I 7.69 2.96 0.00 0.00 28.55 6.71 3.45 0.00 2.75 56.58 1.97
7 NE, L, NI 0.00 0.68 18.18 2.27 7.02 0.00 3.88 0.00 5.09 74.11 9.90
8 NE, NL, NI 8.16 5.59 24.48 9.09 21.89 1.43 4.83 0.00 2.07 68.56 1.21
NO 9 E,I 11.70 10.72 0.00 0.00 6.28 17.24 20.53 3.72 7.10 44.06 1.07
LAND 10 NE, I 15.63 3.65 22.73 9.09 5.15 14.42 3.80 0.00 7.65 68.98 0.00
11 E, NI 12.24 11.17 18.18 25.00 10.96 13.16 5.89 0.00 5.98 63.77 0.25
12 NE, NI 22.22 9.24 29.50 36.36 5.00 5.64 4.68 1.70 6.42 76.56 0.00
WITH 1 E, L, I 6.51 0.80 31.53 0.46 55.31 1.85 34.79 -5.88 9.18 3.87 0.87
LAND 2 NE, L, I 3.79 1.90 47.04 1.13 56.17 1.50 8.03 18.04 14.80 0.27 1.19
3 E, NL, I 5.02 0.64 41.63 0.50 42.97 2.41 26.49 16.87 7.22 3.84 0.20
4 E, NL, NI 29.54 1.69 63.91 1.05 68.41 1.57 8.08 16.42 2.95 2.29 0.28
5 E, L, NI 13.77 2.41 54.42 1.51 72.67 0.00 13.21 7.32 4.22 2.03 0.55
6 NE, NL, I 9.25 1.98 60.32 1.59 38.28 3.15 18.50 27.62 7.35 5.01 0.09
7 NE, L, NI 11.57 14.64 80.06 15.75 82.85 0.75 1.73 8.82 4.86 0.46 0.53
8 NE, NL, NI 11.49 11.37 76.50 12.78 71.57 0.95 2.69 16.94 7.32 0.48 0.06
NO 9 E,I 34.84 4.92 39.04 2.60 12.47 1.69 33.82 39.96 8.86 2.07 1.13
LAND 10 NE, I 15.61 8.11 53.00 6.41 25.86 1.93 18.98 41.85 10.54 0.21 0.64
11 E, NI 35.19 8.40 61.71 5.87 51.12 2.30 21.05 17.85 6.86 0.15 0.67
12 NE, NI 16.54 43.14 83.96 50.36 64.81 1.39 4.91 19.61 8.63 0.16 0.49
ALBANIA 2005
BULGARIA 2001
% of Income
GHANA 1998
Household 
by Asset 
Position
Share of 
HH 
members 
younger 
Group's 
Share in 
Rural 
Population
Share of 
Group 
Poor (%)
Group's 
share in 
overall 
rural 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using the RIGA database. Note: E, L and I refer to high levels of education, land and infrastructure, while NE, NL and NI refer to low levels of 
these three assets. 
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Table 25b. Household asset status and selected group characteristics 
 
Agriculture Agricultural Wage
Non-
Agricultural 
Wage
Self-
Employ-
ment
Remit-
tances
Public 
Transfers Other
WITH 1 E, L, I 0.00 0.19 81.86 0.18 92.54 0.00 2.95 -0.25 0.81 0.00 3.95
LAND 2 NE, L, I 7.64 2.96 81.86 2.58 69.70 6.81 4.69 14.33 2.39 0.91 1.16
3 E, NL, I 29.28 1.22 68.71 0.93 36.86 5.61 11.13 35.00 8.04 0.00 3.37
4 E, NL, NI 24.21 1.33 72.59 1.16 71.67 3.78 7.36 12.31 3.52 0.00 1.36
5 E, L, NI 38.14 0.42 76.35 0.36 90.79 0.00 0.67 0.53 7.37 0.00 0.65
6 NE, NL, I 24.29 10.33 89.97 10.81 67.52 6.70 7.72 9.88 5.85 0.00 2.31
7 NE, L, NI 17.24 14.25 84.55 13.04 83.76 2.71 1.77 5.76 3.03 0.00 2.96
8 NE, NL, NI 24.69 45.36 93.33 47.57 79.44 5.56 2.00 6.27 4.61 0.07 2.04
NO 9 E,I 23.13 1.14 50.06 0.53 3.88 8.10 54.70 9.63 19.14 2.64 1.92
LAND 10 NE, I 34.78 6.16 84.59 5.87 32.53 10.55 28.05 14.31 12.64 0.16 1.76
11 E, NI 39.41 0.76 64.18 0.53 32.18 19.14 23.76 18.86 6.03 0.00 0.02
12 NE, NI 32.49 15.88 93.08 16.42 61.97 10.08 5.84 10.01 9.65 0.00 2.45
WITH 1 E, L, I 22.16 2.88 52.29 2.03 66.95 5.82 11.37 7.20 4.62 1.68 2.36
LAND 2 NE, L, I 10.02 5.40 72.12 5.13 68.35 8.98 4.05 10.28 4.55 3.15 0.64
3 E, NL, I 40.45 8.58 59.10 6.38 45.67 10.79 19.83 15.75 4.83 1.91 1.22
4 E, NL, NI 56.04 6.88 66.70 5.50 58.93 14.33 7.24 9.97 6.43 2.93 0.17
5 E, L, NI 44.75 2.56 61.01 1.87 74.37 5.93 4.23 6.53 6.08 2.34 0.54
6 NE, NL, I 21.88 21.57 85.54 24.33 52.30 17.40 6.81 12.70 6.25 4.23 0.31
7 NE, L, NI 17.67 9.42 83.95 10.29 73.23 9.63 3.44 5.46 4.58 3.11 0.55
8 NE, NL, NI 27.08 33.77 87.33 38.41 57.35 17.81 3.81 8.77 7.55 4.47 0.24
NO 9 E,I 41.83 3.23 27.65 1.16 12.27 9.08 54.43 16.22 6.22 0.78 1.00
LAND 10 NE, I 26.89 2.07 76.94 1.95 21.20 15.53 27.15 23.04 10.70 2.25 0.13
11 E, NI 64.48 1.16 50.49 0.68 33.87 20.15 13.50 21.44 9.57 1.23 0.25
12 NE, NI 36.52 2.47 77.06 2.26 32.87 26.90 6.14 19.32 11.80 2.75 0.21
ALL RURAL 1 E,I 14.91 6.67 82.33 5.69 43.24 1.92 30.58 19.57 2.73 1.44 0.52
2 NE, I 11.53 32.60 90.64 31.59 70.19 2.31 8.67 15.53 2.24 0.29 0.78
3 E, NI 18.05 3.98 86.66 3.60 69.72 1.35 13.86 12.44 1.32 0.55 0.76
4 NE, NI 13.84 56.75 95.66 59.12 87.44 1.80 2.52 6.68 0.91 0.11 0.54
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MADAGASCAR 1993
MALAWI 2004
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Poor (%)
Group's 
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Source: Authors’ calculations using the RIGA database. 
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Table 25c. Household asset status and selected group characteristics 
 
Agriculture Agricultural Wage
Non-
Agricultural 
Wage
Self-
Employ-
ment
Remit-
tances
Public 
Transfers Other
WITH 1 E, L, I 3.91 5.25 24.99 2.69 30.03 7.87 21.87 15.59 3.41 1.21 20.03
LAND 2 NE, L, I 3.93 6.13 43.59 6.23 49.36 9.48 5.59 13.70 3.15 0.55 18.17
3 E, NL, I 14.62 4.97 39.28 5.37 21.26 10.22 29.38 23.80 4.35 0.31 10.68
4 E, NL, NI 38.48 2.81 43.43 2.69 39.53 6.46 31.13 11.09 5.52 0.44 5.83
5 E, L, NI 8.71 4.69 33.45 3.05 45.95 14.08 9.27 10.09 2.49 0.14 18.00
6 NE, NL, I 10.02 8.14 61.41 12.58 38.65 20.55 15.75 9.49 5.42 0.74 9.41
7 NE, L, NI 8.18 13.79 47.89 15.02 58.50 14.35 5.24 3.71 1.36 0.12 16.71
8 NE, NL, NI 11.55 11.50 63.70 17.95 42.81 22.05 14.61 7.96 6.37 0.25 5.96
NO 9 E,I 25.64 13.19 13.78 4.52 8.35 17.26 32.55 34.10 4.70 1.27 1.78
LAND 10 NE, I 14.82 10.18 45.12 10.38 11.23 37.76 19.18 19.73 9.43 1.21 1.45
11 E, NI 36.02 6.29 20.71 2.44 12.06 25.23 33.74 23.66 3.95 0.20 1.15
12 NE, NI 16.10 13.07 59.65 17.09 19.36 40.53 17.37 14.95 6.78 0.06 0.94
WITH 1 E, L, I 20.12 1.04 21.38 0.29 23.35 1.61 40.60 23.46 3.67 5.53 1.78
LAND 2 NE, L, I 5.20 8.17 44.50 7.95 41.72 13.14 8.60 15.04 4.78 14.99 1.72
3 E, NL, I 36.12 1.77 7.72 0.36 18.27 5.80 50.51 12.68 2.24 9.49 1.00
4 E, NL, NI 82.17 0.21 10.61 0.07 18.69 12.90 57.78 0.00 0.16 10.48 0.00
5 E, L, NI 18.99 0.29 10.74 0.14 65.73 9.08 9.66 2.37 4.19 8.71 0.26
6 NE, NL, I 15.67 21.68 47.90 24.66 26.08 17.12 17.70 17.86 6.49 14.52 0.23
7 NE, L, NI 11.30 6.73 63.30 9.91 58.69 14.25 4.47 8.32 2.79 10.81 0.67
8 NE, NL, NI 25.09 11.06 70.58 18.37 37.36 27.16 9.75 7.89 6.30 11.48 0.06
NO 9 E,I 31.82 5.77 4.78 0.58 2.68 5.44 56.04 19.65 4.71 9.99 1.49
LAND 10 NE, I 23.38 22.65 29.44 15.69 12.65 22.45 30.49 13.61 5.81 14.36 0.63
11 E, NI 59.57 1.43 3.26 0.22 11.41 15.55 44.22 15.41 6.63 6.77 0.00
12 NE, NI 29.31 19.20 53.88 21.76 23.61 37.57 15.36 7.06 4.66 11.51 0.23
WITH 1 E, L, I 4.70 1.64 16.78 0.37 40.31 4.69 25.76 12.71 7.52 0.04 8.97
LAND 2 NE, L, I 6.39 9.90 64.91 9.11 57.03 10.75 13.09 8.47 5.11 0.03 5.51
3 E, NL, I 0.00 0.93 35.41 0.55 13.38 11.19 36.17 25.98 5.53 0.00 7.75
4 E, NL, NI 23.59 0.33 26.39 0.18 26.39 40.49 17.73 7.04 2.65 0.00 5.69
5 E, L, NI 40.60 0.77 44.09 0.37 72.18 3.89 7.65 8.86 2.64 0.00 4.78
6 NE, NL, I 5.39 3.83 69.78 4.23 37.23 20.76 22.86 10.67 4.39 0.00 4.10
7 NE, L, NI 15.02 23.36 74.43 26.86 72.38 10.72 4.72 3.92 3.77 0.52 3.97
8 NE, NL, NI 20.65 5.58 85.22 7.27 50.65 23.10 12.75 5.02 4.35 0.77 3.35
NO 9 E,I 22.22 6.51 21.96 2.02 7.70 7.91 51.25 20.24 6.07 1.65 5.19
LAND 10 NE, I 15.51 17.51 63.03 15.92 13.83 24.74 26.68 22.04 6.15 1.12 5.43
11 E, NI 38.20 2.74 48.28 1.66 12.03 20.57 42.92 11.36 7.23 0.42 5.48
12 NE, NI 29.95 26.91 78.03 31.46 24.35 36.92 20.62 7.54 6.01 0.47 4.09
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Poor (%)
Group's 
share in 
overall 
rural 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using the RIGA database. 
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Table 25d. Household asset status and selected group characteristics 
 
Agriculture Agricultural Wage
Non-
Agricultural 
Wage
Self-
Employ-
ment
Remit-
tances
Public 
Transfers Other
WITH 1 E, L, I 2.81 5.36 9.34 0.85 21.17 7.81 37.58 17.59 4.18 8.88 2.78
LAND 2 NE, L, I 1.46 3.07 0.00 0.00 34.45 11.23 11.34 18.18 11.25 5.24 8.30
3 E, NL, I 4.33 5.50 7.88 0.85 15.40 11.68 37.47 18.83 5.18 9.51 1.93
4 E, NL, NI 9.73 4.58 47.66 6.94 32.56 27.14 18.48 11.55 5.66 4.26 0.34
5 E, L, NI 11.85 5.05 32.97 5.24 42.15 11.71 19.63 13.92 6.04 5.31 1.25
6 NE, NL, I 7.97 3.21 6.14 0.99 19.94 9.39 21.16 8.68 20.74 18.52 1.58
7 NE, L, NI 6.42 14.21 74.68 32.29 55.30 16.72 6.24 9.71 7.29 3.33 1.42
8 NE, NL, NI 8.58 8.98 68.22 19.83 41.54 23.06 14.93 9.36 8.76 2.26 0.09
NO 9 E,I 17.94 22.61 5.36 3.40 5.73 11.03 50.67 17.34 5.82 8.42 1.00
LAND 10 NE, I 10.61 6.76 23.45 3.68 9.30 21.11 19.96 14.52 14.31 18.72 2.08
11 E, NI 38.54 8.44 27.39 6.37 13.24 24.36 33.78 13.71 11.14 3.61 0.15
12 NE, NI 17.12 12.23 55.42 19.55 28.27 28.57 13.93 12.59 12.92 3.53 0.20
WITH 1 E, L, I 8.24 1.25 19.77 0.32 27.12 0.37 22.62 20.23 6.42 1.99 21.26
LAND 2 NE, L, I 6.14 0.95 23.35 0.29 40.55 0.83 5.00 13.66 9.00 1.35 29.60
3 E, NL, I 11.23 6.22 27.06 2.15 25.55 2.13 25.07 18.30 13.72 1.97 13.25
4 E, NL, NI 13.95 3.42 51.30 2.39 31.68 3.74 24.13 12.43 10.68 3.82 13.51
5 E, L, NI 4.31 0.46 21.83 0.12 36.24 2.97 11.79 23.44 4.92 1.19 19.46
6 NE, NL, I 9.27 12.58 60.08 10.45 29.13 10.06 14.91 14.63 13.64 2.35 15.26
7 NE, L, NI 0.00 0.70 51.28 0.47 47.29 4.14 3.15 3.73 8.10 1.89 31.70
8 NE, NL, NI 12.82 23.61 81.09 26.94 33.34 18.59 9.72 12.48 8.40 2.33 15.15
NO 9 E,I 16.24 3.08 21.74 0.90 2.44 6.60 32.49 26.36 13.14 4.27 14.69
LAND 10 NE, I 19.88 12.94 69.46 12.71 3.96 18.72 25.52 24.35 13.33 3.01 11.10
11 E, NI 14.58 1.39 61.53 1.19 2.03 7.03 34.14 28.63 10.72 2.39 15.07
12 NE, NI 20.56 33.39 89.53 42.07 4.58 33.70 23.93 15.38 7.40 4.80 10.21
WITH 1 E, L, I 1.94 2.10 54.59 1.50 50.61 2.98 15.10 11.37 14.67 0.52 4.75
LAND 2 NE, L, I 6.27 0.49 56.60 0.49 43.70 4.91 9.15 19.86 18.09 0.03 4.26
3 E, NL, I 6.28 13.31 48.24 10.39 42.46 3.91 19.96 16.20 13.38 1.51 2.58
4 E, NL, NI 7.42 8.67 63.42 9.25 48.79 6.67 14.85 10.38 16.41 1.73 1.18
5 E, L, NI 7.43 1.45 46.82 1.10 45.75 6.07 7.14 16.83 17.96 0.54 5.71
6 NE, NL, I 7.33 6.81 71.93 8.01 42.13 6.29 12.18 19.01 16.94 1.58 1.87
7 NE, L, NI 8.69 1.21 72.71 1.54 65.36 1.72 2.35 9.10 18.53 0.07 2.87
8 NE, NL, NI 10.26 12.61 76.38 16.32 51.77 7.38 8.93 10.79 18.13 0.87 2.12
NO 9 E,I 16.13 19.97 42.76 13.14 4.41 6.52 38.25 24.19 19.48 2.33 4.82
LAND 10 NE, I 13.65 10.98 67.96 12.66 9.15 15.27 21.54 26.25 22.78 1.08 3.92
11 E, NI 19.27 8.27 52.13 7.00 9.25 14.25 24.92 17.41 26.10 2.96 5.11
12 NE, NI 14.76 14.12 79.18 18.60 13.92 19.30 22.59 16.64 23.18 1.13 3.22
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Source: Authors’ calculations using the RIGA database. 
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Table 25e. Household asset status and selected group characteristics 
 
Agriculture Agricultural Wage
Non-
Agricultural 
Wage
Self-
Employ-
ment
Remit-
tances
Public 
Transfers Other
WITH 1 E, L, I 10.45 0.77 11.14 0.11 68.65 0.00 4.48 16.25 0.64 9.32 0.66
LAND 2 NE, L, I 6.08 2.04 58.50 1.44 68.34 2.00 11.54 6.81 6.15 2.02 3.14
3 E, NL, I 16.42 4.88 20.63 1.33 44.09 1.22 24.63 14.11 8.18 4.59 3.18
4 E, NL, NI 41.22 1.00 63.65 0.72 50.69 2.01 19.41 8.82 14.40 3.06 1.60
5 E, L, NI 28.81 0.35 20.73 0.17 77.28 0.00 9.45 0.00 6.69 0.71 5.86
6 NE, NL, I 15.79 30.30 70.66 29.19 49.84 14.76 17.01 7.17 7.53 2.61 1.08
7 NE, L, NI 19.67 3.00 68.05 3.11 73.12 6.16 6.29 9.36 3.34 0.75 0.98
8 NE, NL, NI 17.36 37.72 84.11 43.90 49.20 16.68 16.55 7.15 8.09 1.49 0.85
NO 9 E,I 25.20 1.15 21.06 0.28 12.25 0.34 28.93 51.21 3.92 1.58 1.76
LAND 10 NE, I 19.67 8.92 70.00 7.94 19.40 28.46 24.21 17.08 9.28 0.27 1.30
11 E, NI 62.79 0.19 64.60 0.17 27.00 3.81 41.05 24.57 3.56 0.00 0.00
12 NE, NI 24.73 9.69 90.61 11.65 16.50 44.68 17.38 9.73 10.08 0.76 0.88
WITH 1 E, L, I 5.92 1.04 24.05 0.26 64.32 1.91 11.80 3.72 4.90 1.77 11.59
LAND 2 NE, L, I 12.72 4.96 63.46 4.05 73.46 1.94 7.34 3.43 5.42 0.46 7.95
3 E, NL, I 16.73 0.93 44.92 0.56 48.60 2.60 19.72 12.33 5.70 3.88 7.18
4 E, NL, NI 11.08 0.61 59.99 0.43 43.72 3.36 12.97 5.30 23.78 8.56 2.30
5 E, L, NI 14.86 0.28 42.85 0.16 62.44 2.04 9.75 5.87 10.03 3.59 6.27
6 NE, NL, I 12.38 8.15 76.36 7.98 58.42 3.45 14.25 6.37 11.40 1.67 4.45
7 NE, L, NI 14.02 7.46 73.63 7.28 79.25 2.26 7.08 2.33 3.73 0.42 4.92
8 NE, NL, NI 13.97 9.13 85.07 9.80 63.98 3.84 11.75 4.48 13.13 1.06 1.74
NO 9 E,I 9.80 4.87 42.92 2.46 6.32 1.62 46.12 14.64 14.97 6.40 9.92
LAND 10 NE, I 19.45 28.39 83.03 29.02 17.95 6.64 37.59 15.73 14.86 2.95 4.29
11 E, NI 21.93 1.05 55.30 0.73 10.82 3.38 40.34 16.02 15.05 4.95 9.43
12 NE, NI 22.07 33.12 89.79 37.27 26.00 16.95 31.41 10.04 9.71 2.60 3.27
WITH 1 E, L, I 0.00 0.17 43.88 0.04 55.14 0.00 15.89 25.72 2.19 0.00 1.06
LAND 2 NE, L, I 7.83 0.19 41.33 0.04 61.25 0.00 9.97 28.77 0.00 0.00 0.00
3 E, NL, I 4.00 31.62 47.16 23.60 55.96 1.97 10.81 23.92 2.51 4.74 0.09
4 E, NL, NI 7.17 11.06 64.70 11.65 66.47 4.03 8.50 15.94 2.20 2.64 0.22
5 E, L, NI 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 52.60 12.99 13.50 0.00 0.00 20.90 0.00
6 NE, NL, I 13.04 19.57 65.53 20.47 60.77 2.80 7.22 21.01 4.51 3.16 0.53
7 NE, L, NI 35.58 0.07 100.00 0.13 71.01 0.00 0.00 28.99 0.00 0.00 0.00
8 NE, NL, NI 13.69 26.46 76.47 34.85 63.84 10.54 6.18 14.05 3.10 1.79 0.50
NO 9 E,I 0.66 2.52 18.64 0.71 7.15 2.59 27.95 50.58 8.42 3.21 0.11
LAND 10 NE, I 8.77 2.36 35.33 1.54 10.39 9.50 8.23 46.14 19.86 4.92 0.96
11 E, NI 4.46 0.71 56.00 0.62 16.12 12.99 29.07 33.22 4.14 4.17 0.29
12 NE, NI 13.60 5.23 70.27 6.35 26.31 27.37 12.14 25.71 5.76 2.42 0.28
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Table 26. Percentage of individuals participating in rural wage employment 
Name of Survey Working Age Individuals
Employed 
Individuals
Participation 
Rate M F
Sub-Saharan Africa
Ghana98 Ghana Living Standards Survey Round 3 8,600 737 8% 69% 31%
Malawi04 Integrated Household Survey - 2 22,016 9,000 39% 62% 38%
Nigeria04 Living Standards Survey 35,521 1,675 4% 74% 26%
South & East Asia
Bangladesh00 Household Income-Expenditure Survey 14,282 6,361 43% 51% 49%
Indonesia00 Family Life Survey - Wave 3 13,193 3,409 27% 68% 32%
Nepal03 Living Standards Survey II 14,530 4,839 65% 47% 53%
Vietnam98 Living Standards Survey 11,772 3,356 28% 60% 40%
Eastern Europe & Central Asia
Albania05 Living Standards Measurement Survey 4,998 671 13% 84% 16%
Bulgaria01 Integrated Household Survey 1,340 630 47% 51% 49%
Tajikistan03 Living Standards Survey 9,782 3,205 33% 59% 41%
Latin America & Caribbean
Ecuador95 Estudio de Condiciones de Vida 6,275 2,342 38% 77% 23%
Guatemala00 Encuesta de Condiciones de Vida 10,240 3,970 39% 81% 19%
Nicaragua01 Encuesta de Medición de Niveles de Vida 5,408 1,767 34% 76% 24%
Panama03 Encuesta de Niveles de Vida 13,255 2,640 36% 75% 25%
Notes: (1) This only includes individuals who are of working age (15 and 60 years old).
(2) Participation rates are weighted to be nationally representative.  
Source: Authors’ calculations using the RIGA database 
 
Table 27. Participation in rural labour markets by agricultural vs. non-
agricultural sector (for participants only) 
Ag. Non-Ag. Total
Sub-Saharan Africa
Ghana98 16% 84% 100%
Malawi04 82% 18% 100%
Nigeria04 29% 71% 100%
South & East Asia
Bangladesh00 46% 54% 100%
Indonesia00 38% 62% 100%
Nepal03 45% 55% 100%
Vietnam98 46% 54% 100%
Eastern Europe & Central Asia
Albania05 15% 85% 100%
Bulgaria01 23% 77% 100%
Tajikistan03 75% 25% 100%
Latin America & Caribbean
Ecuador95 51% 49% 100%
Guatemala00 56% 44% 100%
Nicaragua01 49% 51% 100%
Panama03 41% 59% 100%  
Source: Authors’ calculations using the RIGA database 
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Table 28. Participation in rural labour markets by agricultural vs. non-
agricultural sector, disaggregated by industry (for participants only) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Agriculture & 
Fishing Manufacturing Construction
Commerce + 
Transport, 
Storage, etc. + 
Finance, Real 
Estate, etc. Services
Mining + 
Electricity & 
Utilities Other Total
Sub-Saharan Africa
Ghana98 16% 17% 6% 20% 36% 5% 0% 100%
Malawi04 82% 4% 4% 2% 8% 0% 0% 100%
Nigeria04 29% 3% 2% 26% 36% 1% 3% 100%
South & East Asia
Bangladesh00 46% 17% 5% 16% 14% 1% 1% 100%
Indonesia00 38% 15% 11% 11% 22% 2% 0% 100%
Nepal03 45% 13% 20% 5% 15% 2% 1% 100%
Vietnam98 46% 14% 13% 5% 19% 3% 0% 100%
Eastern Europe & Central Asia
Albania05 15% 10% 29% 15% 26% 5% 0% 100%
Bulgaria01 23% 26% 4% 25% 15% 5% 1% 100%
Tajikistan03 75% 1% 3% 4% 17% 0% 0% 100%
Latin America & Caribbean
Ecuador95 51% 9% 11% 11% 12% 3% 4% 100%
Guatemala00 56% 9% 10% 11% 13% 1% 0% 100%
Nicaragua01 49% 9% 7% 8% 25% 2% 0% 100%
Panama03 41% 6% 7% 18% 27% 1% 0% 100%
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using the RIGA database 
 
 
Table 29. Participation in rural labour markets by sector and expenditure quintile 
(participants only) 
Total Total
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
Ghana98 14% 18% 23% 22% 22% 100% 10% 21% 21% 28% 20% 100%
Malawi04 35% 24% 18% 13% 8% 100% 21% 20% 19% 20% 21% 100%
Nigeria04 36% 19% 17% 18% 11% 100% 13% 17% 25% 26% 20% 100%
Bangladesh00 33% 28% 20% 12% 7% 100% 17% 18% 20% 24% 22% 100%
Indonesia00 30% 24% 21% 15% 9% 100% 19% 19% 19% 20% 22% 100%
Nepal03 40% 27% 17% 12% 4% 100% 26% 25% 19% 17% 13% 100%
Vietnam98 31% 29% 17% 15% 8% 100% 19% 21% 21% 21% 18% 100%
Albania05 24% 25% 25% 11% 15% 100% 13% 22% 21% 23% 21% 100%
Bulgaria01 21% 27% 11% 26% 15% 100% 10% 21% 26% 20% 24% 100%
Tajikistan03 33% 25% 19% 15% 9% 100% 15% 19% 24% 23% 18% 100%
Ecuador95 37% 27% 20% 11% 6% 100% 24% 24% 22% 17% 14% 100%
Guatemala00 42% 25% 18% 11% 4% 100% 16% 18% 22% 25% 19% 100%
Nicaragua01 44% 26% 15% 11% 5% 100% 18% 23% 23% 22% 15% 100%
Panama03 48% 26% 16% 8% 2% 100% 18% 25% 22% 21% 14% 100%
Ag Non-Ag
Sub-Saharan Africa
South & East Asia
Eastern Europe & Central Asia
Latin America & the Caribbean
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using the RIGA database 
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Table 30. Participation in rural labour markets by sector and level of education 
(participants only) 
Overall Overall
No 
Education
Primary 
School
Middle 
School
High-
School & 
Above
No 
Education
Primary 
School
Middle 
School
High-
School & 
Above
Sub-Saharan Africa
Ghana98 34% 14% 39% 12% 100% 24% 11% 37% 29% 100%
Malawi04 41% 40% 15% 4% 100% 34% 35% 19% 13% 100%
Nigeria04 52% 38% 5% 5% 100% 15% 47% 6% 31% 100%
South & East Asia
Bangladesh00 77% 11% 8% 3% 100% 46% 15% 20% 19% 100%
Indonesia00 20% 36% 30% 14% 100% 6% 16% 33% 45% 100%
Nepal03 70% 16% 11% 3% 100% 55% 17% 15% 13% 100%
Vietnam98 15% 51% 28% 6% 100% 4% 22% 49% 24% 100%
Eastern Europe & Central Asia
Albania05 1% 3% 73% 23% 100% 1% 2% 44% 54% 100%
Bulgaria01 2% 7% 59% 32% 100% 1% 4% 44% 51% 100%
Tajikistan03 1% 2% 16% 81% 100% 1% 1% 7% 92% 100%
Latin America & the Caribbean
Ecuador95 16% 34% 40% 11% 100% 7% 20% 42% 32% 100%
Guatemala00 42% 44% 14% 1% 100% 18% 39% 33% 10% 100%
Nicaragua01 42% 43% 14% 1% 100% 17% 36% 33% 14% 100%
Panama03 10% 29% 52% 9% 100% 2% 11% 48% 39% 100%
Ag Non-Ag
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using the RIGA database 
 
 
Table 31. Participation in rural labour markets by sector and gender (participants 
only) 
M F M F M F M F
Ghana98 20% 7% 80% 93% 100% 100% 69% 31%
Malawi04 77% 89% 23% 11% 100% 100% 62% 38%
Nigeria04 29% 28% 71% 72% 100% 100% 74% 26%
Bangladesh00 45% 47% 55% 53% 100% 100% 51% 49%
Indonesia00 35% 45% 65% 55% 100% 100% 68% 32%
Nepal03 44% 46% 56% 54% 100% 100% 47% 53%
Vietnam98 41% 52% 59% 48% 100% 100% 60% 40%
Albania05 16% 7% 84% 93% 100% 100% 84% 16%
Bulgaria01 24% 22% 76% 78% 100% 100% 51% 49%
Tajikistan03 69% 84% 31% 16% 100% 100% 59% 41%
Ecuador95 55% 35% 45% 65% 100% 100% 77% 23%
Guatemala00 61% 35% 39% 65% 100% 100% 81% 19%
Nicaragua01 59% 19% 41% 81% 100% 100% 76% 24%
Panama03 53% 7% 47% 93% 100% 100% 75% 25%
Latin America & the Caribbean
Ag Non-ag
Sub-Saharan Africa
Eastern Europe & Central Asia
South & East Asia
Total Overall
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using the RIGA database 
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Table 32. Participation in rural labour markets by agricultural vs. non-agricultural sector, disaggregated by industry, and by gender 
(for participants only) 
M F M F M F M F M F M F M F M F M F
Ghana98 20% 7% 11% 32% 6% 5% 17% 27% 39% 29% 6% 0% 0% 0% 100% 100% 69% 31%
Malawi04 77% 89% 6% 1% 4% 4% 3% 1% 9% 5% 1% 0% 0% 0% 100% 100% 62% 38%
Nigeria04 29% 28% 3% 2% 3% 1% 27% 24% 34% 43% 1% 0% 3% 1% 100% 100% 74% 26%
Bangladesh00 45% 47% 17% 17% 6% 5% 16% 15% 14% 14% 1% 1% 1% 1% 100% 100% 51% 49%
Indonesia00 35% 45% 13% 21% 16% 1% 12% 9% 22% 22% 2% 0% 0% 0% 100% 100% 68% 32%
Nepal03 44% 46% 13% 13% 20% 19% 6% 5% 15% 15% 1% 2% 1% 1% 100% 100% 47% 53%
Vietnam98 41% 52% 12% 17% 19% 4% 6% 4% 18% 22% 3% 2% 0% 0% 100% 100% 60% 40%
Albania05 16% 7% 9% 17% 34% 1% 16% 14% 20% 58% 6% 2% 0% 0% 100% 100% 84% 16%
Bulgaria01 24% 22% 24% 28% 5% 3% 26% 25% 13% 17% 6% 4% 1% 1% 100% 100% 51% 49%
Tajikistan03 69% 84% 1% 1% 5% 1% 5% 1% 20% 12% 0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 100% 59% 41%
Ecuador95 55% 35% 9% 10% 14% 1% 10% 12% 8% 23% 3% 1% 0% 19% 100% 100% 77% 23%
Guatemala00 61% 35% 7% 18% 13% 1% 11% 13% 8% 33% 1% 0% 0% 0% 100% 100% 81% 19%
Nicaragua01 59% 19% 9% 8% 9% 0% 8% 6% 12% 67% 3% 0% 0% 0% 100% 100% 76% 24%
Panama03 53% 7% 7% 3% 9% 0% 16% 23% 14% 67% 1% 1% 0% 0% 100% 100% 75% 25%
Total 
(horizontal)
South & East Asia
Eastern Europe & Central Asia
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Latin America & the Caribbean
Manufacturin
g Construction
Commerce + 
Transport, 
Storage, & 
Communicati
on + Finance, 
Insurance & 
Real Estate
Services
Mining + 
Electricity & 
Utilities
Other OverallAgriculture & Fishing
Sub-Saharan Africa
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using the RIGA database 
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Table 33. Participation in rural labour markets by time categories (for 
participants only) 
FYFT FYPT PYFT PYPT FY PY FT PT Total
Sub-Saharan Africa
Ghana98 55% 45% 100%
Malawi04 9% 1% 13% 77% 10% 90% 22% 78% 100%
Nigeria04 70% 30% 100%
South & East Asia
Bangladesh00 72% 8% 15% 6% 80% 20% 86% 14% 100%
Indonesia00 34% 13% 34% 19% 47% 53% 68% 32% 100%
Nepal03 16% 8% 30% 46% 24% 76% 46% 54% 100%
Vietnam98 13% 7% 54% 26% 20% 80% 67% 33% 100%
Eastern Europe & Central Asia
Albania05 49% 3% 41% 7% 52% 48% 90% 10% 100%
Bulgaria01 85% 15% 100%
Tajikistan03 9% 39% 9% 42% 49% 51% 19% 82% 100%
Latin America & Caribbean
Ecuador95 34% 16% 31% 19% 49% 51% 65% 35% 100%
Guatemala00 38% 11% 46% 5% 49% 51% 84% 16% 100%
Nicaragua01 36% 7% 44% 13% 43% 57% 80% 20% 100%
Panama03 40% 11% 40% 10% 50% 50% 80% 20% 100%  
Source: Authors’ calculations using the RIGA database 
 
 
Table 34. Participation in rural labour markets by sector and by time categories 
(for participants only) 
Total Total
FYFT FYPT PYFT PYPT FT PT FYFT FYPT PYFT PYPT FT PT 
Sub-Saharan Africa
Ghana98 57% 43% 100% 55% 45% 100%
Malawi04 2% 1% 8% 89% 10% 90% 100% 39% 3% 37% 21% 76% 24% 100%
Nigeria04 70% 30% 100% 72% 28% 100%
South & East Asia
Bangladesh00 59% 10% 22% 9% 81% 19% 100% 82% 6% 9% 2% 91% 9% 100%
Indonesia00 24% 11% 34% 31% 58% 42% 100% 41% 14% 33% 12% 74% 26% 100%
Nepal03 5% 4% 25% 65% 31% 69% 100% 25% 11% 33% 31% 58% 42% 100%
Vietnam98 5% 2% 58% 35% 63% 37% 100% 18% 12% 51% 18% 70% 30% 100%
Eastern Europe & Central Asia
Albania05 10% 1% 81% 8% 91% 9% 100% 56% 3% 34% 7% 90% 10% 100%
Bulgaria01 77% 23% 100% 87% 13% 100%
Tajikistan03 14% 5% 53% 28% 68% 32% 100% 16% 2% 66% 16% 82% 18% 100%
Latin America & the Caribbean
Ecuador95 34% 22% 22% 21% 57% 43% 100% 33% 9% 41% 17% 73% 27% 100%
Guatemala00 30% 10% 54% 5% 85% 15% 100% 48% 11% 36% 5% 84% 16% 100%
Nicaragua01 35% 8% 41% 16% 76% 24% 100% 37% 7% 46% 10% 83% 17% 100%
Panama03 33% 13% 42% 12% 75% 25% 100% 45% 9% 39% 8% 83% 17% 100%
Notes: (1) TBC = To be completed.
(2) It is not possible to classify Ghana98, Nigeria04, & Bulgaria01 according to 4 time categories because of insuficient information. 
Ag Non-Ag
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using the RIGA database 
 Table 35. Participation in rural labour markets by time category and gender (participants only) 
M F M F M F M F M F M F M F M F
Sub-Saharan Africa
Ghana98 62% 40% 38% 60% 100% 100% 69% 31%
Malawi04 12% 3% 1% 1% 17% 7% 69% 89% 30% 10% 70% 90% 100% 100% 62% 38%
Nigeria04 72% 69% 28% 31% 100% 100% 74% 26%
South & East Asia
Bangladesh00 73% 71% 8% 8% 14% 15% 5% 6% 87% 86% 13% 14% 100% 100% 51% 49%
Indonesia00 36% 30% 12% 15% 35% 30% 17% 25% 72% 60% 28% 40% 100% 100% 68% 32%
Nepal03 16% 16% 8% 8% 30% 29% 45% 47% 47% 45% 53% 55% 100% 100% 47% 53%
Vietnam98 13% 12% 8% 7% 56% 51% 23% 30% 69% 63% 31% 37% 100% 100% 60% 40%
Eastern Europe & Central Asia
Albania05 49% 48% 2% 7% 42% 38% 7% 7% 91% 86% 9% 14% 100% 100% 84% 16%
Bulgaria01 85% 84% 15% 16% 100% 100% 51% 49%
Tajikistan03 10% 8% 41% 37% 9% 10% 40% 45% 19% 18% 81% 82% 100% 100% 59% 41%
Latin America & the Caribbean
Ecuador95 35% 29% 16% 14% 30% 36% 19% 21% 65% 65% 35% 35% 100% 100% 77% 23%
Guatemala00 40% 28% 9% 17% 46% 47% 5% 7% 86% 76% 14% 24% 100% 100% 81% 19%
Nicaragua01 35% 37% 7% 9% 44% 44% 14% 10% 79% 81% 21% 19% 100% 100% 76% 24%
Panama03 38% 43% 10% 11% 41% 39% 11% 7% 79% 82% 21% 18% 100% 100% 75% 25%
Notes: (1) It is not possible to classify Ghana98, Nigeria04, & Bulgaria01 according to 4 time categories because of insufficient information.
OverallFYFT FYPT PYFT FT PT TotalPYPT
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using the RIGA database 
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Table 36. The percentage of agricultural and non-agricultural income in total rural household income, over time.  
RIGA countries           
 Albania Bulgaria Ecuador Ghana Indonesia 
 2002 2005 1995 2001 1995 1998 1992 1998 1993 2000 
           
Agricultural 51 43 47 25 52 54 71 61 50 36 
Non-Agricultural 49 57 53 75 48 46 29 39 50 64 
           
 Nepal Nicaragua Pakistan Panama Vietnam 
 1996 2003 1998 2001 1991 2001 1997 2003 1992 1998 
           
Agricultural 62 48 58 57 51 44 41 41 62 62 
Non-Agricultural 38 52 42 43 49 56 59 59 38 38 
Source: FAO-RIGA dataset          
           
Non RIGA countries           
 Bangladesh Chile China Mexico Philippines 
 1988 2004 1990 1996 1987 1999 1992 2002 1986 1994 
           
Agricultural 58 44 70 59 53 32 51 24 62 49 
Non-Agricultural 42 56 30 41 47 68 49 76 38 51 
Source: Bangladesh: Nargis and Hossain (2006); Chile: Berdeguè, Ramirez, and Reardon (2001); China: Benjamin, Brant and Giles 
(2005); Mexico: World Bank (2005); Philippines: Estudillo and Otsuka (1999). 
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Table 37. Relationship between income shares and level of income, multivariate analysis 
Country OLS Censored OLS Censored OLS Censored OLS Censored OLS Censored
lnpcincome -0.0125 0.002 0.0854 0.046 -0.0872 -0.041 0.0771 0.0397 -0.1169 -0.0477
t-stat -7.00 1.79 45.30 50.16 -33.86 38.92 43.70 48.52 -40.00 30.77
n 68,881 68,881 68,881 68,881 68,881 68,881 68,881 68,881 68,881 68,881
lnpcincome 0.01 -0.062 0.0581 0.0423 -0.0451 -0.0629 0.1024 0.0603 -0.2493 0.1273
t-stat 3.23 10.25 10.50 8.92 -4.91 16.31 9.38 12.42 -10.47 8.00
n 3,646 5,030 3,646 5,030 3,646 5,030 3,646 5,030 3,646 5,030
lnpcincome -0.0419 -0.0247 -0.1268 -0.0533 0.0383 0.0205 0.1354 0.0732 -0.201 -0.0931
t-stat -2.44 1.80 -7.02 5.04 2.98 3.74 7.32 8.46 -5.03 5.72
n 2,628 2,628 2,628 2,628 2,628 2,628 2,628 2,628 2,628 2,628
lnpcincome -0.1005 -0.0417 0.072 0.041 0.0816 0.0404 0.0389 0.0363 -0.5525 -0.2943
t-stat -16.06 11.23 21.67 22.07 16.82 17.77 9.38 13.80 -36.05 54.63
n 9,822 9,822 9,822 9,822 9,822 9,822 9,822 9,822 9,822 9,822
lnpcincome 0.0274 0.0392 0.0472 0.0262 -0.0761 -0.0251 0.0453 0.0228 -0.0351 -0.003
t-stat 11.25 14.14 20.59 19.60 -25.88 28.23 15.88 17.65 -6.75 0.74
n 12,658 12,658 12,658 12,658 12,658 12,658 12,658 12,658 12,658 12,658
lnpcincome -0.1193 -0.047 0.0748 0.0349 -0.3701 -0.1919 0.1183 0.0485 0.1049 0.0741
t-stat -9.57 10.25 9.37 8.92 -14.03 16.31 11.97 12.42 5.01 8.00
n 5,030 5,030 5,030 5,030 5,030 5,030 5,030 5,030 5,030 5,030
lnpcincome 0.0254 0.0168 0.1131 0.0635 -0.0586 -0.0137 0.0815 0.0514 -0.3507 -0.227
t-stat 6.19 6.11 15.23 23.04 -6.38 4.94 13.06 16.83 -21.67 32.65
n 5,204 5,204 5,204 5,204 5,204 5,204 5,204 5,204 5,204 5,204
lnpcincome -0.0788 -0.0368 0.1188 0.0691 -0.1967 -0.1084 0.1187 0.0743 0.1013 0.0889
t-stat -4.52 3.91 8.00 7.97 -11.02 11.96 7.50 8.25 5.26 7.68
n 2,643 2,643 2,643 2,643 2,643 2,643 2,643 2,643 2,643 2,643
lnpcincome -0.0278 0.0011 -0.0077 0.0049 0.0148 0.0016 0.0537 0.0258 -0.0484 -0.0172
t-stat -5.48 0.34 -1.07 2.28 1.35 0.65 11.10 11.23 -7.06 4.95
n 9,746 9,746 9,746 9,746 9,746 9,746 9,746 9,746 9,746 9,746
lnpcincome -0.0562 -0.0321 0.0115 0.0386 -0.3489 -0.2141 0.3926 0.1981 -0.0723 -0.0148
t-stat -6.03 4.42 1.38 4.88 -34.45 37.95 40.55 40.77 -5.28 1.63
n 4,220 4,220 4,220 4,220 4,220 4,220 4,220 4,220 4,220 4,220
lnpcincome 0.034 0.0393 0.1477 0.0781 -0.3635 -0.2593 0.1628 0.0987 -0.0844 -0.0405
t-stat 3.43 3.91 9.22 10.37 -17.79 20.04 10.95 11.57 -3.75 2.85
n 1,636 1,636 1,636 1,636 1,636 1,636 1,636 1,636 1,636 1,636
lnpcincome 0.1431 0.0854 0.1428 0.1041 -0.0433 0.0092 0.0143 n.a. -0.2386 -0.1472
t-stat 7.44 7.88 7.45 8.42 -0.70 0.42 1.57 n.a -5.98 13.81
n 861 861 861 861 861 861 861 861 861 861
lnpcincome 0.0308 0.0181 0.0558 0.0371 -0.1574 -0.0716 0.083 0.0453 -0.0683 -0.0072
t-stat 3.06 4.19 6.48 7.71 -7.99 10.52 6.41 7.74 -2.65 0.64
n 2,450 2,450 2,450 2,450 2,450 2,450 2,450 2,450 2,450 2,450
lnpcincome 0.0192 0.0101 0.1693 0.0785 -0.3576 -0.2021 0.1358 0.0878 -0.1623 -0.0774
t-stat 1.87 1.98 16.97 16.80 -20.66 21.42 11.96 13.39 -7.65 7.65
n 3,814 3,814 3,814 3,814 3,814 3,814 3,814 3,814 3,814 3,814
lnpcincome -0.0032 0.0022 0.0867 0.0365 -0.2103 -0.1027 0.1059 0.0665 0.0091 0.0262
t-stat -0.23 0.35 6.45 5.99 -10.52 10.59 6.93 7.95 0.41 1.85
n 1,824 1,824 1,824 1,824 1,824 1,824 1,824 1,824 1,824 1,824
lnpcincome 0.0554 0.0243 0.1529 0.0784 -0.3795 -0.2206 0.0668 0.0406 -0.1379 -0.045
t-stat 7.21 6.12 18.92 18.31 -24.25 26.03 7.83 8.84 -6.51 4.53
n 2,916 2,916 2,916 2,916 2,916 2,916 2,916 2,916 2,916 2,916
Pakistan
E
u
r
o
p
e
Albania
Bulgaria
L
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C
Ecuador
Guatemala
Nicaragua
Panama
Vietnam
A
s
i
a
Bangladesh
Indonesia
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A
f
r
i
c
a
Ghana
Madagascar
Malawi
Nigeria
Transfers/Other
Megadata
Ag Wage Non-Ag Wage Ag Production Self Employment
 
Notes: Tests of significance based on robust standard errors in all cases.  Elasticities reported instead of coefficients.  
Source: Authors’ calculations using the RIGA database 
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Figure 1. The change in the share of all farm land held by small holders 
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Source: Anriquez and Bonomi (2007) 
 
Figure 2a. Incidence of poverty by region, 1$ a day (1993 PPP), 1981-2004 
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Sources: Ravallion et al. (2007) and Chen and Ravallion (2007) 
Note: EAP = East Asia and the Pacific, ECA = Eastern Europe and Central Asia, LAC = Latin America and 
the Caribbean, MNA= Middle East and North Africa, SAS = South Asia, SSA = Sub-Saharan Africa. 
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Figure 2b. Incidence of poverty by region, 2$ a day (1993 PPP), 1981-2004 
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Sources: Ravallion et al. (2007) and Chen and Ravallion (2007) 
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Figure 3a. Number of rural poor, by region, $1 day, 1993-2002 
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Sources: Ravallion et al. (2007) and Chen and Ravallion (2007). 
 
Figure 3b. Number of rural poor, by region, $2 day, 1993-2002 
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Sources: Ravallion et al. (2007) and Chen and Ravallion (2007). 
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Figure 4a. Rural share of total poor, by region, 1$ day, 1993-2002 
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Sources: Ravallion et al. (2007) and Chen and Ravallion (2007) 
 
Figure 4b. Rural share of total poor, by region, 2$ day, 1993-2002 
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Sources: Ravallion et al. (2007) and Chen and Ravallion (2007). 
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Figure 5a. Incidence of poverty by region (ECA, LAC and MNA) and by urban/rural, 
1$ a day, 1993-2002 
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Sources: Ravallion et al. (2007) and Chen and Ravallion (2007) 
 
Figure 5b. Incidence of poverty by region (EAP, SAS and SSA) and by urban/rural, 
2$ a day, 1993-2002 
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Sources: Ravallion et al. (2007) and Chen and Ravallion (2007). 
 
 Figure 6. Share of country populations older than 60 years. 
 
Source: Anríquez (2007) 
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Figure 7. Ratio of females to males by country, working age 15-49 years 
 
Source: Anríquez (2007)
 Figure 8. Changes in female-to-male ratio by initial ratio 
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Figure 9a. Share of rural on-farm income by country per capita GDP 
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Source: Authors’ calculations using the RIGA database  
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Figure 9b. Share of rural non-agricultural income by country per capita GDP 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using the RIGA database  
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Figure 10. Participation in rural non-farm wage and self-employment activities 
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Source: Authors’ calculations using the RIGA database.  
Notes: For each country the figure shows participation in wage (first column) and self-employment 
(second column) rural non-farm activities. For Bulgaria and Ecuador participation in self-employment is 
missing. 
 
Figure 11. Rural non-farm income shares from wage and self-employment sources 
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Source: Authors’ calculations using the RIGA database  
Notes: For each country the figure shows the income shares from wage (first column) and self-
employment (second column) rural non-farm activities. For Bulgaria and Ecuador self-employment 
income shares are missing. 
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Figure 12. Percent of households participating in main income generating 
activities, by expenditure quintile  
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Source: Authors’ calculations using the RIGA database  
Note: expenditure quintiles move from poorer to richer. 
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Figure 13. Percent of total income from main income generating activities, by 
expenditure quintile  
on-farm activities
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Source: Authors’ calculations using the RIGA database  
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Figure 14. Share of households receiving public transfers, by expenditure quintile. 
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Source: Authors’ calculations using the RIGA database  
 
Figure 15. Share of households receiving private transfers, by expenditure quintile. 
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Source: Authors’ calculations using the RIGA database  
 
  
 
Figure 16. Household livelihoods by expenditure quintiles 
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Source: Authors’ calculations using the RIGA database  
Note: Households are characterized by the main (>75%) source of income. Diversified households do not have one main source. ‘Farm’ aggregate includes crop and livestock 
income. ‘Other’ is composed of non-agricultural wage and self-employment; transfers, including remittances; and other minor sources. Quintiles are sorted from poorest to 
richest. 
 
 Figure 17. Share of diversified rural households by national per capita GDP 
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Source: Authors’ calculations using the RIGA database  
 
Figure 18. Share of agricultural production by household livelihood strategy.  
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Figure 19. Educational achievement, urban and rural heads of household  
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Source: Zezza, et al (2007) 
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Figure 20. Average years of education, overall and rural heads of households  
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Source: Zezza, et al (2007) 
 
Figure 21. Percentage difference in rural-urban net primary and secondary school 
attendance rates 
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Source: Zezza, et al (2007) 
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Figure 22. Percentage difference in rural female-male net primary and secondary 
school attendance rates 
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Source: Zezza, et al (2007) 
 
Figure 23. Land distribution, by region and land category (in hectares) 
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Figure 24. Land concentration by expenditure (30 bins), by region (Lowess 
distribution) 
 
Source: Zezza, et al (2007) 
 
Figure 25. Livestock concentration across the expenditure distribution (30 bins), 
by region (Lowess distribution) 
  
  
Source: Zezza, et al (2007) 
 
0
2
4
6
8
10
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 o
f l
an
d 
ov
er
 e
xp
en
di
tu
re
0 10 20 30
Expenditure (30 bins)
Bangladesh00 Indonesia00 Nepal96 Pakistan01 Vietnam98
Asia
0
2
4
6
8
10
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 o
f l
an
d 
ov
er
 e
xp
en
di
tu
re
0 10 20 30
Expenditure (30 bins)
Ecuador95 Guatemala00 Panama03 Nicaragua01
Latin America
0
2
4
6
8
10
P
er
ce
nt
ag
e 
of
 la
nd
 o
ve
r e
xp
en
di
tu
re
0 10 20 30
Expenditure (30 bins)
Albania05 Bulgaria01
Eastern Europe
0
2
4
6
8
10
P
er
ce
nt
ag
e 
of
 la
nd
 o
ve
r e
xp
en
di
tu
re
0 10 20 30
Expenditure (30 bins)
Ghana98 Madagascar93 Malawi04
Africa
0
5
10
15
P
er
ce
nt
ag
e 
of
 T
LU
 o
ve
r e
xp
en
di
tu
re
0 10 20 30
Expenditure  (30 bins)
Bangladesh00 Nepal96 Vietnam98
Asia
0
5
10
15
P
er
ce
nt
ag
e 
of
 T
LU
 o
ve
r e
xp
en
di
tu
re
0 10 20 30
Expenditure  (30 bins)
Ghana98 Madagascar93 Malawi04 Nigeria04
Africa
0
5
10
15
P
er
ce
nt
ag
e 
of
 T
LU
 o
ve
r e
xp
en
di
tu
re
0 10 20 30
Expenditure  (30 bins)
Albania05 Bulgaria01
Eastern Europe
0
5
10
15
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 o
f T
LU
 o
ve
r e
xp
en
di
tu
re
0 10 20 30
Expenditure (30 bins)
Ecuador95 Guatemala00 Nicaragua01 Panama03
Latin America
  118
Figure 26a. Correlation of schooling with participation in agricultural and non 
agricultural wage employment 
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Source: Winters, et al (2007) 
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Figure 26b. Correlation of infrastructure with participation in income-generating 
categories 
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Source: Winters, et al (2007) 
 
Figure 27a. Estimated probabilities of being poor ($2/day) as a function of the 
schooling of a rural household head, simulated low and high values of 
infrastructure, Malawi. 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using the RIGA database  
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Figure 27b. Estimated probabilities of being poor ($2/day) as a function of the 
schooling of a rural household head, simulated low and high values of 
infrastructure, Nicaragua. 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using the RIGA database  
 
Figure 27c. Estimated probabilities of being poor ($2/day) as a function of the 
schooling of a rural household head, simulated low and high values of 
infrastructure, Bangladesh. 
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Source: Authors’ calculations using the RIGA database  
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Figure 27d. Estimated probabilities of being poor ($2/day) as a function of the 
schooling of a rural household head, simulated low and high values of 
infrastructure, Panama. 
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Source: Authors’ calculations using the RIGA database  
 
 
Figure 28a. Estimated probabilities of being poor ($2/day) as a function of the size 
of farm (ownership), simulated low and high values of infrastructure, Malawi 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using the RIGA database  
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Figure 28b. Estimated probabilities of being poor ($2/day) as a function of the size 
of farm (ownership), simulated low and high values of infrastructure, Nicaragua. 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using the RIGA database  
 
 
Figure 28c. Estimated probabilities of being poor ($2/day) as a function of the size 
of farm (ownership), simulated low and high values of infrastructure, Nepal. 
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Source: Authors’ calculations using the RIGA database  
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Figure 28d. Estimated probabilities of being poor ($2/day) as a function of the size 
of farm (ownership), simulated low and high values of infrastructure, Bangladesh. 
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Source: Authors’ calculations using the RIGA database  
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Figure 29. Daily rural wage distributions by levels of education (for participants 
only) 
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Source: Authors’ calculations using the RIGA database  
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Figure 30. Daily rural wage distributions by agricultural vs. non-agricultural 
sector (for participants only) 
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Source: Authors’ calculations using the RIGA database  
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Figure 31. Daily rural wage by sector and gender (participants only) 
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Source: Authors’ calculations using the RIGA database  
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Figure 32. Daily rural wage distributions by time categories (for participants only) 
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Source: Authors’ calculations using the RIGA database  
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Figure 33. The percentage of agricultural and non-agricultural income in total 
rural household income, over time, RIGA countries. 
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Source: Authors’ calculations using the RIGA database  
 
Figure 34. The percentage of agricultural and non-agricultural income in total 
rural household income, over time, RIGA countries. 
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Source: Bangladesh: Nargis and Hossain (2006); Chile: Berdeguè, Ramirez, and Reardon (2001); China: 
Benjamin, Brant and Giles (2005); Mexico: World Bank (2005); Philippines: Estudillo and Otsuka 
(1999).  
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Figure 35. Percentage of agricultural and non-agricultural income in total rural 
household income, over time and by expenditure quintiles, RIGA countries. 
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Source: Authors’ calculations using the RIGA database  
  134
Figure 36. Share of on-farm specializing households, by per capita GDP 
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Source: Authors’ calculations using the RIGA database  
 
Figure 37. Elasticity of income sources from a given source with respect to changes 
in household income, by per capita GDP, for each country in the RIGA dataset. 
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Source: Authors’ calculations using the RIGA database  
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Figure 38. The patterns of rural development; predicted shares from different 
income generating activities, by per capita income, using results from megadata 
analysis 
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Source: Authors’ calculations using the RIGA database  
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Appendix I 
 
In providing a detailed analysis of labour markets, there are two areas of particular 
importance to consider in the creation of variables: i) how to categorize the time spent 
working in labour activities, and ii) how to determine wages from those activities. For 
each of these, definitions must be identified in a manner that considers the way in which 
employment questions are asked in the surveys and that allow comparisons across 
industries for individuals within countries and across individuals living in different 
countries.  
 
In categorizing the labour time dimension beyond simple participation in labour 
markets, we are particularly interested in duration and frequency which helps get at the 
distinction between permanent, casual and seasonal workers. Duration is the length of 
time that a job has continuously been worked at by a specific person in a given time 
span, such as the number of months worked in the last year. The duration of a job can be 
considered as short as one day to as long as one year. Frequency refers to how often a 
job is worked at by an individual in a given time span, such as the number of hours per 
week during the duration of a particular job. Frequency can include a few hours per day 
or a few days a week up to a full day and a full week’s work. The duration of a job is an 
important issue to consider because it provides an understanding about the stability of 
the employment, as well as the continued opportunity it provides the employee to earn 
income over time. Both the duration of a job and the frequency of work may also 
influence the level of wage compensation provided in return for supplying labour. To 
operationalize this distinction in a manageable framework, when complete data is 
available, all employment is categorized into one of the following four classifications: i) 
Full Year-Full Time (FYFT), ii) Full Year-Part Time (FYPT), iii) Part Year-Full Time 
(PYFT), and iv) Part Year-Part Time (PYPT).41 These groups are intended to capture 
the labour time characteristics of each employment and reflect the predominant types of 
jobs that exist by distinguishing between full time, part time, seasonal, and casual 
labour, which is essential in this case, because each type of work presents a unique set 
of opportunities and challenges. 
 
Having categorized employment on the basis of labour time characteristics, we develop 
a methodology for determining earnings from those activities. This allows an 
understanding of which jobs provide employees with more lucrative opportunities. To 
get at the return to employment, earnings per a specific unit of time is required. While 
hourly earnings are often considered an ideal measure, choosing the best option requires 
considering the time units reported in each survey. For the purposes of this study, 
amount earned per day has been chosen as the standard wage estimate. This is due to the 
fact that days worked per month is a more common labour time measurement in surveys 
than hours per day or week. Furthermore, converting income earned to daily rates when 
it is reported per month requires clearer assumptions than converting to hourly wages 
which would require assumptions about the amount worked per day. That is, 
assumptions regarding days per month are less prone to create errors than hours per day 
which is more likely to vary. The common practice of asking about days per month and 
the easier conversion make daily wage the ideal measure of this study. 
 
                                                 
41 The precise definitions of these variables can be found in Quiñones et al (2008). 
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Daily wages are reported in local currency units and reporting basic comparisons is not 
particularly useful. Note, however, that examination of the daily wage data clearly 
shows that wage rates are generally skewed toward zero with a long right tail. 
Following standard convention, the natural log of daily wages is taken when reporting 
distributions as this mirrors a normal distribution. Since this is the case, in comparing 
wage distributions below the distribution of the natural log of wages is reported. 
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Appendix II 
 
We use Working’s (1943) semi-log approach and Leser’s (1963) modification to test 
our hypothesis regard the patterns of development. The Working-Leser approach relies 
on the assumption that expenditure shares are a function of the logarithm of total 
income. Our primary hypothesis is nearly the inverse of Engel’s law so it closely 
parallels the logic underlying the law. We assume that income shares are a function of 
the logarithm of household per capita income. Moreover, the similarity of our variables 
to those used in testing Engel’s law (income shares to expenditures shares, household 
per capita income to total income), naturally suggest the use of a modified Working-
Leser model. Building on this basic approach, we borrow from Deaton and Muellbauer 
(1986) by incorporating demographic effects into the system. The resulting model is 
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where income shares are assumed to be a function of the logarithm of household per 
capita income and demographic variables. Sf is the share of income earned from activity 
f (agricultural production, agricultural wage, non-farm wage, non-farm self 
employment, and other), nj is the number of persons in demographic category j (j = 
1,….J), n is the number of people per household, x is total income, and ε is a stochastic 
term, and á, β, and δ are terms to be estimated. Household demographic categories 
include household labour, female or male head of household, age and age squared of the 
head of household, religious and indigenous categories, and education disaggregated 
into four categories (less than primary school (baseline), primary school, secondary 
school, and high school or greater). As per capita income captures many features of 
wealth, such as infrastructure or productive assets, we have not included any other 
control variables. To account for heteroskedasticity, all reported coefficients are 
computed using robust standard errors. Since our econometric approach is essentially a 
semi-log model and we are primarily interested in the relationship between household 
per capita income and income shares, all reported income coefficients are transformed 
into elasticities. Finally, since the dependent variables may be censored due to the fact 
that some households do not participate in certain activities and are censored at share 
zero, results for both an ordinary least squares and censored regression model are 
reported. 
 
 
